How South America Let Venezuela Down.

• Author: Stuenkel, Oliver
• Position: COMMENTARY - Essay

Fifteen years ago, South America witnessed a remarkable example of how regional diplomacy can help a country overcome a profound political crisis. Polarization and consequent tensions regarding Venezuela's political direction grew in the years after Hugo Chavez's election in 1999. They spiked in 2002, when a group of businessmen and military leaders staged a shortlived coup d'etat. Chavez returned to power within forty-eight hours. Governments in the region not only condemned the move, but also closely followed the situation and pressured both the Venezuelan government and the opposition to re-establish a dialogue in the coup's after-math. Brazil's President Fernando Henrique Cardoso advised Chavez to grant leading opposition figures involved in the plot amnesty, arguing that including all factions were crucial to promote a broad national dialogue. When oil workers went on strike against Chavez in late 2002, Cardoso provided the Venezuelan government oil shipments to avoid an economic collapse. Under President Lula, who took office in January 2003, Brazil continued to play a key role in helping its neighbor overcome polarization, leading the group "Friends of Venezuela," consisting of several Latin American governments. President Lula insisted on including the United States and Spain in the group, which helped bring the government and the opposition together.

Brazil's move proved crucial as it convinced the opposition to seriously engage in the debates. Lula may have been a left-wing president, but he was still seen as a legitimate and relatively impartial mediator by the center-right opposition in Venezuela. The United States' inclusion was particularly remarkable considering Washington's controversial and unhelpful role during the 2002 coup--contrary to Venezuela's South American neighbors--the US government seemed to signal cautious support to Pedro Carmona, who had led the coup attempt, during his 48 hours in power. At the time, Brazil understood that an eclectic grouping with the representation of all sides of the ideological spectrum was necessary to be credible in Venezuela and jointly exert pressure to avoid a violent confrontation.

Ten years later, violent confrontation yet again emerged in Venezuela. Polarization had never been fully over-come but worsened considerably in 2014, when large-scale anti-government demonstrations shook the country. More than 30 protesters died during the clashes, and more than 1,500 were detained. In 2016 and 2017, protests and repression reached new dimensions, and the government adopted a more explicitly authoritarian strategy, sidelining the opposition-dominated parliament, and imprisoning a growing number of opposition figures. This scenario was accompanied by a profound economic crisis, the result of years of mismanagement and excessive public spending during years of high commodity prices. Entirely dependent on oil exports, both presidents Chavez and Maduro had used high oil prices to finance social programs, which reduced poverty but could not be sustained in a more adverse macroeconomic scenario. When oil prices halved from over $100 per barrel to around $50, the Venezuelan government paid the price for its previous largesse. With the government unable to pay for imports, price controls were imposed, which led to dramatic product shortages, severely affecting the poor, who were unable to obtain even basic goods on the black market. As a consequence, a significant part of the population no longer had access to three meals a day, a plight that continues today. Public hospitals across the country lack even basic medicines. Looting of supermarkets has become more common. People with chronic diseases that require medication are forced to emigrate if they want to survive. With the world's worst-performing economy and the highest inflation rate on the planet, oil-rich Venezuela is sliding ever deeper into an economic catastrophe from which the country will take years, if not decades, to overcome.

Why have governments in the region been unable to halt Venezuela's decline, contrary to their positive influence in 2002 and 2003? There are four reasons why regional diplomacy failed.

First of all, the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated dramatically, and can no longer be compared to the problems present fifteen years ago. While there was a near equilibrium of forces between government and opposition, power is now concentrated almost exclusively with the government and the armed forces. Today, there is growing evidence that Nicolas Maduro's gamble of creating a constituent assembly has paid off. The opposition is weak and divided, and the armed forces are reaping unprecedented riches by controlling the distribution of food and medicines, having little interest in changing the status quo. With many disillusioned citizens migrating to Colombia, Brazil, the United States, Argentina and Spain, and violence against protesters continuing unabated, the days of mass protests are unlikely to return in the near...