Iran's ballistic missile program: A new case for engaging Iran?

• Author: Rezaei, Farhad
• Position: ARTICLE - Report

ABSTRACT Much like Iran's nuclear program, scholars and policy makers are largely puzzled to understand Iran's intentions in developing its ballistic missile program. The aim of this study is to understand Iran's objectives in developing its ballistic missiles arsenal. To fulfill this objective, the article reviews the entire history of Iran's ballistic missile program. It hypothesizes that just like its nuclear program, Iran developed its ballistic missiles arsenal as a strategy of deterrence, a response to Iraq's invasion and Washington's policy of containment. The second hypothesis held that Iran's determination to continue developing its ballistic missile program might be an attempt to dissuade its rivals from exercising power in the Middle East.

nlike the nuclear program, Iran's ballistic missile arsenal has received only scant scholarly attention. At best, some highly technical analysis has been offered, at worst, the missiles have been considered part of the nuclear package designed to carry nuclear warheads. However, the missile program is a complex and sophisticated response to Iran's unique security challenges which should be analyzed on its own. The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA) in July 2015 has made this task more urgent. With the nuclear program rolled back, the missiles have become a new target of international attention. The ballistic program is run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), commonly known as the Revolutionary Guards, which has been subject to numerous sanctions because of its alleged terror activities and other infractions.

The focus is especially intense in Washington, where the Obama Administration's drive to conclude the nuclear accord was highly divisive. For instance, some critics urged to impose a new round of sanctions on Iran to curb its missile program. Others suggested using American anti-ballistic missile defense

capabilities in the region to target Iranian ballistic trials. According to this rationale, denying the Revolutionary Guards the ability to test missiles would disrupt its research and development opportunities. (1)

Both courses of actions have potentially far reaching consequences. Slapping on more sanctions may prompt Tehran to abrogate the JCPOA. Intercepting missiles of a sovereign country violates international law and may lead to a huge conflagration in the Middle East and beyond. Given the high-level stakes of these policies, an analysis of Iran's rationale for developing its ballistic arsenal is in order. To increase the scientific rigor of this research, it needs to be grounded in Intentional Relations (IR) theory.

This paper is organized into five sections, which reflect the research goals outlined above. Section one offers a short analysis of the pertinent intentional relations theories. Section two traces the history of Iran's missile program and explains how developing indigenous missile and anti-missile systems became one of the components of Iran's deterrence strategy. Section three covers the arms race in the Middle East and its impact on Iran's security environment. Section four discusses the implications of the JCPOA for Iran's missile program. The concluding section considers the impact of the 2016 presidential election in the United States on the future prospect of the ballistic missile program.

Realism and Neorealism: Theories of Motivation

Literature indicates that the decisions that drive proliferation of nuclear weapons are quite like those which prompt the quest for a ballistic missiles program. Both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are instruments of power that may be used as deterrent or compellent threats. They both serve to enhance the security of a state through raw power.

Realist and Neorealist IR theory postulated that a state that faces a deteriorating security situation will opt for developing its nuclear arsenal/ballistic missiles program as a safeguard against adversaries. Both theories are driven by the rational choice model, that is the assumption that rational actors act in a rational way when they opt for a nuclear or ballistic option to maximize their security when faced with a serious challenge. As John Mearsheimer, a leading Realist theorist puts it, states always strive to maximize their power over their rivals with hegemony as their ultimate objectives. In fact, the anarchic nature of the international system encourages players to seek out opportunities to enhance their power vis-a-vis other players. (2)

Theoretically conceptualized, the anarchic state of international affairs forces actors to engage in a constant conflict for power and security. Because of the high degree of uncertainty in such a system, states do not trust the actions of other states. Therefore, they succumb to the so-called security dilemma - defined as the inability for individual states to maximize their own power and security without threatening the security of other states - a fundamental driver of global politics. As the renowned nuclear expert Michael Krepon noted, plagued by a security dilemma states prefer to be safe than sorry, a position which compels them acquire too much security. Such "over insurance" can be understood as a response to a persistent state of uncertainty in an anarchic situation. (3)

Neorealism, also known as structural realism, postulates that no single entity governs the international system, prompting national actors to worry about their existence and stay highly vigilant. In this view, states are security-conscious entities, and their military policies are driven by their "most probable threat appraisal" as opposed to the worst-case scenario. Besides, in a zone of high-level conflict characterized by constant violence and mistrust, states engage in enduring rivalries and protracted conflicts. Regional countries which are not protected by the superpower patrons are more prone to maximize their power to deter any potential attack by their adversaries. Clearly, Neorealist scholars believe that a decision of a weak player to maximize its power is a rational response to a serious security dilemma. Such countries are characteristically unable to protect their vital interests or stand up to major powers by relying on conventional deterrence. Conversely, giving up such weapons is perceived as a dangerous act since it requires placing trust in other states' actions. (4)

A large body of research indicates that states use rational choice thinking when deciding to proliferate or acquire a ballistic arsenal. In the case of Iran, however, the discourse of the regime's motives has been highly politicized, with rational choice theories taking a back seat. At best, analysts have sought to apply methods of varying rigor to evaluating rationality; at worst, they have projected their own view of what rational behavior should be. Consequently, two camps have emerged - the optimists and the pessimists. The former considers the Iranian regime to be a rational player driven by security concerns; the latter views it as an irrational, messianic entity seeking to maximize its power for offensive purposes. Absent conclusive evidence to prove or disprove either side, the discourse has turned into a "profession of faith." As one observer put it, when it comes to Iran, rationality and irrationality is in the "eye of the beholder." (5) Still, a theoretically rigorous analysis of Iran's ballistic missile program should clarify the motivations of the regime.

Developing indigenous missile and anti-missile systems have been key components of Iran's deterrence strategy. The tension between Iran and its powerful neighbors goes a long way toward explaining why Iran feels the need for greater defense capabilities. Iran was forced to consider nuclear and ballistic options because of the long and bloody war with Iraq which had a profound role in shaping Iran's strategic thinking. (6)

The history of this bloody conflict between the two countries is well known. The second longest war of the twentieth century, it has been frequently compared to World War I. Like the 1914 war, it relied on trench warfare, human wave attacks, indiscriminate assault on civilian population and, most importantly, Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians. Altogether, the human cost of the war to the Iranians was enormous; with 188,015 killed, 320,000 wounded and 2 million people left homeless by Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on cities. (7)

Although Iran's dedication to exporting its revolution, a goal that the regime was not willing to forgo in the face of extreme hardship, exacerbated the conflict, the war left deep and enduring scars on the collective psyche. Even a casual perusal of cultural narratives indicates a deep sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Admittedly, in IR theory, revolutionary export should be considered an Idealist position; its consequences - the war with Iraq and a collision with the United States and its allies - created an unprecedented security predicament.

Both the leaders of the regular armed forces, the Artesh, and the Revolutionary Guards, who fought in some of the most ferocious battles of the war, understood that Iran had little in terms of conventional equipment to deter Iraq from launching missile attacks. Thus, the leadership concluded that Iran would need a powerful deterrent of some kind. At its core was the belief that Iran's existence in an unstable and dangerous environment was precarious and that it had suffered horribly at the hands of others. In this sense the war with Iraq was a classic case of a structurally-determined rivalry between two players vying for regional domination, something straight out of the playbook of Realists and Neorealists. (8)

But the embargo on weapon sales pushed by the United States after activists seized the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979 proved to be a huge obstacle for obtaining a strong deterrence. The strained...