Gezi Park protests as a litmus test for mainstream western media.

• Author: Yanarisik, Oguzhan
• Position: Essay

Despite the new communicative opportunities presented by social media, the mainstream media remains the key site of discourses with significant power over narratives that represent and shape Western societies. Nick Couldry describes 'media power' as "the concentration in media institutions of the symbolic power of "constructing reality" (both factual representations and credible fictions)." (1) In this framework, the mainstream media has an important role in influencing identity and policy narratives that are dominant amongst both the public and the elite. The term 'mainstream' here roughly denotes the most widely circulated print media as well as the most heavily trafficked online media and the most watched/listened broadcast networks.

The mainstream media is uniquely positioned to exert control over discourse through its operation as a central institution of information production and its relations to other dominant institutions. (2) Although dominant ideologies and their variations are jointly produced by the elite class, "media elites have the special role and persuasive power to control dominant discourse reproduction among the population at large." (3) It is predominantly the media elite's definition of the situation that contributes to the manufacturing of public opinion.

In its first term, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was frequently praised by the mainstream Western media as a 'model' that had to be exported to the rest of the Muslim world. Its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan was applauded as one of the rarest blends in the Islamic world and the champion of Turkey's westernisation reforms. (4) Western mainstream media was predominantly talking about Turkey's success story under AK Party rule. Erdogan's record in both economic and foreign affairs was generally described as "nigh-impeccable." (5)

However, this situation has gradually changed especially with the worsening of Turkish-Israeli relations after the Davos and Mavi Marmara incidents, the downfall of Turkey's EU membership process and the increase of active foreign policy choices of the AK Party government that are more independent from its traditional Western allies. Personal attacks against Erdogan have become more common firstly in the pro-Israeli and neo-con segments of the Western media. Yet, the Gezi Park protests in 2013 has become a tragic turning point and opened a new era within which basic codes of media ethics (such as impartiality, truthfulness and fairness (6)) are frequently violated and anti-Erdogan attitudes have become an almost unquestionable rule for the mainstream Western media. Provocative messages, including calls for violence, were widely distributed without checking their authenticity during the events. Some well-known representatives of Western media outlets did not hesitate to misinform their audiences about what was happening or to act as active participants of the protests.

What Happened in Gezi Park?

Turkey was paralyzed by mass protests over the eviction of a peaceful sit-in at Istanbul's Gezi Park on May 31, 2013. The demonstrations sparked and spread to various cities around Turkey in a short period of time, and they turned into broader protests against AK Party and specifically Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Foreign media, including but not limited to CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, France 24, German ZDF, Der Spiegel, Reuters, The New York Times and Russia Today showed unprecedented interest in the events, compared to previous domestic incidents in Turkey, and described them as "the biggest challenge to Erdogan and his governing Justice and Development Party during their decade in power." (7) CNN broadcasted seven-hour continuous live coverage to its American audience about events in Taksim on June 11, 2013. At the same time, media outlets such as The Guardian and Associated Press portrayed the demonstrations as "Turkey's most widespread anti-government protests in decades." (8) From the very first day of the protests, some foreign journalists started to talk about "a potential Turkish Spring." (9)

Amid escalating tension and growing opposition, the Turkish government started a negotiation process with the representatives of the Taksim Platform, a solidarity group formed to oppose the planned demolition of Gezi Park in Taksim. The group listed its demands, including a decision to end the redevelopment of Gezi Park and termination of other irrelevant projects like the construction of a third bridge on the Strait and a third airport in Istanbul. Ironically, the Taksim Platform representatives expressed that they did not accept a referendum over the issue. They even claimed that "in developed democratic countries a referendum cannot be held" over such an issue, and they wanted the government to abide by their demands without question. (10) This approach clearly put the 'democratic demands' argument of the protestors in jeopardy.

In the following meeting with the representatives of the protestors, the government stepped back from its initial redevelopment plan about Gezi Park and proposed a referendum on the issue. A deal with the representatives was reached on the 14th of June and the government asked the protesters to evacuate the park. The protesters, who were divided over the decision of whether to stay, first announced that they would leave, but they later issued another statement declaring that they reject the referendum over the redevelopment plan and that they would "stay in the park and continue the resistance," without defining any deadline or concrete aim. (11) Upon this decision, police forces evicted Taksim Square and Gezi Park on 15th of June, but protests of varying degrees continued elsewhere.

Many different groups of people joined these protests for a multitude of reasons and some of these were members of illegal and known terrorist organizations. Alongside flags of marginal far-left political parties such as the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and Workers Party (IP) and their youth organizations like Turkey Youth Union (TGB), the protestors were also openly carrying signs and flags of organizations such as the PKK and the DHKP-C, which are both recognized as terrorist organizations by Turkey, EU and USA.

A considerable group of activists hurled fireworks, firebombs and stones at police. The Turkish Interior Ministry stated that within the first five days of the protests 280 workplaces, 6 public buildings, 103 police vehicles, 207 private vehicles including live broadcasting vans of news agencies, one residency, one police station, and 12 AK Party district buildings were damaged, with a total cost over 40 million dollars. (12) Moreover, the protestors' vandalism targeted international companies like Starbucks, which declared its concern over their personnel's safety and condemned the hate speech of protestors against the company. (13)

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Foreign and domestic anti-government media alongside the majority of foreign analyses based their arguments on the assumption that protestors were representing all segments of Turkish society except the AK Party supporters. Foreign media outlets like The Economist asserted that these mass protests were "the expression of the long-stifled resentment felt by nearly half of the electorate who did not vote for the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party in the June 2011 parliamentary elections." (14) Moreover analysts like Paul Mason from BBC, claimed "the breadth of social support -within the urban enclave of Istanbul- was bigger than Greece and closer to Egypt" Nevertheless, the only source of his assertion was a quote from a protestor saying "Everyone is here except the AK Party." (15)

However, two out of three major political parties, namely the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), strongly criticized these protests and the vandalism applied by these groups. If voter bases of these political parties are kept in mind (AK Party 50 percent, MHP 13 percent, BDP 7 percent in 2011 General Elections), political representatives of a decisive majority of the electorate (more than 70 percent) expressed their opposition to these protests. Both MHP and BDP denounced the protests and asked their followers not to participate in these events. Devlet Bahceli, one of the hard line opponents of Erdogan and the leader of Turkish nationalist MHP stated that "sympathizers of the terrorist organization PKK and marginal leftist groups" had provoked these protests to destabilize the country. He unequivocally refuted claims about a possible "Turkish spring," and denounced vandalism that targeted public and private properties. Bahceli also condemned efforts as "baseness" in the...