Gulenism as "Religionist" Kemalism.

• Author: Caylak, Adem
• Position: ARTICLE - Critical essay

ABSTRACT Utilizing Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemonic struggles through both coercive means of the state and also the production of consent in civil society, the article conducts a comparative textual analysis of the writings and speeches of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Fetullah Gulen. In so doing, the article focuses on four main themes: (1) sacralization of modern knowledge, science, and education; (2) militarism and centrism; (3) statism and corporatism; and, (4) ethnic nationalism and Turkism. It argues that the ideology of the Gulen's "service movement" shares the principles of Kemalism in the above-mentioned domains, while couching them within a religious discursive framework. Since Gulenism uses Quranic terminology out of context and for secular ends, the term "religionist" is used instead of "religious" to describe this ideology.

Introduction

Since the 2000s social science literature on the group led by Fetullah Gulen, which was assumed to be a religious movement, has focused on two major themes. The first has been the ideals, values and ideology of its leader. In the post 9/11 atmosphere, most interpretations framed this community as an alternative to Islamist movements which advocate radical change to secular political systems and evincing a worldview that clashes with the Western interests and ideals, most often using violent means. Gulen's worldview, in contrast, has been widely seen as an example of "moderate" (as opposed to "radical") Islam. This perspective was reinforced by his advocacy of dialogue among religions, apparent acceptance of the Western ideals of multiculturalism and tolerance, and his emphasis on the compatibility of these ideals with Islam. (1) The second line of inquiry has focused on whether, as a religious movement, it could be considered as a part of civil society through the study of Gulen's followers as a social movement.

The interpretations differed according to the definitions of civil society scholars have adopted. Whether it is conceptualized in neutral terms or as having liberal-democratic traits was consequential in the conclusions drawn about the role of the movement in democratization. (2) Thus, there are evaluations of the movement as contributing to democratization, pluralism and erosion of Kemalist statism both in terms of its discourse through studies of Gulen's writings and lectures (3) as well as its practices through analysis of its public activities in the spheres of education, business, trade, the media and health. (4) This article offers a different perspective to both these lines of inquiry by utilizing Antonio Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony and Ali Shariati's notion of "religion of legitimation" to compare the official ideology of the Turkish Republic (namely, Kemalism) and the ideology of Gulen movement (namely, Gulenism).

It is imperative to conduct a comparative analysis of these two seemingly incompatible ideologies to understand the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, which has been framed as heralding a new period in the history of the Turkish Republic. This article conducts a comparative textual analysis of the writings and speeches of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Fetullah Gulen focusing on four main themes: (1) sacralization of modern knowledge, science and education; (2) militarism and centrism; (3) statism and corporatism, and; (4) ethnic nationalism and Turkism. It argues that Gulenism and Kemalism share these principles, but that the former adopts a religious and spiritual language to mobilize the consent of the pious citizens that "secular" Kemalism had hitherto been unable to integrate into the polity as "acceptable citizens." Despite its use of religious language, Gulenism is not a religious movement, but a secular and worldly one that has been used to gain consent of the dominated classes. Thus, since Gulenism uses Quranic terminology out of context and for secular ends legitimized by a quasi-messianism of Gulen, the term "religionist (dinci)" is used in this article instead of "religious (dini, dindar)" to describe this ideology. (5)

In the first section, Gramsci's concept of hegemony and his understanding of civil society, as well as Ali Shariati's separation of "religion of legitimation" from "religion of revolution" will be discussed as the theoretical framework for the analysis of Gulenism and Kemalism. In the second section, Kemalism as the hegemonic ideology of the Turkish Republic will be analyzed briefly followed by comparisons of these two ideology's understandings of knowledge and approach to education, organization of authority, state-society relations and national identity.

Theoretical Framework

To describe the "intellectual and moral authority" of the dominant social and political institutions and how "capitalism" was able to thrive and marshal the support of the working classes in the early twentieth century, Antonio Gramsci reframed the concept of "civil society" and identified how capitalist social relations became "hegemonic" not only through the use of "coercion," but also by the organization of spontaneous "consent." Hegemony is not just domination in economic and political relations. In addition to these, the people need to think that the existing order is the appropriate one which is accomplished through the activities within civil society. For Gramsci, "civil society" does not refer only to all economic relations, but instead occupies a space within the superstructure comprising all ideological relations. Thus, it includes all "private" institutions that work for the maintenance of hegemony by the dominant class. Gramsci considers civil society to be part of the state, together with political society. Defined more comprehensively, civil society has three complementary features: (1) As the ideology of the dominant classes, it encompasses the economy, law, arts and science; (2) as the worldview spread among all the social classes in order to produce consent to the direction set by the dominant class, it produces philosophy, religion, common values and folklore befitting all, and; (3) as the ideological governance of society, it can be observed within institutions that produce and spread ideology, such as the school system, mass media, libraries, etc. (6)

According to Gramsci, the bourgeois leadership of society in moral, material, ethnic, religious, cultural, ideological, political and economic spheres has been made possible by hegemony production within civil society; in other words, the organization of consent for discourse and values of the dominant group throughout the whole society. Thus, contrary to the common Marxist prediction of revolution in capitalist societies, Western working classes were integrated into the system through the transformation of their "common sense" values, which had become compatible with the capitalist state's values and norms. (7)

For Gramsci, then, capitalism had transformed society and become firmly entrenched within it through two methods. The first was the use of force and suppression of dissent to elicit obedience. The second was the construction of social consensus through ideological leadership. This was possible by developing and working through a certain form of collective creed (such as religion) prevalent within society. (8)

Based on the Gramscian understanding of civil society as a bridge between the state and society and its role in hegemony construction, this article argues that "secular" Kemalism represents the "coercive" dimension of capitalist hegemony, and the "religionist" Kemalism of the Gulen movement its "consensual" dimension. Through comparative textual analysis of the speeches of Ataturk and Gulen, the analysis will argue that the "religionist" version overlaps with its "secular" counterpart both ontologically and epistemologically on issues of knowledge, the individual, society, the state, education and nationalism, which represents its 'consensual' dimension. While the former uses profane and secular language, the latter's language is spiritual and religious. However, both are constructive discourses coming from the same paradigm and a blend of Turko-Islamic imperial tradition and Western positivist modernity.

In addition to Gramsci's notion of hegemony, the analysis here draws on the "religion vs. religion" perspective of Ali Shariati. Shariati makes a distinction between "religion of revolution" and "religion of legitimation." While the former aims to transcend the existing differences in society and to work against the status quo of oppression, enslavement etc., the latter--which Shariati also calls "religion of multitheism or shirk"--works to perpetuate and legitimate social and economic differences and to maintain the status quo by using metaphysical beliefs. (9) Thus, the article posits that both "secular" and "religionist" forms of Kemalist discourse aim at eliminating "religion of revolution"/"true religion" and legitimizing the status quo, while the former has used coercion and the latter has worked to produce consent. It aims to show that these two Kemalism's are the twin children of Western modernity aiming to create a sanctified "secular theology." They are the two faces of the "religion of legitimation" that suppress the "true religion" and legitimize the existing order. (10)

Kemalism: The Official Ideology of the Modern Turkish State

Turkish political thought has been shaped since the founding of the Republic by Kemalism. At first, associated with the accomplishments of its founder Ataturk, Kemalism was later institutionalized as the official ideology of the state. Its role in shaping the ideational movements of the Republic has been either viewed positively as the encourager of new ideas, or negatively through its hegemonic strategy of either absorbing, eliminating or marginalizing alternative ideas. However, as Belge argues, in the history of the Republic, no ideational movement could become legal or be taken seriously without...