Greek Foreign Policy in Defence of the National Interest: Teetering between Exceptionalism and Integration/Ulusal Cikar Savunmasinda Yunan Dis Politikasi: Istisnacilik ve Butunlesme arasinda Bocalama.

• Author: Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios
• Position: Essay

Introduction

Defining and promoting the national interest is a tricky undertaking. It has long been debated and studied by scholars in particular with relation to the great powers. It has also recently been popularized again with Graham Allison's writings on the Thucydides trap; i.e., the notion that when a great power threatens to displace another, war may ensue as has been the case most of the time over the last 500 years. In order to avoid conflict, Allison suggests that "coherent strategy does not guarantee success, but its absence is a reliable route to failure" (1) While Allison's references are to the great powers historically, in the case of a country like Greece, just like any other country, some of the lessons derived are just as pertinent. A cursory look at the 2018 Global Firepower Index which ranks the war-making capabilities of some 136 nations across the globe, Greece ranks 28th while it ranks 7th among the 28 European Union member states, and 10th among NATO's 29 members. (2) In contrast, Turkey, Greece's NATO ally yet the country Greece perceives to be its greatest potential threat, ranks 9th out of 136 while it is 4th among NATO nations. These figures are all the more relevant considering that the country's population is 11.1 million as per the OECD with a 27,700 USD per capita GDP compared to Turkey's 76.9 million population and 27,078 USD per capita GDP. (3) Nevertheless, deterrence has its limits, especially for a bankrupted country like Greece, in the face of a bigger and more powerful neighbour. Deterrence on its own, especially for a small country like Greece, could lead to a military escalation if it is not ensconced within the context of other foreign policy initiatives and for a which act as levers regulating the behaviours of states.

For an EU member state like Greece, the national interest is thus intertwined with the European Union's interest and its definition as a soft power and as global power as interpreted in the Union's European Security Strategy of December 2003 and its Global Strategy of June 2016. Yet for crisis-wracked Greece, the national interest verges on the national sentiment which at times leans closer to exceptionalism rather than the pursuit of greater integration, and by extension, influence within the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. In fact, a mitigating factor is the country's geography which has enhanced the notion of the country being a flank state, on the margins of all the integrative processes in Europe and the West. This perception has not changed in the post-Cold War era as the migration crisis emanating in part from the Syrian conflict acts as a reminder of the country being a bulwark. The continued toil in maintaining non-conflictual relations with NATO ally and neighbour Turkey has not helped either in changing the dichotomic interpretation of the country's identity, and by extension, its national interest. Does Greece belong to the West or does it stand alone? How do these perceptions shape its foreign policy elite and decision makers in clearly identifying and acting in favour of the defence of the national interest? The problematique for Greece is compounded by the fact that its neighbours to the East and the North are also caught up in their own cases of reconsideration regarding their identity and sense of belonging. The most apt example is the case of Turkey which finds itself in conflict as to whether it has a place in the West and all things western or whether it has to reformulate its direction in favour of a Turkey first concept. Turkey itself faces many, if not more of the same dilemmas as Greece, given its flank state status sharing borders with some highly volatile and ambitious neighbours, whether they are greater or lesser powers. To the North, the inability to totally tame the fires stemming from the end of the Cold War and the demise of Yugoslavia, and to integrate the countries in the region in the European mainstream has allowed for a surge in Russian influence at a time when the markings of a new Cold War or Cold Peace between Russia and the United States are in evidence. This also entails an increase and awareness of Russian exceptionalism which in defence of its national interest could potentially influence the course of Greece and its neighbouring countries. Likewise, the increased Chinese presence via the Belt Road Initiative and the relevance of Greek assets such as the port of Piraeus for its realization also leaves its indelible mark. Finally, the renewed interest in hydrocarbons given their presence in the region, especially the Eastern Mediterranean, and its transit realities also shape the current geopolitical landscape.

Defending the National Interest in Times of Crisis

Under normal circumstances, (i.e. non-crisis times) the task of defining and defending the Greek national interest would be challenging. In this crisis-laden era, the task is daunting. How does Greece cope? Or more significantly, how can Greece promote its national prerogatives given the parameters of its geographic, geopolitical, political, institutional, economic, social, and ideological realities. A cursory look at the website of the Greek Foreign Ministry clearly places the context within which the country's foreign policy operates: "Greek foreign policy is designed to serve the national interest. In today's globalized environment, this means that foreign policy must be developed across a broad spectrum, from traditional diplomacy and the cultivation of Greece's bilateral relations to our country's participation in the European Union and other international organizations" (4) How this is done and whether the country's political and bureaucratic elites understand what today's 'globalized environment' entails is not entirely clear given the rise in transactional politics in lieu of a grand strategy, norms, and values. This becomes even more pressing since transactionalism has come to represent the Trump administration's foreign policy approach. According to Thomas Carothers, Donald Trump is a "disruptor" (5) He is "a postmodern president; he's history-free, fact-free, structure-free, and protocol-free. He is acting in ways that belie the last 60 years of assumed history of the United States and the world, and the way the world is organized" (6) Consequently, with his combative approach, he produces polarization in the United States, "which also brings out fundamental differences between U.S. and European politics. European politics is much more about consensus, civility, and continuity." (7)

Thus, a mid-sized EU member state as well as one within the Euro-Atlantic context that is Greece has to tackle and defend its national interest vis-a-vis a middle power with global ambitions that is Turkey as well as, over a quarter century after the end of the Cold War, persisting instability to its North as the ideological veneer that separated the country from its northern neighbours has been replaced by unresolved concerns of irredentism albeit within a process of incomplete integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. Consequently, of the four countries with which Greece has land borders (Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], Bulgaria, and Turkey), it only has normalized relations with Bulgaria. With Albania, a technical state of war since the Second World War is still in place from the time when Italian occupation forces in Albania attacked Greece in October 1940. Although the two countries signed a Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighbourliness and Security Agreement on 21 March 1996 and Greece has been a steadfast supporter of Albania's membership in NATO in 2009 and its accession to the European Union, the technical state of war remains. The concern regarding Albanian irredentism remains strong as long as the future status of Kosovo remains unresolved and the tenuous arrangement between the Slav Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in FYROM is not consolidated. Furthermore, the ethnic Albanian Cham exiles, i.e., Albanians expelled from Northern Greece after the Second World War on the pretext of collaborating with the German occupying forces, and their demands to return to the regions in Greece from which they were expelled, as well as concerns regarding the implementation of European standards for the protection of the rights of...