Greece's Strategy and Perceptions towards Turkey: The End of Consensus and the Return of History?/Yunanistan'in Turkiye Stratejisi ve Algisi: Uzlasmanin Sonu ve Tarihe Donus?

• Author: Ifantis, Kostas
• Position: Essay

Introduction

There is no doubt that the 1943 assessment and warning about partisanship in foreign policy by Walter Lippmann is still relevant: The divisive partisanship is above all "a danger to the Republic... For when a people is divided within itself about the conduct of its foreign relations, it is unable to agree on the determination of its true interest.... The spectacle of... (a)... nation which does not know its own mind is as humiliating as it is dangerous." (1) In the case of Greece, the post-1974 era brought about an end to the bitter partisanship of the past and gave way to a broad consensus on foreign policy that was to last for the next four or so decades.

After WWII, Greek foreign policy lurched incoherently between stark alternatives. The Right bandwagon with the West while the Left viewed this as little more than capitulation to the interests of American imperialism. Constantine Karamanlis embraced the European idea, investing in the institutionalizing European cooperation that would ease the costs of Greece's modernizing effort and engagement with the world. One of Karamanlis's greatest achievements was overcoming this political divide and steering Greece toward a new era of bipartisanship. With the dictatorship's trauma and deteriorating relations with Turkey as a backdrop, Karamanlis laid the foundations for a broad coalition behind Greece's liberal European orientation. This course entailed a commitment to both liberal democracy and a foreign policy less exceptional within the European integration context. This domestic compact, although weakened by populist political struggles in the 1970s and 1980s finally emerged as the dominant paradigm. The steadiness of bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy was the product not just of strategic necessity but also of changes in the nation's political landscape. Relative economic growth eased the socioeconomic divides of the post-WWII era, closing the ideological distance between the liberal Right and the social-democratic Left and making it easier to fashion a consensus behind the western liberal paradigm. Prosperity and affluence helped nurture Greece's political centre, which served as the foundation for growth and development, although major developmental deficits were not addressed.

The financial crisis that engulfed Greece in 2009 ended certainties and established truths and shattered the post-1974 consensus. The field of foreign and security policy did not escape the fractures that crippled the political process and proclaimed a populist voluntarism and an anti-systemic discourse as the solutions to the plights of the Greek people inflicted by foreign foes and their domestic servants. And although the crisis found the Greek-Turkish relations enjoying one of the longest periods of tranquillity, it took just a couple of incidents to return to the much more familiar dramas in the Aegean.

The paper is not a comprehensive treatise of the current state of affairs between Greece and Turkey. The scope is to focus on a few highlights that demonstrate in turn the impact of the crisis on the Greek public debate on, perception of, and strategy towards Turkey. The analysis is placed in the context of a strategic consensus that was ruptured during the crisis and the lack of bipartisanship on the country's security preferences. Although Athens and Ankara have enjoyed an unusually long period of calm waters in the Aegean from 1999 to 2016, the last two years have produced the familiar aggressive rhetoric and mutual mistrust. With the bilateral issues intact, the traditional inertia on both sides can easily turn into heightened tensions with the risk of miscalculation given the proximity of military hardware being hardly insignificant. The paper also presents some of the findings of a research conducted by the two guest editors of this special issue on the Greek elites' perceptions of Turkey in the midst of the crisis.

The State of Play

On 7 December 2017, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan formally visited Athens. According to media reports, it was one of the biggest security operations in living memory--with 2,800 police deployed around Athens, snipers posted on rooftops, and commandos, sniffer dogs, bomb disposal experts and bodyguards drafted in. The visit, the first by a Turkish President in 65 years, was described by the maj ority of Greek media as a diplomatic fiasco. The assessment, not only in the Greek media, was that the summit:

Turned into a verbal theatre of war as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, flouting the niceties of diplomacy, crossed an array of red lines. Disputes that had lain dormant--not least the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne delineating the borders between the two nations--were prised open with brutal force (...). 'It needs to be modernised,' he said of the treaty, which has long governed Greek-Turkish relations and is seen as a cornerstone of regional peace. (2) A few months earlier, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu had also taken aim at the Treaty of Lausanne saying that Ankara will not accept 'defacto situations' in the Aegean Sea. Speaking before Turkey's National Assembly, Cavusoglu said that a number of interconnected problems remain in the Aegean between the two neighbouring countries. "Among these problems is the question of sovereignty of certain islets and rocky formations, and the fact that there are no sea borders which are set by an international agreement between Turkey and Greece" (3)

With tensions running high between the two neighbouring nations, Athens had hoped the visit would be heralded as a new beginning by putting a deteriorating bilateral relationship on a new footing. It was thought it would be a meeting with only gains to be made. A less than favourable international environment for President Erdogan's domestic crackdown, following the failed treasonous coup against him in July 2016, had "strained relations with Europe and the US and meant that the Turkish leader has made fewer trips to the west" (4) In Athens, the Greek government expected someone who would reciprocate to its diplomatic overtures and appreciate the positive spotlight offered by striking a more conciliatory note. Instead, the Turkish leader did nothing but ratcheting up a rather confrontational rhetoric and jettisoning diplomatic niceties during meetings that were supposed to improve relations in the Aegean. In his meeting with the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, President Erdogan attacked Greece for failing to look after Ottoman sites and provide a proper place of worship for Muslims. In Cyprus, he bluntly put the blame of the latest round of failure to resolve the long-standing issue, exclusively on the Greek and the Greek Cypriot side who kept turning down a comprehensive settlement. He also reprimanded his hosts by attacking the living standards and economic gap between Greeks, and the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority in the province of Thrace in north-eastern Greece. (5)

Once more, he demanded the handover of the eight Turkish officers who had escaped to Greece as the July 2016 coup unfolded. The eight landed at the airport of the north-eastern Greek city of Alexandroupolis in a Black Hawk helicopter after issuing a mayday signal and requesting permission for an emergency landing, which was granted. They immediately applied for political asylum and the Turkish demand to extradite them was turned down by the Greek Supreme Court. The verdict further heightened the tension between Athens and Ankara. (6) Ankara, which had pledged to give the officers a fair trial, has been calling for their return since the day they fled Turkey and responded to the Court's verdict with anger. A statement from the Turkish foreign ministry read: "We protest this decision which prevents these individuals who have threatened the life of our president and took an active role in a coup attempt that killed 248 of our citizens ... from appearing in front of Turkish judiciary. Once again Greece, an ally and a neighbour, has failed to fulfil the basics of the fight against terrorism" (7) The ministry said the ruling was "politically motivated. cooperation and relations with Greece would be re-evaluated, adding that the judgment violated international norms and the rights of the victims of the coup attempt". (8)

President Erdogan personally criticised the Greek prime minster for failing to hand the soldiers over to Turkey. "From statements made in Greece by its prime minister right after the coup, we were of the positive opinion that they would be extradited to Turkey (...) We thought that Mr. Tsipras would keep his word. With time, though, we saw that the judicial authorities were mobilised and these putschists were not extradited." (9)

By late Spring 2018 all eight had been moved them out of police custody, following the expiry of the 18-month pre-trial period they are legally allowed to be detained while their asylum application is examined. They have been placed in top-secret locations under heavy police protection. (10) By the time of writing, three of them had been granted asylum by the Greek Judiciary. Although the Greek Government had filed an appeal on the rulings, the Court had rejected it producing a judicial precedent that most probably applies on the remaining cases. (11) In a written statement on 20 April 2018, the Turkish Foreign Ministry accused Greece that "is a country that protects coup plotters" while Prime Minister Yildirim said it is a "safe haven for Gulenists" (12)

A further complication arose in March, when Turkish armed forces arrested two Greek soldiers who accidentally crossed the land border between Greece and Turkey. By the time of writing, they were still incarcerated without an indictment being issued while Ankara, early on, started floated the idea of an exchange, which was flatly rejected by Athens.

In a huge public rally marking the second anniversary of the failed criminal coup on 15 July 2018, the Turkish President issued...