Kyrgyzstan: in search for stability.

• Author: Gurbuz, Y. Emre
• Position: Essay

Kyrgyzstan achieved its independence in 1991 and entered a new phase of state-building. Over the years, it struggled to adjust to a liberal economic and political system, both of which were considered indispensable for stability. Kyrgyzstan borrowed an established state apparatus from the Soviet system but it had to be restructured to meet the needs of a pluralistic democratic system in accordance with the market economy. The heavy burden on Kyrgyz authorities was not only a shift in the economic and political structure but also the centralization of state functions in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. The adjustment had to be achieved successfully in order to improve the state's capacity for its survival in the post-Soviet world. In the last two decades following independence, failure to improve state capacity resulted in a permanent search for stability.

In the last two decades, Kyrgyzstan sought to expand state capacity and establish stability by both authoritarian and non-authoritarian measures. Kyrgyzstan also tried soft and hard authoritarianism under different presidents. Recently, Kyrgyzstan is one of the rare examples of a post-Soviet republic trying to solve the problem of stability by non-authoritarian measures. The first years of independence also started with non-authoritarian hopes for a pluralistic democracy under President Askar Akayev, which was later transformed into soft authoritarian rule. Increasing authoritarianism led to his overthrow by a popular revolt. Despite expectations, his successor President Kurmanbek Bakiyev moved from soft to hard authoritarianism, which was terminated by another popular revolt.

During the authoritarian regimes, state capacity was sought to be achieved through "despotic power." (1) Two popular revolts, however, proved the failure of authoritarianism for Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan can employ "infrastructural power," which refers to the "capacity of the state to actually penetrate to the society." (2) The recent Kyrgyz government aimed to establish a pluralistic, democratic and parliamentary system, which required an increase in economic resources and their redistribution. Authoritarian measures can be replaced by negotiation with different groups, which can be achieved by an increase in resources and their fair allocation.

A UN report underlines that "[a]uthoritarian approaches to building political capacity are ... unsustainable." (3) The report also argues that "poverty has been reduced the most in states where effective government power rests on a broad political base. In such cases, rulers have minimized the hold of upper classes on the state, successfully organized the middle and lower strata into an effective power bloc, and then used this power to channel resources to the poor," (4) which is a key factor for state capacity. For Kyrgyzstan, where public protests are a daily routine and ousted the president on two occasions, the allocation of resources through these channels is of utmost importance.

The two uprisings in Central Asia are generally explained within the context of the "Great Game" between Russia and the USA, denying the role of domestic conflicts and networks. Some other works examine the role of interest groups, coined as "elites," "clans," "tribes" or "interest groups," as the main mobilizers of society. The state then becomes just an arena for the struggle between different groups in Kyrgyzstan. (5) Both factors have some explanatory use in understanding the reasons beyond the "revolutions" (6) in Kyrgyzstan.

In this paper, however, the aim is to understand the recent process in Kyrgyzstan, which focuses on the shaky position of the state. The failed attempts at authoritarian rule have proved that Kyrgyzstan has to be an open, democratic society that shares resources within a wider society. However, a loose political structure with a minimal role for the state also has its deficiencies. Ethnic clashes between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in June 2010 and the cleavage between the North and South of Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the need to form an effective state apparatus. Thus, stability will be achieved not only by an increase in resources and their allocation, but also by improving state capacity, which necessitates the establishment of a certain level of state autonomy as mentioned by Michael Mann. (7)

Autonomy of the state refers to its "ability to formulate interests of its own, independent of or against the will of divergent societal interests." (8) According to Theda Skocpol, the state can act against the needs of classes, interest groups and other groups in society. It has an autonomous power because it is the only institution which can control the society within its boundaries, keep an army and enact taxes. Only the state can know where the dangers are because only the state possesses information about international affairs and internal conditions. No other social group can compete with the state in these spheres, which the state can use or abuse for its own benefit. (9)

According to Mann, the power sources of the state are economic, ideological and military but the state's autonomy does not just rely upon these monopolized functions. The autonomy of the state is the outcome of the state's ability to maneuver in a multifunctional environment and between cross-cutting social groups, who are in need of a state and regulations regarding the "protection of life and property." The state functions of "the maintenance of internal order," "military defense/aggression," "maintenance of communications infrastructure" and "economic redistribution" renders the state indispensable, and its monopoly on these functions creates the source of its autonomy. (10)

In Kyrgyzstan, however, these functions are not fully carried out by the state yet, which will be discussed and exemplified in this article. This paper will argue that one of the main reasons of this failure is the scarcity of the state's economic resources, which is also a reason behind the application of despotic power that led to authoritarianism. The multi-vectored (11) policy in Kyrgyzstan's international relations could give the state some autonomy above interest groups in society. These agreements are also the basis of new financial resources, which Kyrgyzstan needs for investment. Thus, international agreements are not only for the benefit of the state but also for interest groups and the general public.

This paper will first summarize the tenures of President Akayev and Bakiyev to illustrate the transition from democracy to soft and hard-authoritarianism. Then, the multitude of differences in Kyrgyzstan will be explained. Although these factors weaken state capacity, some of them could also force Kyrgyzstan to establish a pluralistic, democratic government. Additionally, this article will describe the state's attempts to increase resources with foreign assistance and create a stable government, noting the expectation that the search process for stability will increase the state's capacity in the end.

Akayev Years: From Democratic Promises to Soft-Authoritarianism

The authoritarian understanding aims to construct the state as an autonomous body of administration, which is an unquestionable employer of physical force and the prime mover in society separated from interest groups. (12) The deposed presidents of Kyrgyzstan also sought to use the state as a physical force. Although the first years of independence started with great hopes for democracy in Kyrgyzstan, it shifted to authoritarianism as a result of the failure to enlarge and allocate resources.

Kyrgyzstan's first attempt to restructure its dysfunctional economic system was through a "shock therapy" of privatization and other market reforms. While Kyrgyzstan is not rich in natural resources, it has neighbors like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with abundant hydrocarbon deposits. Market reforms and the formation of a trustworthy and stable banking system were expected to turn Kyrgyzstan into the "Switzerland of Asia." (13) During the Soviet period, Kyrgyzstan was dependent on the financial support of Moscow. (14) Although industry was developed in Kyrgyzstan, resources came from neighboring republics. (15) The collapse of the USSR meant the end of the transfer of resources. The Kyrgyz state could not even pay the...