Israel's COVID-19 Diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Europe.

• Author: Hasanoglu, Eldar

Introduction

Srael's aid diplomacy efforts extend back to the early 1950s, when the newly established state, striving to diversify its diplomatic relations and gain support in intergovernmental organizations, launched various aid initiatives. In terms of humanitarian and development aid, the most important initiative of the Israeli government was the establishment of the Agency for International Development Cooperation (MASHAV) in 1958. Since then, alongside providing humanitarian assistance to over 140 nations, MASHAV has engaged in hundreds of joint development projects and directly trained more than 300,000 individuals in areas in which Israel has accumulated experience, particularly in public health, education, and agriculture. (1) Combined with bilateral trade and weapons sales, these development and humanitarian assistance efforts facilitated the establishment of sound bilateral relations with many nations. Therefore, MASHAV has been one of the backbones of Israeli diplomacy, particularly vis-a-vis the developing world. However, in recent years, the near paralyzation of government ministries due to consecutive elections and the slashing of overseas aid budgets amid financial hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, significantly reduced Israeli development assistance through MASHAV. According to Gil Haskel, director of the agency for the last eight years, the lack of budget for MASHAV's consultancies and training courses constitutes a "strategic hit to Israel's presence and international reputation." (2) Nonetheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be an opportunity for Israel to achieve diplomatic gains. From the early stages of the pandemic, the Israeli leadership has embarked on the so-called "COVID-19 diplomacy." COVID-19 diplomacy is a novel term that began to appear in media outlets circa mid-2020. Lacking an exact definition in the scientific discourse, "COVID-19 diplomacy" was initially used to refer to China's extensive personal protective equipment (PPE) donations and deployment of Chinese medical teams (3) to countries that faced increasing infection rates amid severe equipment and manpower shortages, (4) to shore up China's international image and strengthen its bilateral relations. (5) The term later gained substantial popularity in academia as well as global media, as other high and medium-level income countries, particularly, inter-alia, Russia, Turkiye, and India, began to undertake similar aid initiatives. By the end of the first year of the pandemic, vaccines have emerged as the linchpin of the global struggle against COVID-19. In this context, overtaking the donations of PPE, test kits, and ventilators, vaccines have become the most important element of COVID-19 diplomacy initiatives. Many vaccine-producing countries, especially China (6) and Russia, (7) have pledged to donate large quantities of vaccines, mainly to middle and low-income countries, and have signed agreements for local vaccine production. In addition, some non-producer countries have also donated their surplus stock of acquired vaccines to countries that experience difficulties in acquiring enough doses to immunize their frontline medical workers or general populations.

This article will analyze the COVID-19 diplomacy initiative undertaken by Israel to strengthen its existing partnerships and forge new ones. While many other countries with similar economic development levels have undertaken large-scale COVID-19-related aid programs to shore up their global image and influence, Israel's COVID-19 diplomacy initiative has been more limited in terms of both scope and geography. Since April 2020, the Israeli government has deployed Israeli medical teams, donated PPE, and shipped surplus vaccines to approximately 20 countries, the overwhelming majority of which have long-standing strategic cooperation with Israel. (8) These recipient countries included Kazakhstan, Panama, Ethiopia, Nepal, Mexico, Chile, Kenya, Nepal, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Uzbekistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Cameroon, Guatemala, Rwanda, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Italy, and Honduras. This analysis focuses on Israel's COVID-19 diplomacy efforts in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Europe, the two regions that have witnessed substantially increased Israeli involvement in recent years, as explained in more detail below. The goal is to outline political and strategic calculations behind the Israeli government's decision to extend COVID-19-related assistance to certain countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Europe and assess the impact of Israel's COVID-19 diplomacy initiative.

The research method employed in this study is qualitative, and the authors used both primary and secondary sources, including, inter-alia, documents from governmental websites, United Nations (UN) vote records, articles published in peer review journals and newspaper reports, to review Israeli foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa and Central Europe, and outline what activities Israel's COVID-19 diplomacy efforts comprised. The UN data used for this article are recorded in the UN Digital Library and UN Watch databases. The UN Digital Library data covers all UN General Assembly (UNGA) and UN Security Council (UNSC) sessions from 1946 onward, and the dataset created by UN Watch allows cross-comparison of voting patterns of different countries on resolutions concerning Israel since 2015. Where available, the authors also analyzed statements of Israeli officials concerning COVID-19 related assistance to explore the key themes of Israeli rhetoric and lay out how they justified assisting certain countries.

Israeli Foreign Policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa

In 2017, during his address at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Heads of State and Government Summit in Liberia, Benjamin Netanyahu, then-Prime Minister of Israel, stated that Africa is among Israel's top national and international priorities. Indeed, over the last decade, the Israeli leadership has relentlessly worked toward restoring diplomatic relations that were severed during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and developing extensive economic, security, and political ties with the continent, to extend its sphere of influence. Israel's strategy predominantly focuses on deepening ties with sub-Saharan nations. With a constantly growing population exceeding 1.1 billion, sub-Saharan Africa is home to some of the fastest-growing economies in the world. It offers an important potential market for Israel's exports in multiple areas, such as agricultural technology, irrigation, solar energy, and military goods. Israeli policymakers aim to establish strong commercial ties with sub-Saharan Africa to diversify Israel's export markets, thus reducing over-dependence on certain markets in Europe and North America.

Although economic issues also play a significant role, the Israeli policymakers' main goal is to win the region to Israel's side in intergovernmental organizations to alter the unfavorable balance of votes; sub-Saharan African countries have almost one-quarter of the seats at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In 2017, during a meeting with Israel's ambassadors to African nations, Netanyahu declared that Israel's first interest in Africa is "to dramatically change the situation regarding African votes at the UN and other international bodies from opposition to support." (9) Moreover, Israel's foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa places great emphasis on security cooperation, as the stability of the region, particularly of the Horn of Africa, is vital for Israel's national security. The spread of al-Qaeda and al-Shabab in the region poses a direct threat to Israel's maritime security, assets, and investments. For instance, the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which was attacked by al-Shabab militants in 2013, is reportedly owned by Israelis. (10) Furthermore, Israel faces domestic pressure from sub-Saharan illegal immigration. So much so that, by 2012, illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers from the region represented nearly 1 percent of Israel's population. Although measures taken by the Israeli government, including constructing a fence along the border with Egypt and providing financial assistance for voluntary departures to third countries, led to a substantial decrease in the number of illegal immigrants, a significant number of people from sub-Saharan Africa still try to cross into Israel to seek asylum.

Israel's COVID-19 Diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa Donation of PPE

The COVID-19 pandemic caught the world off guard, as most countries initially experienced severe shortages of PPE for frontline medical workers. The steep rise in demand for PPE quickly overwhelmed the global medical equipment industry, which triggered price gouging and export bans. Despite the initial shock, the medical equipment industry quickly adapted to the increased demand, and, within a few months, the shortage of PPE largely ceased to exist in high and middle-income countries. Nevertheless, many low-income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, still experience severe shortages of PPE. In a continuation of its recent thrust into the region, Israel donated PPE to several sub-Saharan African countries.

In April 2020, Cameroon became the first African state to receive Israel's COVID-19-related humanitarian assistance, as the Embassy of Israel in Yaounde donated hundreds of 3D-printed face shields to the Cameroonian government. The shields were produced by the 3D High-Tech Centre at the National Advanced School of Engineering (Polytechnique) in Yaounde, which was established with the assistance of an Israeli company and uses Israeli technology and equipment. (11) During the donation ceremony, the Ambassador of Israel to Cameroon, Isi Yanouka, stated that the face shields, initially intended for Cameroonian healthcare personnel, could later be exported to other African countries. (12) Cameroon is...