Iran versus ISIL.

• Author: Devine, James
• Position: COMMENTARY - Essay

Despite its outward appearance, Iran's involvement in the war against ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) defies simple sectarian explanations. (1) While ISIL might be motivated by its hatred for all things Shi'a, Tehran has not always rushed to the aid of its coreligionists. Instead, its support has been selective and strategic. This is true again, as it confronts the ISIL. It does not have the guns, troops or air power to threaten Iranian territory. Nevertheless, it poses a multidimensional threat to its core interests. Tehran's response, therefore, is more about realpolitik than religion. Nevertheless, because of the sectarian divisions in the region, and the ideological schism with the United States there are deep contradictions within Iran's strategy for dealing with ISIL, and its long-term effectiveness is an open question.

Iranian Realpolitik

Despite the religious foundation of the state, Iranian support for its Shi'a neighbors has actually been quite checkered. After the Kuwait crisis in 1991, Tehran did not intervene when Saddam Hussein brutally put down a Shi'a rebellion in the south of Iraq. Similarly, Iran backed Armenia against predominantly Shi'a Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Iran also deferred to Russian interests and withdrew support from Shi'a militias during the Tajik civil war. Of course, Tehran has backed the Shi'a organization Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shi'a groups scattered across the Persian Gulf. However, this support has always been consistent with Tehran's broader regional objectives and its national security interests.

Tehran's regional strategy is built around escaping western-led containment, deterring military attacks from either the U.S. or Israel, and insulating Iran's borders from regional instability. ISIL threatens this strategy on multiple levels. First of all, ISIL threatens Iran's regional alliance network. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Tehran has invested a great deal in cultivating ties with the more than 20 Shi'a political parties that make up the National Iraqi Alliance. Tehran helped put Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in power, and then played an instrumental role in having him removed and replaced by Haider al-Abadi when it became evident he was not the man to handle the ISIL situation. For a country as isolated as Iran, the importance of having a friendly government on the border cannot be overstated.

Even with Saddam Hussein out of the picture, Tehran would see a Sunni led Iraq as a political and military threat. The friendly Shi'a government in Baghdad has also been a bulwark against a potential American invasion of Iran. If ISIL succeeds in redrawing the Iraqi border much of this will be lost. Iran might still have a friendly Shi'a government in Baghdad, but it would not have the same strategic impact. There would be a new hostile "Caliphate" dangerously close to the Iranian border, and an independent Kurdish state that would make a likely ally for both Israel and the United States.

ISIL also threatens Iran's relationship with Bashar al-Assad and the Ba'thist regime in Syria. The civil war appears to be mired in a stalemate at the moment and the infighting between the various opposition groups has given the al-Assad regime some breathing room. However, ISIL represents a much more coherent and effective fighting force than the other opposition groups. After the seizure of Mosul, it is capable of funding its own operations and in possession of a significant cache of heavy weapons. If a new Caliphate is consolidated on the territory straddling the Iraqi-Syrian border it still might not be able to oust Bashar al-Assad from power, but it would mean the permanent dismemberment of Syria. Even if al-Assad remained in control of Damascus, he would be diminished as an ally. Moreover, the new Caliphate would create a barrier between Iran and Syria, cutting important supply lines that have been used to ship weapons to Syria and Hezbollah. Iran has other potential routes at its disposal, by sea and through Turkey, but they are much more vulnerable to interdiction.

The key concern for Tehran, of course, is its connection to Hezbollah. The organization was established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) in the 1982 during the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has the capacity to destabilize the Israeli-Lebanese border if military strikes are ever launched against Iran. Although it is not clear to what degree Hezbollah would follow through, the threat is an important part of Iran's deterrent strategy. Hezbollah is also a central player in Lebanese politics. Although the Lebanese system divided power along sectarian lines (Shi'a, Sunni, and Christian) the relationship provides Tehran with some influence in Lebanese politics. The relationship also provides Iran with soft power in the region. By underwriting Hezbollah's military power, Iran can lay claim to being the leader of the resistance front standing up to Israel and Western domination. While it is far from clear how much influence the "Arab Street" actually provides Iran, for a country with so few traditional state allies, it is a valued resource, particularly in the Shi'a areas of the region. Hezbollah is also important within the Islamic Republic itself. It was created during the formative years of the revolution and remains a symbol of the regime's political ideology. Hezbollah's success on the battlefield is seen as a vindication of the revolution and a sign of its continuing power. Among Iranian reformers there have been some complaints about the resources allocated to Hezbollah, and the regime's obsession with "resistance," but among conservatives these are still powerful symbols. Abandoning them would mean abandoning the revolution. Indeed, if there is a group that Tehran would be willing to fight for simply because of the ideological/sectarian connection, it is Hezbollah.

Iran's commitment to keeping the Damascus-Hezbollah link intact was already in evidence before the rise of ISIL. Hezbollah entered the Syrian civil war in late 2012 and were instrumental in the regime's regaining control around al Qusayr. This was a strategic blow to the opposition; it reconnected Damascus to Latakia in the north of the country and left opposition forces in the Homs area isolated. Just as importantly, it reopened the arms route from Syria into Hermel, the Hezbollah stronghold in the Bekaa Valley. Since then, the Syrian regime's defense strategy has become increasingly reliant on Hezbollah, and Shi'a militias loosely organized into Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA). (2) LAFA has been trained and organized by the al-Quds Brigades of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and among its members are volunteers drawn from pro-Iranian Shi'a militias originating in Iraq. Not only does this illustrate the extent of Iranian support for Hezbollah and the Assad regime, it also illustrates the degree to which Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq are all strategically interconnected from the Iranian perspective.

The second threat involves the United States. Although they are currently lined up on the same side versus ISIL, they are still competing with each other for influence in Iraq. Since the fall of Saddam in 2003...