Israel and the Syrian Crisis: Ardent Desire and Restrain Risk.

• Author: Hazran, Yusri

Introduction

Examining the Israeli response to the uprisings in Syria, this article argues that Israel regarded the outbreak of the popular riots therein as a golden opportunity for the removal of the Ba'ath regime, a primary link in the Iranian 'axis of evil.' The strategies the Israeli government has adopted toward Syria have been heavily influenced by the view prevalent among ruling circles and academics alike--namely, that the country serves as a stronghold against Israel, buttressed by its alliance with Iran. Israel's readiness to intervene in Syria has nonetheless been mitigated by what is refered to herein as the 'Lebanese syndrome' -the fear of further entanglement a la the First Lebanese War. In order to evince the association between the Lebanese syndrome and the non-involvement strategy, the present contribution briefly reviews the Israeli perspective on the 'Arab Spring.' The following three sections then analyze the features of the Lebanese syndrome, Syria's conceptualization as a hostile entity and the Israeli plan for the country's dismantlement, and Israeli strategy with regard to the uprisings and the civil war in Syria in light of the link between the historical enmity between the two states and the ongoing effects of the Lebanese syndrome. Demonstrating that, despite the belief that Syria is a bastion of resistance to Israel and the Israeli commitment to dissolving the 'axis of evil,' Israel has chosen not to become involved, this article contends that this restraint derives first and foremost from the deterrent weight of the Lebanese syndrome.

Israel and the 'Arab Spring' Uprisings

The popular uprisings that erupted in Tunisia and Egypt took Israeli political, military, and academic bodies by surprise. Its first reaction was thus shock at the overthrow of regimes it had long regarded as moderate, anti-Islamist, pro-Western, and in favor of peace with Israel. Israeli officialdom, media, and intellectual circles focused primarily on the events in Egypt, a neighbor of particular political, security, and economic relevance. While many feared the Islamist alternative in light of its potential impact on the existing status quo, the outbreak of the uprising in Syria allayed Israel's concerns, giving rise to hopes for the collapse of the "axis of evil" stretching from Tehran to Beirut.

Before the Syrian uprising, the Israeli perception of the Arab popular uprisings had been melancholic, bleak, and pessimistic. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011, then-Prime Minister Netanyahu extended his hand in peace to the Libyans and Tunisians in their attempt to establish democracy--as well as to the Syrians, Lebanese, and Iranians struggling against unjust, oppressive regimes. Conspicuous for its absence in this speech was Egypt, Israel's peace partner. (1)

Discussion of the outbreak of the uprisings in Syria and the ensuing civil war lies beyond our present brief, with numerous studies have already addressed this subject. (2) Still, to a large extent, the outbreak of the uprisings in Syria has been perceived as a form of "compensation" of sorts for the swift fall of the Mubarak regime--a supporter of stability in the region and promoter of peace. The longer the revolt has gone on, the more it has raised hopes in ruling Israeli circles that the regime's fall would weaken Iran's axis of evil. The two approaches are divided by an insurmountable fence--the bloody legacy of the Lebanese Israeli experience. The stamp this has imprinted on the Israeli historiographical discourse demonstrates the influence the Lebanese syndrome exerts. Unpacking the elements of the Lebanese syndrome reveals the force it exerts on Israeli public and national consciousness in diverse contexts, in particular--for our present purposes--the Israeli attitude toward the Syrian regime.

What Is the Lebanese Syndrome?

Known in the Israeli public and academic discourse as the First Lebanon War (1982), this campaign is both perceived and presented as forming part of Israel's traumatic history. While this view finds expression in diverse contexts beyond the scope of the present article, a number of historical details support the notion that the war constituted a national trauma. The titles of numerous books written in the first decade following its eruption--A War of Deception, Another War, Snowball, The Lebanese Labyrinth, etc.--reflect precisely such a reading. The syndrome can be summarized in four points.

Firstly, the First Lebanon War was undertaken at Israel's own will and whim. Unlike Israel's other campaigns -1948, 1967, and 1973- the military operation undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was not supported by a national consensus. Its voluntary nature thus caused much frustration and resentment. The controversy over the Second Lebanese War stemmed directly from the first, its goal is to fulfill the Great Oranim Plan. (3) The fact that Israel initiated a war that did not, according to its critics, realize its aims exacerbated the bitterness over a large number of casualties, harm to Israel's reputation, and ongoing enmeshment to which it led. Arye Naor, Israeli secretary of state between 1977 and 1982, quotes a military officer close to Sharon as saying that, despite substantial reservations, Ariel Sharon's appointment as minister of defense was understood as indicating Begin's firm resolve to embrace the military option. (4)

Secondly, it was a war of deception in two senses:

(i) Ariel Sharon's appointment as Minister of Defense constituted a watershed in internal Israeli politics, being viewed as a duping of the prime minister, government, and Israeli public into a grandiose plan that never had any chance of succeeding. As veteran Israeli journalists Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari observe:

Born of the ambition of one willful, reckless man, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was anchored in delusion, propelled by deceit, and bound to end in calamity. It was a war for whose meager gains Israel has paid an enormous price that has yet to be altogether reckoned; a war whose defensive rationale belied far-reaching political aims and an unconscionably myopic policy... [that] drew Israel into a wasteful adventure that drained much of its inner strength and cost the IDF the lives of over 500 of its finest men in a vain effort to fulfill a role it was never meant to play. (5) (ii) Israel was deceived and ultimately betrayed by its Maronite allies. The core argument is that the Maronites--specifically the Phalanges--deliberately duped Israel, drawing it into the Lebanese quagmire to strike a mortal blow against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Syrian army's military and organizational presence without any intention of keeping their word to join the fighting at some stage to remove the PLO from Beirut.

Israeli historiography of the Jewish State's relations with Lebanon has largely theorized that Israel was misled, in particular, by the Phalanges led by Bashir Gemayel. As Jacques Neriah, Rabin's political advisor and a great admirer of Gemayel, notes: "To a certain extent, Bachir was not honest about his real intentions, or at the very least was very unclear about his plans for peace." (6)

Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari sharpen the idea of Christian betrayal even further: "The Christian leaders misled Sharon into trusting in the [IDF's] power to impose sovereignty on the state, deceiving him with regard to their true intentions--even though today the party leaders claim that they explained the considerations and spoke clearly." (7)

Thirdly, in addition to the military and political failure, the historical discourse regarding the First Lebanon War is grounded in the belief that Israel was convinced that the IDF could destroy the PLO and establish a pro-Israel regime that would lead to peace between Israel and other Arab states. These assumptions proved specious almost immediately after the IDF's entry into Lebanon. Israeli historiographical, media and academic discourse regarding the Lebanon War also propounds that the human sacrifice was completely avoidable. Many Israeli public figures thus maintain that its instigators set unrealistic goals that exceeded Israel's military and political capabilities--first and foremost, a new political order in Lebanon. As Schiffer observes:

Israel's ability to influence the establishment of a strong Lebanese government was an illusion--a government formed under Israel's aegis that would last until the IDF left Lebanon. The Christians--of whatever denomination--only had a short-term interest in collaborating with Israel, nothing more. It is a mistake to think that Christians are united in their worldview regarding what happens in Lebanon. Different factions exist that while appearing to cooperate with one another the moment the IDF departs, and they have no one to depend on, will begin to argue among themselves. It is difficult to estimate the consequences. (8) Israeli sociologist Gadi Yatziv, one of the founders of the Peace Now movement that emerged as part of the public protest against the First Lebanon War, espouses a closely corresponding line. In his view, while Israel set itself unachievable goals from the outset, the primary decision-maker sought to frame it in broad political and strategic terms, even promising that it would yield great benefits. The efforts to 'make order'--whether on a trivial or significant level--solely by force of arms, thereby imposing a 'new political order,' electing a president, 'cleansing territory,' defeating the PLO, and signing a peace agreement with Lebanon on the basis of one successful war were all considered great folly as early as the end of the 20th century and the end of colonialism. (9)

Gemayel's assassination in September 1982 opened up Pandora's box that compounded Israel's entanglement in Lebanon, damaging its international reputation, creating intolerable economic burdens, and deepening the...