Identity dynamics of the June and November 2015 elections of Turkey: Kurds, Alevis and conservative nationalists.

• Author: Kose, Talha

Most analysts of Turkish politics agree that "identity politics" was a major dynamic in shaping the results of both the June 7 and November 1, 2015 general elections in Turkey. The political stalemate in the aftermath of the June 7 elections was also attributed to the significant impact of the identity politics on the outcome. (1) Economy, public policy issues and Turkey's turbulent foreign policy, as well as debates on switching to a presidential system from a parliamentary one, were important themes discussed in the pre-election campaign. Identity related positions of the competing parties played a significant role in shaping the preferences of the electorate. The electorate is fragmented into four main identity lines in Turkey: Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, secular left and conservative/Islamist. In the November elections the deadlock, attributed to the use of identity politics, was surpassed (2) yet the legacy of this ideology seems set to be a major issue in the coming years. This study examines the effect identity politics had on the June and November 2015 general elections in Turkey.

While the parties that are predominantly affiliated with Turkish and Kurdish nationalism increased their votes, (3) support for center right and center left parties declined in the June elections leading to a hung parliament. (4) Parties adjusted their campaign strategies accordingly for the November elections however the results were not in line with those from June. (5) The main concern of the November elections was whether the AK Party could achieve a majority in the parliament and so be able to form a single party government. The second issue was whether the political polarization on the axis of pro and anti AK Party government, that have continued since the Gezi Protests of 2014 and which further escalated after the June elections, would be abated after the November elections.

With regard to the first problem AK Party managed to overcome its challenge and regained the parliamentary majority with 317 MPs. It is still early to make definitive judgments about the cessation of political polarization but especially in the electoral domain the Turkish electorate decided to increase its support for the two larger parties. Smaller and more ideologically motivated parties were the main losers of the November elections.

The AK Party struggled to transform the overall campaign strategy that was focused on macro issues such as switching into a presidential system and macro economic stability into a campaign that was mostly focused on issues of economic re-distribution, economic stability, youth employment and security. (6) The other parties did not make substantial changes in their campaign strategies between the two elections and the Turkish electorate responded against the centrifugal tendencies of ethnic polarization and increased their support to AK Party. In total two major parties--AK Party and CHP--received three quarters of the votes, whereas MHP and HDP lost in total 6,8 points (4,39 from MHP and 2,36 from HDP) from their vote shares, which corresponds to a quarter of their total votes in comparison to June elections. The rise and the decline of votes to nationalist parties--both Turkish and Kurdish--within such a short period of time needs to be considered as the two sides of the same coin rather than two independent trends.

Fragmentation and polarization along the lines of identity was one of the reasons behind the failure to establish a coalition government after the June 7 elections. If this had not been the case, it would have been easier for the party leaders to negotiate and find a middle ground for their policy differences. (7) The November 1, 2015 elections did not fix the identity related fragmentation yet it pushed forward a new agenda in which the issues of security and economic stability were prioritized. It is therefore crucial to understand the prevailing identity dynamics of the Turkish electoral landscape.

Identity Dynamics of the June 7 and November 1 Elections

In terms of shaping the June election there were three major questions related to identity politics which continued to be important in November. The first question was whether the HDP would be able to transform itself from being a regional or ethnic Kurdish party into a national party relevant to all of Turkey. The second question was whether the Alevi votes would continue to be concentrated with the CHP, or the process of gradual shift towards HDP (8) would lead to diversification of Alevi voter preferences. The third question was about the distribution of conservative votes. How the AK Party and the MHP would position themselves in their competition over conservative right wing voters in the central, northern and western parts of the country was an important issue. Similarly whether the AK Party would regain the support of conservative Kurdish voters in the east and southeast of Turkey from the HDP was also a crucial concern in both elections. These last two questions were even more important for determining the results of the November elections for the AK Party when it regained its majority in the Turkish Parliament mainly due to its success in convincing conservative Turkish nationalists. The AK Party was even more successful in regaining the support of the conservative Kurdish voters, managing to increase its vote percentages substantively in some cities in the east and southeast of the country. AK Party increased its votes by more than ten points in Igdir (20 percent), Sanliurfa (18 percent), Bingol (18 percent), Erzurum (16 percent), Elazig (14 percent), Bitlis (13 percent), Agri (11 percent), Batman (10 percent) and Mus (9 percent). It also took the place of HDP as the leading party in the November elections in the eastern border cities of Kars and Ardahan.

The efforts of the HDP to appeal to the entire Turkish electorate, which they call "Turkiyelilesmek" and the diversification of Alevi political representation, is expected to affect the policies of other parties in the coming years. This transformation continues to put pressure on the governing AK Party, which has been having difficulty in attracting voters from the younger generation (9) and is facing serious challenges, especially in its policies related to the Kurds. (10) The main opposition party CHP's voter base is stuck between 23 to 28 percent and its image of being a party supported by older, affluent, urban and secular Turks, living in Turkey's coastal areas, has put a serious pressure for change on the party. (11) CHP's slightly fluctuating but structurally stagnant voter base is a problem for the party leadership with its total vote percentages in the last three parliamentary general elections only reaching 25.9 percent (2011), 25 percent (June 2015) and 25.3 percent (November 2015).

HDP's Dilemma: "Turkiyelilesmek" (12) or "Middle Easternization"

HDP struggled to appeal to the entire Turkish electorate via a language of strategic opposition to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan starting with the August 2014 presidential election campaign. Their campaign was based on a blend of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in the eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey and an antagonism towards the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the rest of Turkey. Its campaign was successful insofar as it overcame the challenge of a 10 percent national threshold in the June and November elections, yet this does not necessarily mean that the party reached its objective of "Turkiyelilesmek".

The PKK's strategic priority shifted towards becoming an influential regional actor in the Middle East within the power vacuum that emerged with the weakening of the Assad Regime in Syria. The HDP's claim of "Turkiyelislesmek" was overshadowed by the re-ignition of PKK violence in July 2015 with the leaders of the party unable to distance themselves from the PKK's attacks. The HDP's co-chairpersons, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, instead declared their support for the Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (Democratic Civil Congress) DTK's quest for "democratic autonomy" (demokratik ozerklik) and "self-government" (oz yonetim) on December 27, 2015. (13) The claim that HDP is pursuing a policy of "Turkiyelilesmek" is further challenged by the ongoing clashes between the PKK and the Turkish security forces.

In the June elections, AK Party lost their majority in the parliament predominantly because they lost the support of Kurds to HDP and Turkish nationalists to MHP. (14) The support for AK Party from the Kurds declined not only in the east and southeast of Turkey but also in the big urban conurbations of Istanbul, Izmir and Adana. The peace process or "Solution Process" played a pivotal role in this transformation which was used by HDP and some unofficial networks related to the PKK to consolidate their position as the legitimate representative of Kurds in Turkey. Conversely nationalist Turks were disturbed by the ongoing peace process with the PKK thus switching their allegiances to the MHP.

Until its collapse, with the re-ignition of PKK attacks in July 2015, (15) the Kurdish peace process (cozum sureci) was a promising story that had the potential to re-structure Turkish politics entirely. Peace processes are often complicated and fragile processes and parties learn a lot from their previous experiences, especially mistakes and successes. (16) Elections are, by their nature, not the best time for ongoing peace processes, because social and political polarization better serves the interests of political leaders trying to consolidate their votes. The peace process however has not been ruined, but it was stalled during the election campaign. Unfortunately in the immediate aftermath of the first election (in late July) a fresh wave of violence broke-out, signifying the end of the peace process. Three important developments: increasing expectations of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement; (17) PYD's de facto...