Iran Under Raisi's Presidency.

• Author: Uygur, Hakki
• Position: COMMENTARY

Background

The Iranian voters cast their votes in the 13th presidential election on June 18, 2021, and elected Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi as the new president of Iran. A number of leaders have served as the highest elected official in Iran subsequent to Abolhasan Banisadr, who was elected as the first president following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 which overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy. After Banisadr, who had to flee abroad following a disagreement with the Islamic Republican Party and then Ayatollah Khomeini, Mohammad Ali Rajaei served as the second president of the Islamic Republic for a brief period, and following his assassination; Ali Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani were respectively elected as the 'second-highest-ranking official' in Iran.

In fact, although the concept of 'Islamic Republic' was used by some countries such as Pakistan, it was a newly-emerged concept. The relevant definition sprung up, to a great extent, in reaction to the secular-monarchical character of the Pahlavi regime. Therefore, this concept did not get a reaction from the nationalist, leftist, or various Islamist groups that united against the Pahlavi regime and few people raised concerns about the issue. Similarly, there was no consensus even among the top authorities on how to define the Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which is the pivotal concept of the post-revolutionary constitution of Iran. That was the case not only among the various political movements such as the Freedom Movement of Iran, led by the first Prime Minister of Iran Mehdi Bazargan, or the People's Mujahe-din Organization of Iran which was under the leadership of Massoud Rajavi and later turned into a 'terrorist organization,' but also even for Khomeini, the unquestionable leader and the theorist of the Revolution. For instance, Khomeini, while in exile in Paris, stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran would be similar to the French model of state or that he would settle in Qom, leaving the governance to the politicians. However, as is seen in many post-revolutionary countries, the practice soon overshadowed the theory and built its own political reality.

The Islam/Republic Dilemma

The political consciousness and experience of the ulama (clergies) who succeeded in winning the post-revolutionary internal power struggle in a couple of years was largely related to the constitutional movement during the Qajar period. It has been narrated that the Shia ulama, who were not in favor of such concepts as parliament, republic, and election under the influence of the experience of modern Turkey, promised to support the Pahlavi dynasty in exchange for Reza Pahlavi's renouncement of the proclamation of the Republic. Therefore, this feeling of insecurity impelled the religious revolutionaries to take all kinds of measures at the constitutional level so as not to fall into the trap of a new constitutional attempt, as frequently stressed by Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, one of the key figures of the new regime. In particular, the conflict between Banisadr and Khomeini set the alarm bells ringing among these circles and caused some important institutions which were affiliated with the Presidency to pass over to the control of Vali-e Faqih.

The rapid militaristic characterization of post-revolutionary domestic and foreign policy, and the above-mentioned disagreements both proved Khomeini's dream of a supervisory Vali-e Faqih to be naive and incompetent. The factors such as the disputes over the governance between Khomeini and Banisadr first and then to a lesser extent Khamenei, as well as the undeniable influence of Khomeini's son Ahmad on him, led to serious problems not only between the presidents and Khomeini but also with Ayatollah Montazeri, who was expected to be the successor of Khomeini. Each of these debates and disputes led the authority of Vali-e Faqih, who is known as the Supreme Leader, to expand and even to gain a supra-constitutional and institutional power with the amendment of 'absolute velayat' to the constitution.

Ali Khamenei, successor to Khomeini, also experienced similar disagreements which Khomeini had with the elected presidents and came out stronger, in the end, thanks to his influential charisma. Khamenei had serious disagreements at first, with his close friend of fifty years Hashemi Rafsanjani and then, with the reformist President Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Hassan Rouhani also suffered the same fate as the former presidents. As the former Secretary-General of the National Security High Council, Rouhani, who had a role both in the memorandum of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commanders and in the severe suppression of student protests during the Khatami era, began to give 'moderate' messages following his presidential candidacy. The great support of the Iranian people for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, the Nuclear Deal) signed with the U.S., raised Rouhani's hopes considerably and he began to openly oppose Khamenei's statements in public. Trump's election and his withdrawal from the JCPOA not only challenged the Iranian foreign policy but also undermined Rouhani's ambitions in domestic policy. The worsening economy and the accusation that he trusted the U.S. brought discredit on Rouhani and he became 'the most unsuccessful president in the history of Iran' along with the devastating effects of the global pandemic.

Towards the Elections

In the light of the aforementioned issues, it can be claimed that a certain amount of electoral engineering was carried out as part of the macro policies set out by the Supreme Leader and his office in all of the presidential elections held in the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past forty years. Considering the current legal proceedings and practices in Iran, it is seen that the mechanisms regarding the...