Kazakhstan's Multi-Vectorism and Sino-Russian Relations.

• Author: Omelicheva, Mariya Y.
• Position: ARTICLE

Introduction (1)

Little-known to the outside world in the wake of the Soviet Unions dissolution, Central Asia occupies a more prominent place in international affairs today. Its strategic importance in the geopolitical and energy calculi of Russia, China, and the United States, in addition to India, Turkey, Iran, and countries of Europe and Asia has grown in the recent decade. Among the five Central Asian republics, three have extensive oil and natural gas deposits. Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil and gas field is the sixth largest oil field in the world. With over 170 oil fields, the country possesses nearly three percent of global oil reserves, (2) and its proven gas reserves rank 15 (th) in the world. (3) In 2011, auditors from Gaffney, Cline & Associates estimated Turkmenistan's gas reserves as second only to Russia's proven natural gas reserves. The volume of Uzbekistan's natural gas deposits is modest compared to the natural endowments of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It nonetheless has an abundance of fossil fuels available for domestic consumption and export.

The growing presence of China, the world's largest energy consumer, in the Central Asian energy sector has been disconcerting to Russia, whose political clout in the region has been largely contingent on its access to energy resources and exclusive control over energy transportation routes. Many analysts have predicted that the colliding interests of Russia and China in Central Asia would inevitably lead to a rupture in the relationship between the two great powers. (4) Contrary to these grim predictions, Moscow and Beijing have been able to avoid political disputes. The dominant explanations for the placidity of Sino-Russian relations have given little heed to the role played by "secondary" states caught in the midst of the greater powers' competition over power, resources, and influence. Yet history is replete with examples of these less-powerful states escalating great powers' tensions and contributing to regional and global crises. The Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign an association agreement with the EU prompted mass protests in Ukraine that deposed the president but also provided a pretext for Russia's eventual annexation of Crimea. The Georgia-Russia "gas and wine wars" pitted Moscow against Europe and the U.S. These and other examples demonstrate how "secondary" states' foreign policy choices can have wider consequences and implications. (5)

This study illuminates the role of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy in preempting the emergence of issues conducive to the rise of tensions in Sino-Russian relations. By making tactical concessions to Moscow, while expanding its cooperation with Beijing, Kazakhstan has been able to deflate Russia's fear of losing its relative power position in the region. By leveraging big partners against each other, Astana has contributed to a balance of power in Central Asia where neither state has been able to have an upper hand in either the military-political or economic realm.

The article begins with an overview of the heightened competition over Central Asian energy resources followed by a brief discussion of explanations of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. In the second part, we examine the concrete strategies employed by the Kazakh government to safeguard its independence and to mitigate tensions in relations between Russia and China by means of multi-vectorism.

Conditions for Sino-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia

Central Asia has always mattered to Moscow. In the 1990s, Russia's economic, political, and military problems stymied the realization of the Kremlin's goal of regaining influence in the former Soviet states. The global economic situation at the beginning of the 21 (st) century was favorable to Russia's Central Asian ambitions, while the post-9/11 context provided Moscow with a pretext for stepping up its involvements in the regions security realm. During Vladimir Putins tenure as President and Prime Minister of Russia, Moscow significantly expanded its security and economic cooperation with the Central Asian states. Russia leveraged its access to Central Asian natural resources and control over energy transportation routes to promote its geopolitical and economic interests in the region.

From an economic standpoint, the resale of cheap Central Asian gas and oil to European customers, and the use of imported energy for government-subsidized domestic consumption, afforded Russia considerable direct benefits at a time of high world market prices for energy resources. The Russian monopoly over gas and oil transportation routes provided the Kremlin with a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations for lower import prices on Central Asian gas and oil. (6) From a geopolitical perspective, exerting control over Central Asian energy resources became a viable strategy for reasserting Russian influence not only over the Central Asian republics, but also Ukraine and Georgia by means of rerouting cheap natural gas to these energy-dependent republics trying to escape Moscow's orbit of influence. The domination of Central Asian energy exports also awarded the Russian government significant leverage vis-a-vis member-states of the European Union dependent on Russia's energy supplies.

Russia's monopolistic aspiration in the Central Asian energy sector has been challenged by China's rapidly growing energy demands. (7) While the bulk of China's oil imports originate in the Middle East, Central Asian energy resources have become increasingly attractive to the Chinese government due to the ongoing political instability in the Persian Gulf region and the remoteness of the Middle East petroleum wells. Beijing has invested heavily in oil and gas field development in Central Asia, as well as in constructing or renovating the pipelines' infrastructure to meet its demand for energy resources. Simultaneously with China's growing presence in the Central Asian fossil fuels market, Chinese state enterprises have made inroads into various economic and industrial sectors of the Central Asian states. By 2007, China had surpassed Russia as the major trade partner in Central Asia with Astana becoming Beijing's largest trading partner in the region. (8) The 2008 global financial crisis further undermined Russia's dominant position in the Central Asian energy sector. The diversification of energy networks allowed the Central Asian governments to strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis Moscow, which had been forced to pay near market price for Central Asian gas and oil.

Most of the analyses of Russian foreign policy consider it as an exemplar of realpolitik behavior explainable by the tenets of political realism. (9) Realists of all genres characterize international politics in zero-sum terms and emphasize the enduring propensity for conflict among states vying for power and domination. (10) The extent to which a state engages in power politics depends on its relative power position. In other words, a state's foreign policy is ultimately driven by shifts in the distribution of power within an international system. In Central Asia, Chinas rise has resulted in changes in Russia's relative power position in the region. Given the centrality of energy politics to Russia's international and regional standing, China, which has broken Russia's monopoly on the transportation networks and eroded its share of the Central Asian energy market, represents a geopolitical rival to Moscow in the region. (11) Subsequently, Russia and China have long been expected to experience increased tension in their bilateral relations. (12) Why hasn't Russia resorted to the familiar power politics consistent with realpolitik in its relations with Beijing?

Russia and China's shared interests in maintaining a broader strategic partnership have been frequently noted as a mitigating factor to their conflicting aspirations. Signed into the 2001 Sino-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing was fueled by fears of NATO's eastward expansion. The Sino-Russian cooperation was cemented by shared apprehension and dismay over Western meddling in the domestic politics of sovereign states in the wake of the "color" revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004-2005), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). Today, Russia and China continue challenging the U.S.-led liberal international order by establishing and promulgating their own rules for managing international relations and global security.

The lack of attention to the Chinese vector in Russian foreign policy has also been accounted for by the...