How and why the West reacted to the Arab Spring: an Arab perspective.

• Author: Metawe, Mohamed

For nearly six decades, both the United States and Europe had established an implicit accord with the Middle East's authoritarian regimes; to turn a blind eye to dictatorial practices in exchange for achieving, securing and even promoting their strategic interests in the Middle East. So long as the authoritarian regimes fulfilled the West's interests in the Middle East--protecting Israel's security and even promoting friendly relationships with Israel, maintaining the influx of oil and energy supplies to the West, and complying with the Western capitals' demands in fighting against terrorism and containing the rogue states, particularly Iran--the Western nations had 'tolerated' the flagrant suppression of economic and political rights in the Arab region. (1)

Europe has always been involved in this accord between the United States and the despotic regimes in the Middle East. Despite its frequent confirmations of its obligation to encourage democracy in its Southern borders, Europe's behavior in practice did not differ from the American stances with regard to the Arab authoritarian regimes. In other words, for more than 20 years Europe has always been rhetorically a champion to democracy and human rights in addressing the region of the Middle East. However, in practice, the EU countries allied with the Middle East despotic regimes and did not lift a finger to the atrocities, so long as their strategic interests were maintained. Europe used the Arab despots to protect its security interests--particularly migration control, fighting against terrorism and suppressing political Islam--in exchange for ignoring the Middle East's promotion of democracy. (2) This paper argues that this accord is still working, even in the aftermath of the Arab revolts, albeit with a different mechanism.

The United States and Europe's negative response to Hamas' stunning victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections is still fresh in the Arab mind. This undermined the West's preaching for values of democracy and human rights in the Arab world. The clear message that the Arab political pundits and general public received was that the West has nothing to do with democracy when its results go against the grains of the United States and Europe. (3) Both the United States and Europe found themselves caught between the anvils of the "march of democracy" in the Arab world and the hammer of their traditional alliance with despotic regimes in the Middle East. (4) In other words, the collapse of some friendly authoritarian regimes in the Middle East produced more danger than opportunity to the Americans and the Europeans.

The cascade of Arab revolutions that unfolded in the Middle East posed grave challenges to both Europe and the United States. In brief, the main challenges included: the fall of their traditional authoritarian allies; the rise of the prospect of political Islam to take over in those countries; grave threats to Israel's security because of the likelihood of the collapse of the peace agreements; the rising prices of oil and the West's uncertainties about its influx; and the European fear of a sweeping illegal migration from the Middle East to Europe. (5) Whether the Arab Spring will democratize the Arab world or not, it has already ousted the despots that have been in harmony with Israel. Eventually, this signifies that the public opinion of the Arab regimes will be a crucial factor in their non-tolerant foreign policies against Israel and their further sympathy towards the Palestinians. (6)

If Israel is the prime 'loser,' the United States becomes the second. The United States would no longer be able to control the Middle East. Instead of talking to and ordering only a few authoritarian leaders, the Obama administration must now address the Arab public opinion, which has always expressed its deep resentment and bitterness against the American and Western "imperial control" of the region's destiny. (7) Israel's security concerns, in particular, rapidly increased with the Arab awakenings in the Middle East. In other words, Israel's closest 'friends' became potential enemies with the replacement of Mubarak's regime with the Brotherhood's regime, led by President Mohamed Mursi, who had always criticized the peace treaty with Israel and always asked for it termination. In addition, the close relationships between the new Islamist Egyptian regime and Hamas meant a potential increase in forthcoming tensions between Egypt and Israel. Moreover, Egypt has already sent signal of rapprochement with Israel's main rival in the Middle East, Iran. (8)

The danger of Islamic fundamentalism has always been the very reason for the West to pay no attention to the atrocities and violations of human rights committed by their friendly authoritarian regimes. The Arabs have always condemned the American and European policies not only because of their flagrant bias towards Israel, but also for claiming that Israel is the icon of democracy, while at the same time not punishing the Arab regimes' violations of human rights. (9) Europe was also surprised by the unfolding uprisings in the Middle East, as the price and the influx of oil became more certain, the migration from the Mediterranean increased, and its creditability as a democratic model of governance was put at stake at the very beginning of the Arab Spring. (10) To conclude, both the United States and Europe metaphorically bet on the wrong horse when they championed the despotic regimes in the Middle East, because the substitute--either chaos or Islamism--was not in their favor. (11)

The West's Tactical Reactions

Tactically, the United States resorted to the 'case-by-case' approach and Europe chose the 'wait and see' approach, albeit with different, fragmented and heterogeneous reactions in addressing the Arab Spring. (12) As for the Tunisian revolution, Europe--France in particular--was supportive to Ben Ali's regime until it was toppled. France's Foreign Minister Michelle-Alliot-Marie was the first prominent European official to react to the Tunisian revolution, by expressing her worries about the regime and suggesting sending Special Forces to restore order in Tunis. Later, Catherine Ashton (the HR-CFSP) talked about a peaceful transition to democracy. Nevertheless, there was no concrete European support to the will of the Tunisian protesters in the first two weeks of the revolution. The Obama administration was more courageous than the Europeans, albeit with no crucial decisions, when it declared that the Tunisians have the ultimate right of self-determination--but this only came after two weeks of the revolution that lasted for 30 days. Therefore, it can be concluded that both Europe and the United States dealt cautiously with the uprisings until they realized it was a revolution; then they supported the yearning of the Tunisian people for liberty and democracy. (13)

The January 25 revolution in Egypt was another subsequent and even bigger earthquake to the transatlantic relations. The Western reaction was very confused because neither the American nor the European intelligence agencies expected the collapse of Mubarak's regime, even after Ben Ali's regime was ousted. The American reaction swung between supporting Mubarak's regime at the beginning of the revolution and supporting the Egyptian protesters at the end of the crisis. At the very beginning of the crisis, Hillary Clinton claimed that the Egyptian regime was "stable" (14) and that there was a chance for the Egyptian government to respond to the legitimate demands of its people, and that the United States encouraged dialogue between the government and the opposition in order to reach a settlement. However, when demonstrations spilled over the entire country, the American position changed its stance, asking Mubarak for "a peaceful and orderly transition of power" to his Vice President Omer Suleiman. Obama later asked for an "orderly, meaningful, peaceful, and immediate transition of power," (15) as did Congress by issuing a common announcement asking Mubarak to step down. The United States aimed for a peaceful transition of power to its most trusted ally, Omer Suleiman. (16)

But once the United States realized that the protesters no longer accepted Suleiman, they intensified talks with the Egyptian Army, and a transition of power...