Kurdish Votes in the June 24, 2018 Elections: An Analysis of Electoral Results in Turkey's Eastern Cities.

• Author: Alptekin, Huseyin
• Position: ARTICLE

This article analyzes Kurdish votes specifically for the June 24, 2018 elections by first addressing the political landscape in eastern and southeastern Turkey before these elections. It further elaborates on the pre-electoral status of the main actors of ethnic Kurdish politics -the People's Democratic Party (HDP), Free Cause Party (HUDA-PAR) and other small ethnic parties. Then the paper discusses the election results in the eastern and southeastern provinces where there is a high population density of Kurds. The June 24, 2018 elections were actually comprised of two elections: parliamentary and presidential. While this article addresses both elections, it primarily focuses on the general election results.

The elections held on June 24, 2018 made a lasting impact on the political life of Turkey. In a sense, this election was the most significant election in the history of Turkey since the first multi-party and democratic (1) general elections held in 1950. Turkey, which underwent the democratization process with the 1950 elections, decided to transform the system with the referendum of 2017 and made the actual transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential system with the June 24 elections.

Most of the proposed constitutional amendments included in the April 2017 referendum, with which Turkey adopted the presidential system, were implemented after the June 24 elections. In other words, the elections held on June 24 were the first elections of the new system of government (2) in Turkey.

The June 24 elections simultaneously elected the new president on the one hand (in other words, the first president of the new system) and on the other hand, identified the members of the parliament who are important in terms of executive-legislative balance in the new system. Kurdish votes played a key role in the June 24 elections in both respects (to constitute the majority in legislation and to elect the president).

Kurdish votes played a key role in the June 24 elections for two reasons. First, whether the HDP would exceed the 10 percent threshold in the parliamentary elections would determine the AK Party's chance to hold a majority in parliament. As explained below, most of the HDP seats in the parliament generally came from the eastern and southeastern provinces. There are no effective parties in the region, other than the AK Party and the HDP, and this has been the case since the 2002 elections even when considering the HDP's antecedent parties. Therefore, in a scenario that the HDP could not exceed the threshold, the party that would win most of the HDP seats from the eastern provinces would be the AK Party. This way, the AK Party would have won 50 more seats in the parliament and could hold the majority.

The second factor that rendered Kurdish votes noteworthy in the June 24 elections was directly related to the presidential election. Winning in the presidential elections requires 50%+1 votes in the first or second round. Just like any significant segment of society, the Kurdish votes could not be neglected if such a high rate of votes was to be achieved. For this reason, the Republican People's Party (CHP), which sought the HDP votes in the case of a second round being held in the presidential elections, and the lyi Party put micro Kurdish initiatives into practice in their election campaigns. While lyi Party chairwoman and presidential candidate Meral Aksener called for the release of the HDP's former co-leader Demirtas, who was imprisoned, (3) the CHP's presidential candidate Muharrem Ince did not stop there and went as far as to visit Demirtas at the prison in Edirne where he was jailed. (4) Hoping to obtain more votes, Ince used this visit as a campaign tool in the Hakkari rally, which took place right after his visit to Demirtas. As the mainstream opposition parties kept seeking a share of HDP votes in this way, the HDP largely maintained the position it used in the preceding election campaigns. While the HDP emphasized being a political party for Turkey in general, it highlighted a policy based on ethnic identity in east and southeast Turkey.

This was an election strategy that the HDP had previously used during the 2015 elections and it was particularly successful in the June 7, 2015 elections. The AK Party, which took part in the elections as the ruling party, aimed to preserve and even increase its votes as the only party that could be effective in the region apart from the HDP.

Small-scale ethnic parties in the region also made a tremendous impact before the June 24 elections in addition to the parties previously mentioned in the article. The Free Cause Party (HUDA-PAR) ran with independent candidates in Diyarbakir and Batman and with the party list in the rest of the country for parliamentary elections while supporting the AK Party candidate Erdogan in the presidential election. Other small-scale ethnic parties negotiated with the HDP and HUDA-PAR under a framework called the Kurdistani Bloc. However, unable to take what they wanted from these two parties, the bloc did not take a clear stance as a whole. For example, Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR), which was in the bloc for a while, decided to run with independent candidates in five provinces.

Under these circumstances, the results of the June 24 elections are as follows: (i) The AKP and the HDP continued to remain as the only two effective parties in the region, (ii) HDP votes in the region, which had diminished from the June 7, 2015 elections to the November 1 elections, decreased further in the June 24 elections, (iii) Election alliances of other parties cost seats to the HDP, (iv) It was once again observed that Kurdish voters in Turkey do not act as a bloc but intra-Kurdish and intra-regional differences prevail in voter behavior. (5)

Outlook Before the June 24 Elections

Since the 2002 general elections, the first election for the AK Party, the party has been in competition with the HDP and its predecessors (6) for Kurdish votes. From this perspective, the AK Party, along with the HDP and its predecessors, has become one of the two parties with which Turkeys Kurds are mobilized most in terms of political participation. In fact, in the 16 years since 2002, with the exception of the June 7, 2015 general elections, the AK Party has been the party most supported by Kurds in all local, parliamentary and presidential elections, and referendums in Turkey. (7) The AK Party's inclusion of fractions, which are economically and politically in the periphery of Turkish society, may be regarded as the structural reason for this support. This new economic and political mobilization has been possible with the AK Party's political and economic liberalization politics. (8) With such inclusive policies, the AK Party, which came to power with the November 3, 2002 elections, has considered the Kurdish issue a priority. (9)

In order to eliminate problems caused by the Kurdish Question, the AK Party has taken many rather reformist steps. The AK Party, which has passed many laws in regards to the teaching and use of Kurdish in public spaces as well as ensuring the enforcement of these laws, has enabled significant progress in terms of sociocultural rights. As Alptekin and Kose (10) emphasize, the AK Party has not confined itself to legal regulations while one by one removing the legal obstructions against the use and teaching of the Kurdish language. Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) began initiatives to launch a channel that would exclusively broadcast in Kurdish following the addition of the article "The institution can broadcast in different languages and dialects other than Turkish" within the scope of Law No. 5767 (Amendment to the Turkish Radio and Television Law and Laws that Regulate the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and Televisions (11) passed on June 11, 2008 and put into action on June 26, 2008). TRT Ses (TRT 6, or TRT Kurdi as it is known today), which began test broadcasts on December 25, 2008, started regular broadcasts in the Kurmanci and Sorani dialects of Kurdish as well as in the Zaza language on January 1, 2009. Kurdish language, taught by means of private courses since 2004, started to be taught as an elective course from the 5 (th) grade in the framework of "Living Languages and Dialects" course in the 2012-2013 academic year. Additionally, steps were taken for the teaching and academic study of Kurdish at universities. The first Kurdology Institute was founded within Mardin Artuklu University in 2009 after its approval by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. Later, the institute was renamed the Living Languages Institute and a Department of Kurdish Language and Culture was constituted within it.

The AK Party has also enabled a legal space for ethnic political movements. Ethnic Kurdish politics in the vein of the HDP has been the movement most plagued by the penalty of party closing actions in Turkey. The last party in the movement to be shut down was the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in 2009. By way of legal changes, the AK Party has made it more difficult to ban parties. With the 2010 constitutional referendum, it was regulated that 2/3 of the votes of the Supreme Court was necessary rather than the previously accepted 3/5 in order to shut down parties or stop them from receiving government aid, thus making it more difficult to take such punitive action.

One other important step was the initiative (as a bundle of recognition, negotiation, and reconciliation) processes undertaken by the AK Party in order to carry the Kurdish issue outside of the security domain. However, these processes were not able to eliminate violence caused by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror. The PKK's attacks ending the ceasefire period showed that it was not an actor to be conferred with. This reality has blockaded the path of negotiation and reconciliation processes for Turkey as of today and prioritized...