Kazakhstan's Middle Power Response to Terrorism.

• Author: Kurmashev, Aidar
• Position: ARTICLE

Introduction

Currently, the increased role of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) in international relations and their influence on the world political processes is obvious, being recognized virtually by all observers and researchers. (1) Since the end of the last century the issue of relations between states and ANSAs was the subject of extensive research and had spawned a lively theoretical discussion, (2) the importance of which goes far beyond the academic framework.

Since 2000, in his Addresses to the Nation, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been focusing on the challenges wrought by the transnational flows of financial transactions, trade, information, and diverse migration, whose volume and turbulence have surged beyond the ability of governments to manage them. One negative effect of these flows, is transnational terrorism, which pools together not only in underdeveloped countries with unstable political regimes, (3) but tends to recruit adherents from anywhere in the world. Thus, a massive invasion of non-state actors in world politics is undoubtedly an important phenomenon, transforming the state system in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Kazakhstan, due to its geopolitical position and permanent changes in international politics, is particularly vulnerable to the threats from the ANSAs. Every year, extremist and terrorist activities are becoming more organized and new recruits are being attracted to such groups under the influence of certain internal and external forces (see Table 1). This can be evidenced by the detention of 70 foreigners in the last five years who were involved in the activities of international extremist or terrorist organizations in Kazakhstan. (4)

As a result of the subversive activities of ANSAs, Kazakhstan experienced acts of terrorism in the western and southern parts of its territory. During 2011-2012, 12 violent actions were committed. According to statistics from 2008 to 2013, the number of people convicted of terrorist crimes increased from 27 to 171, and for extremist crimes -from 56 to 168 persons. (5)

Fleeing the Syrian-Iraqi zone, most extremist and terrorist groups have a critical need to replenish their ranks with new recruits to form ancillary infrastructure and additional channels of financing. During the last four years, 440 Kazakhstani recruits have been disallowed to enter the zones of terrorist activity (2014: 136 recruits, 2015: 151 recruits, 2016: 91 recruits, 2017: 62 recruits). (6) Despite the measures taken, the problem of Kazakhstani citizens' participation in terrorist activities abroad continues to be relevant.

The most serious threat is expected from the militants or citizens trained in shady foreign theological schools, who come back to their home country. Intensive propaganda of radicalism and terrorism in Kazakh society is able to instigate inter confessional war. 125 citizens of Kazakhstan have been returned or independently returned from the camps of international terrorist organizations or from third countries supporting terrorists and 57 of them were charged with participation in terrorist activities. (7)

Moreover, there is an improvement in the quality of the technical, artistic and psychological components of the information and propaganda materials posted by terrorist organizations on the Internet. The use of social networks allows emissaries of international terrorist organizations to significantly expand their audience in Kazakhstan. This has caused particular categories of citizens to become more aggressive as well as lose their sense of patriotism and national identity, cultural, moral and family values. The uncontrolled development of these processes is thought to increase the number of people sharing radical ideas, leading to an escalation of violence in society. This is confirmed by the tragic events that occurred in 2016 in the cities of Aktobe and Almaty, where 17 and 5 people respectively, died as a result of terrorist acts. (8)

Now that the country appears to have overcome the peak of attacks, though still experiencing some displays of radicalization, it makes one wonder how Kazakhstan with functional but fledging institutions of a middle state is managing to respond to challenges from ANSAs. The answer lies in revealing patterns of attitudes that the country has taken against terrorist organizations to the extent that 'middle-power-ness' allows. To understand better how Kazakhstan exerts its influence on ANSAs, the article considers not only the state's own policy but also its institutional capability to thwart ANSAs, positioning the country's image in the world and international state of affairs.

Methodology

How Kazakhstan's fight against terrorism is shaped by its middle state capabilities is discussed in three sections. The first section attempts to test if Kazakhstan can be regarded as a middle state. This is done through qualitative evaluation of compliance between empirical indicators and criteria claimed to be typical for middle states. The second section is to explore approaches taken by the Kazakh state to counteract extremism and terrorism. Both domestic measures and international initiatives are considered to expose the nature of the chosen attitude. The study also uses a dialectical method to systematize the strength and weaknesses of the approach. The third section argues on the extent to which Kazakhstan's behavior towards armed non-state actors is determined by its middle state capacity. In this section, using the methodology of discourse analysis, we shall touch on the orientation of public policy, institutional and organizational capacity, external forces and transnational bonds straddling state borders, security and economic concerns, and perception of adversaries outside the immediate neighborhood that have all marked the current course of policy against ANSAs.

Kazakhstan as a Middle Power

There is no conceptual consensus behind the definition of the sizes of states by referring to them as smaller or greater powers. However, it is commonly agreed that their behavior in the international arena tends to differ. The problem with defining categories of states concerns the issue of what the measure should be. The scholars who address this issue can be classified into three groups: (i) those who believe the smallness or greatness of states is directly measurable in certain parameters, (ii) those who suppose that it is the perception or will of the world community that determines whether a state should be regarded as smaller or larger, (iii) those who are convinced that the powerfulness of a state derives from its international behavior. To avoid further debates on the validity of particular measurements, scholars have classified states according to a combination of quantitative and relational criteria. (9)

As an implication, scholars suggest certain types of international behavior derived from the classification. For example, referring to a country as a small state often implies that this state does not exert any influence over world politics and whose opinion is disregarded in the international community. At the same time, middle states, which lie between big and small powers, aspire to become normative mediators and seek compromising positions in various global disputes. They also try to expand their influence and recognition in regional and global governance. Middle power diplomacy's main trait appears to be a foreign policy that respects international norms and law, seeks to get together with like-minded' states to be an instrumental bridge between developed and developing countries. (10) They want to get a 'niche' in which they focus their resources on certain areas to get desirable results. (11)

As for great powers like those at the time of the Concert of Europe, when Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austro-Hungary and Russia were the main decision makers, or superpowers like the U.S. and USSR at the time of Cold War, Keohane (12) defines 'system-influencing' states to be those which cannot individually dominate a system but may nevertheless be able to significantly influence its nature through unilateral as well as multilateral actions. 'System-determining' states are to play a critical role in shaping the system: the 'imperial power' in a unipolar system or the two superpowers in a bipolar system.

According to the aforementioned findings, Kazakhstan can be referred to as a middle state for several reasons. Kazakhstan's territory is 2,724,900 km (2), making it the 9 (th) largest state in the world by its size. (13) Although in economic terms Kazakhstan's capacity is still around small state level, as the country's nominal GDP has not yet exceeded the world's average, accounting for $9,220 per capita compared to world's average of $11,310 per capita, Kazakhstan's purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP is twice as high as emerging market and developing economies' PPP GDP, making up $26,930 against $12,430 per capita respectively. (14) Another quantitative indicator, demography, can be circumvented as it is widely agreed that having a large population does not guarantee powerfulness of the state. (15) Kazakhstan has a population of only 18,157,100 people, (16) but engages in a number of international initiatives from the world disarmament process to chairmanship in different international organizations including the UN Security Council. In addition, despite the fact that Kazakhstan does not...