Hope and Despair: Understanding Change in Turkey-EU Relations.

• Author: i Lecha, Eduard Soler

Introduction

The centenary of the Republic of Turkey coincides with the 60th anniversary of its association with the European Union (EU). The bid to join the EU, or more broadly defined, to anchor Turkey in the European integration process, is one of the oldest and more frustrating priorities of Turkey's foreign policy. The idea of change is deeply rooted in Turkey-EU relations. Firstly, because 'Europeanizing' Turkey has often been framed as equivalent to democratization, modernization, and liberalization.. Secondly, because during these sixty years relations have experienced many ups and downs, periods of hope but also moments of despair, the eruption of many crises, and different attempts to overcome them. Thirdly, because changes in Turkey-EU relations must be placed in the context of broader patterns of change in Turkey's foreign policy, which is the overall aim of this special issue.

This article adopts Charles G. Hermann's categorization when assessing the intensity of foreign policy change, ranging from rare but far-reaching transformation of the international orientation of a country's foreign policy to almost continuous policy adjustments to accommodate new domestic or international realities. (1) In between, there are different degrees of change including the reassessment of goals as well as the means to achieve them, defined by Hermann as program change.

Before analyzing the drivers of change, it is useful to establish how those categories apply to Turkey-EU relations. Belonging to the West and being recognized as such is part of Turkey's international orientation. Aspiring to join the EU is the corollary of this orientation and stands as a foreign policy goal. The reforms introduced to achieve this goal are part of what Hermann referred to as "program changes", and the economic or organizational resources deployed in the implementation of those reforms would qualify as adjustments. When mapping those instances of change, it is also necessary to note those factors that may prevent change, if only because one of the peculiarities of the Turkey-EU relationship is its resilience to all sorts of shocks and Turkey's perseverance in keeping the goal of accession open and discarding alternative frameworks of relations.

As for the identification of the drivers of change, this article builds on Jakob Gustavs-son's analytical framework. (2) This implies exploring which are the political and economic factors, at the international and the domestic level, that may have altered the preferences and strategies of individuals within Turkey's government, but also within the complex decision-making process of the EU. As I have pointed out elsewhere, "it takes two to tango". (3) In other words, the actions or inactions of successive Turkish governments explain only partially the variations in EU-Turkey relations, and therefore an analysis of change in these relations must also contemplate the changes in the policies of the EU and its member states toward Turkey.

The literature on European integration and particularly on enlargement adds a third dimension to our analysis: How do both parties justify their decisions? Helen Sjursen suggests three Habermas-inspired categories that could be used to justify enlargement: 1) pragmatic arguments (decisions made on calculations of utility based on a given set of interests), 2) ethical-political arguments (referring to duties and responsibilities emerging because of belonging to a particular community), and 3) moral arguments (based on universal standards of justice). (4) Applying these categories will provide a more sophisticated understanding of the patterns of change and continuity, by assessing whether critical decisions have been justified, and by whom, based on utility, identity, or fairness. Following the systematic analysis by Hague, Ozbey, Eralp and Wessels, it is also useful to differentiate between the goal and the plot of the different narratives put forward both by the EU and Turkey. (5)

The article focuses on five critical periods in Turkey-EU relations: (1) the 1959 application to associate Turkey with the recently created European Economic Community (EEC), (6) followed by the signature in 1963 of the Treaty of Ankara granting Turkey such a status; (2) the request by the Turkish government for full membership in 1987 which led to the negotiation and signature in 1995 of the Customs Union (CU); (3) The acceptance by the EU of Turkey as a candidate country in Helsinki in 1999, marking a considerable policy shift when taking into consideration that Turkey was denied such a status two years earlier; (4) the unenthusiastic opening of the accession negotiations in 2005; (5) the current state of relations, where transactional cooperation coexists with signs of an increasingly adversarial relationship. For each episode, the article assesses the intensity, drivers, justification, and impact of major decisions, while exploring why alternative routes were discarded. Therefore, this granular analysis will enrich the discussion on the current state and imminent challenges for Turkey-EU relations by placing the most recent signs of turbulence within a longer period of fluctuations, and by identifying those inhibitors that have so far buffered crises and contributed to keeping Turkey as the "longest standing applicant to the EU", in Atila Eralp's words. (7)

The Starting Point (1959-1963)

The Turkish government led by Adnan Menderes requested in 1959 to negotiate an associate status with the new-born EEC. Greece had done the same a month earlier. Negotiations started that September, but the process was temporarily interrupted after the coup d'etat in 1960. Yet negotiations resumed one year later, leading to the signature of the Treaty of Ankara in 1963. This treaty had a predominantly economic character, as it focused on trade preferences and financial support, with the goal of preparing both parties for a CU. One of the peculiarities of this treaty is that, like the one with Greece and in contrast with other association agreements that were to be signed with Mediterranean countries, it foresees in its article 28 the possibility of Turkey's accession to the community, once the provisions from the treaty would become operational. This politically meaningful commitment was further reinforced by political statements during the signature of the treaty. The then president of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, repeatedly mentioned the idea that "Turkey is part of Europe." (8) Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Cemal Erkin, stated that even if the treaty was essentially an economic document, it "constitutes a turning point in the life of the Turkish nation as a political document" that "confirms and approves Turkey's desire to be part of Europe." (9)

Beyond being a decisive turning point for Turkey-EU relations, the Treaty also confirmed and consolidated previous foreign policy choices regarding Turkey's engagement with the West and with Europe in particular. Thus, the signature of the Treaty of Ankara should be analyzed as part of a chain of decisions that include its membership of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948, the accession to the Council of Europe in 1949, a few months after its creation, and membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.

The westernization of Turkey's foreign policy also entailed decisions such as involvement in the Korean War in 1950, and the signature of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and it meant a departure from its previous policy of neutrality. This period, conceptualized by William Hale as "the engagement phase", (10) reflected a change in Turkey's threat perception due to Stalin's revisionist policy. Some traumatic events in the early 1960s (the Turkey-for-Cuba deal to end the 1962 missile crisis, and the content of President Johnson's letter on Cyprus in 1964) prompted Ankara to consider that it could not solely rely on the US but had to balance this with more engagement with Western Europe. (11)

Domestic changes in Turkey were a relevant factor too. Among those, the victory of Menderes' Democrat Party in the 1950 elections strengthened Turkey's Atlanticist turn in a way that marked a distance with the "isolationist policies" of previous Kemalist governments. (12) Haluk Kabaalioglu also notes that Menderes' political thought was aligned with that of the founding fathers of the EU, and that he had expressed preference for the EEC model over alternative regional cooperation processes such as the British-led European Free Trade Association (EFTA). (13)

However, partisan or personal modifications reinforced rather than triggered this foreign policy change. The goal of anchoring Turkey to the Western Alliance had already started with the Republicans in power. Interestingly, Ismet Inonu, leader of the opposition when the request for association took place, stated that "being a member of the western world and in view of our regime, from the start we were always enthusiastic about the EC. We want to join the Community". (14) Additionally, after the abrupt end of the Menderes government in 1960, it took only a few months to restart the negotiations for the association agreement, and the terms of the agreement were accepted by Turkey's political forces "with little debate or dissent." (15)

Changes within the EEC also explain why the Ankara Treaty was signed. When Turkey applied to join, the leaders of the EEC could only rejoice to see both Turkey and Greece moving toward them rather than toward the EFTA. The lack of internal debate within the EEC on the convenience of having Turkey as an associate member is even more significant when compared with the resistance that Turkey's membership of the Council of Europe and NATO had raised some years before.

The Greek factor acted as a catalyst for both parties. The European leaders did not want to discriminate between Turkey and Greece. (16)...