Is a New Opening Possible in Turkiye-EU Relations?

• Author: Kose, Talha

Many foreign policy analysts referred to Turkiye's May 14 and 28, 2023 general elections as the most important elections of 2023. Experts, journalists, politicians, and communities from across the world, starting with the West, followed the election very closely, and it resulted in yet another victory for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the People's Alliance, and the AK Party. President Erdogan's re-election was considered an unexpected development in Europe and many Western countries. That surprise stemmed from the fact that decision-makers and the public opinion in Turkiye and the West were misled or misinformed by "experts" and "pollsters." Having been caught by surprise in the presidential election's first round, local and foreign circles concluded that Erdogan would win the second round by a comfortable margin. Accordingly, we witnessed a barrage of congratulatory messages as soon as Erdogan's victory became a certainty.

Erdogan missing the first-round victory by a tiny margin and his ability to clinch re-election despite facing a broad coalition of rivals earned the respect of international observers. It is important to recall that many Western analysts had speculated that the Turkish president would not consent to a peaceful transfer of power if he were to lose. Yet the election took place in a transparent and peaceful manner. The calm that was witnessed during and after that election served to bust negative myths about Turkiye and President Erdogan. At the same time, the West's democratic reservations about strengthening its relations with Turkiye and negative perception of Erdogan's personality weakened due to the Turkish leader's post-election statements and the professionalism of his new cabinet.

Indeed, the members of Erdogan's new cabinet have the necessary background to develop a more balanced and more positive political and economic relationship with the West within the context of foreign policy and the economy. Turkiye's Western counterparts, too, have made that observation. Specifically, the assignment of Hakan Fidan and Ibrahim Kalin as leaders of foreign policy and intelligence was a welcome development by Western diplomatic circles. Likewise, international economic and financial circles welcomed the tasking of Cevdet Yilmaz, Mehmet Simsek, and their teams including the governor of the Central Bank Hafize Gaye Erkan with the economy's management. Some media outlets and think tanks in Europe and the U.S., too, have already signaled their optimism regarding this new chapter with Turkiye. It is possible to expect those parties to disseminate such messages more strongly as the relevant relationships translate into practice.

Turkiye's disagreements with the U.S. and the European Union over counter-terror measures and particularly the PKK/PYD presence in Syria persists. Furthermore, there are ongoing problems linked to migration, the Eastern Mediterranean (including Cyprus and Greece), and the suspension of Turkiye's EU membership process. The way those issues will be managed shall play a crucial role in the future of relations. The positive atmosphere that emerged after the May 2023 elections could potentially generate positive momentum in Turkiye's relations with the European Union and the U.S.

This study analyzes the reasons behind problems that occurred in Turkiye-EU relations over the last two decades and discusses the steps that may be taken to overcome the above-mentioned challenges after the May 14 and 28 elections as well as potential future scenarios.

A New Era in Relations with the West?

The Turkish elections were highly relevant to the country's relations with the West as well as Europe and the European Union. Over the previous two years, the relationship had reached a standstill that hurt the interests of both sides. It is necessary to analyze Turkiye's relations with the West by focusing on four main pillars: relations with the Euroatlantic front, relations with the European Union and bilateral relations with European countries. Those relationships collectively determine the nature of Turkiye's relations with the West. The fourth pillar consists of Western-oriented international organizations, treaties, and norms. The U.S., the European Union and prominent European states previously reacted and responded in different ways within the context of their relations with Turkiye. In recent years, however, those three players or groups have grown similar to each other. It goes without saying that the U.S. has been the main architect of that approach under President Joe Biden. After all, the U.S. continues to play a defining role in the Euroatlantic security axis--which includes NATO. In the past, it was possible for Turkiye and the European Union to keep a lid on their disagreements thanks to the strategic visions and constructive contributions of the U.S. and the United Kingdom. In this regard, those two countries stepped in and addressed disputes with their strategic approaches. Yet the U.S. and the European Union (except member states like Hungary, Poland, and Romania) have largely aligned their respective perspectives. That development largely yielded negative results for Turkiye, whose policies have occasionally differed from its Western partners within the context of NATO and other international organizations.

The West's relations with Turkiye and attitude toward the country became much more coordinated since Joe Biden's election as U.S. president. Since 2020, Turkiye's relations with the West have taken a negative turn under Washington's coordination. Moreover, the West's dream of an "Erdogan-less Turkiye" has kept its relations with the country extremely shallow and stagnant. In the end, that situation created a lose-lose scenario for Turkiye and the West. It is highly likely that Erdogan's re-election as president on May 28 with impressive popular support shall reverse the downturn of relations with the West that began in 2013. Initial signals from Washington and European capitals indeed support that claim. The main reason behind that shift was not that the West instantly came to think of Erdogan as a positive figure. Instead, it was the number of mutually important issues that must be resolved. Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, tensions in the Balkans, security in the Eastern Mediterranean and hydrocarbon projects, the fight against irregular migration, creating the middle corridor with Asia, European energy security, counter-terror measures, and NATO's enlargement are among the many issues that the West cannot address without Turkiye's constructive contributions. Over the last decade, European political stakeholders and decision-makers have become aware of that fact. Which is why they will no doubt support speedy normalization with Turkiye on the basis of mutually important issues and functional matters.

Why Turkiye's Relations with the EU Deteriorated

Although the AK Party governments initially made progress toward EU membership, their enthusiasm and motivation faded over time. From 2006 on, the Union's various moves and attempts by some European politicians to exploit the debate over Turkish accession (1) slowed down the negotiations and even brought talks to a standstill in certain areas. Furthermore, Europe witnessed economic turmoil ahead of the 2008 global financial crisis and the political repercussions of such developments rendered the continent more inward-oriented and ultimately less enthusiastic about enlargement. At the same time, Europe's emerging political leaders began to distance themselves from the continent's liberal values as right-wing and left-wing populism gained ground in the political arena. (2) Accordingly, the vision for value-based expansion encountered certain political obstacles. Certainly, the least expected outcome of that process was Britain's decision to leave the European Union. It is important to note that Brexit deprived Turkiye of a major supporter within the Union.

Turkiye's post-2010 foreign policy and domestic political preferences deepened its disagreements with the European Union. The accession talks, which had slowed down in 2008, approached a complete standstill by 2016. Specifically, structural...