Germany's Kurdish and PKK policy: balance and strategy.

• Author: Yilmaz, Omer
• Position: Kurdistan Workers' Party - Report

Introduction

The activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane, or PKK) have been outlawed in Germany since 1993. The organization, however, remains active in the country through the proxy of a series of affiliated associations -which is interpreted in Turkey as proof of Germany's tacit support of PKK terror. In this regard, Turkish officials and representatives have repeatedly called on German authorities to take more decisive steps against the group and show zero tolerance to terrorism. (1) Although Germany refuses to meet Turkey's demands and continues to turn a blind eye to the PKK's activities, German authorities have at times cracked down on terror networks extensively and, other times, loosened their grip on the organization, which has been closely associated with the cyclical developments. Meanwhile, the German government tends to closely follow developments in Turkey, on which the PKK's armed struggle primarily focuses. In this sense, Germany has been watching the PKK's return to violence and a series of counter-terror operations conducted by the security forces since July 22, 2015.

In the wake of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's terrorist activities (hereafter DAESH) in Iraq and Syria, the German government, along with a number of Western countries, delivered weapons and ammunition to Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. Both Turkish and German news outlets, however, have claimed that the military aid ended up in the hands of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) which Turkey considers a Syrian affiliate of the PKK. (2) German citizens losing their lives among PYD ranks in Syria, (3) the growing number of German journalists reporting from Southeastern Turkey, (4) and the close involvement of certain German politicians in the area (5) have brought about the claims in Turkey that Germany was supporting the PKK. In other words, Berlin's Kurdish and PKK policy has become a subject of interest among the Turkish public.

The most recent developments, therefore, call for an examination of Germany's position on Kurds and the PKK. This study aims to provide a summary of Germany's view of the Kurdish question and PKK terrorism and to offer insights into Turkish-German relations with an eye to providing a proper perspective. Although this article concentrates on Germany's Kurdish policy in general, it primarily focuses on Berlin's position toward the PKK terror group and their activities.

This study argues that the German government seeks to maintain a delicate domestic and international balance with regard to the Kurdish question and PKK terrorism. The country's strategic goals, too, have a notable influence on policy-making. In this regard, there are at least two key aspects of Germany's Kurdish and PKK policy: First and foremost, the German government constantly attempts to prevent the PKK challenge and related issues from putting strains on their commercial and political relations with Turkey. At the same time, the German authorities seek to strike a healthy balance between addressing domestic demands to provide greater support to the Kurdish movement on the basis of human rights, and the need to maintain public order by preventing PKK-related violence, including clashes between Turkish and Kurdish groups on German soil. The issue is complicated by Germany's attempts to form an alliance with the Kurds by directly and covertly supporting armed groups in order to access energy reserves in the Middle East and thereby to gain a strategic depth in the region. Germany's politics of balance disappoints and even frustrates Turkey and the PKK leadership alike at times, but the policy has remained unchanged for years. (6)

Main Factors Behind Germany's Kurdish and PKK Policy

The politically well organized Kurdish community in Germany is the leading factor behind Berlin's PKK and Kurdish policy. (7) Although a serious number of Kurds from Iran, Iraq and Syria have sought political asylum in Germany over the years, the vast majority of the Kurdish community consists of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, most of whom arrived in German cities as guest workers from the 1960s onwards. (8) A large number of Kurds, meanwhile, left Turkey after the 1980 military coup and due to the worsening security conditions and political pressures in eastern and southeastern Turkey in the 1990s. (9) Due to the fact that a high number of Kurds arrived in Germany as political asylum seekers, the group has traditionally been more politicized than other immigrant communities. United by nationalist fervor and organized politically, many of the Kurdish immigrants have sought to influence the German public and government to put political pressure on the countries of their origin, particularly on Turkey, to change their policies against the Kurds. (10) From the mid-1980s onwards, they became quite active in politics and successfully lobbied German decision-makers into pressuring the Turkish authorities by making use of their contacts in both German politics and media. (11)

From the 1990s onwards, in particular, domestic security concerns played an important role in redefining Germany's policy toward the Kurds and the PKK. In Germany, where the PKK's network is strongest outside Turkey, the organization was able to recruit Kurds, who had been politicized on German soil, and has been succesful to find supporters from other ethnic communities, including the German society. (12) As such, Germany became a leading source of new recruits and financial assets for the PKK leadership, which transfers large amounts of money to senior figures in Turkey and Northern Iraq. According to a report by the Federal Authority to Protect the Constitution, or Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, the number of PKK members in Germany increased from 7,000 in 1993 to 14,000 in 2014. (13) When the organization instrumentalized violence, attempted to promote the violent activities of its members and engaged in violence in Germany with a view to molding the German public opinion in favor of its struggle against Turkey; however, the PKK became a domestic security threat to the German authorities. In the early 1990s, PKK members attacked Turkish-owned stores and diplomatic missions in Germany -which sparked a violent response from Turkish groups and alarmed the German authorities. During this period, concerns over domestic security became influential on Germany's PKK policy. (14)

Another factor behind Germany's Kurdish and PKK policy has been the demands of certain political parties from the German governments--including the Greens, the Left Party and part of the Social Democratic Party--for a human rights-oriented foreign policy. (15) The Greens and the Left Party, in particular, have traditionally raised the Kurdish question in the German Parliament and directed heavy criticism against Turkish authorities. (16) Since 1984, when the PKK launched its violent campaign, the Greens have argued that Turkey was fighting a war against the Kurds and urged the German government to halt all military and defense aid to Turkey. (17) Although the Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU) and the Liberal Party (FDP) maintained that Turkey had a right to defend itself against terrorists, they tried to alleviate domestic pressures by calling on Turkish authorities to improve their relations with minorities.

Moving forward, the Hafez al-Assad regime's chemical attacks against the Kurdish population of Halabja and the Saddam Hussein regime's cruel attitude against the Kurds in Iraq during and after the Gulf War (1990-91) made the German public more amenable to the group -which rebalanced the scales in favor of the Kurds. Therefore, the Turkish governments, as such, received more frequent calls from Germany during 1990s about respecting human rights whilst conducting counter-terrorism operations. (18)

German-Turkish relations, too, played an important role in Berlin's Kurdish policy. (19) Especially during the Cold War years, when Turkey was seen as a key NATO ally and a major trading partner for German companies, Berlin treated Turkey's anti-PKK campaign as a domestic issue and limited its criticism to satisfying the German public. When the Cold War ended and clashes in Turkey became more violent, however, Germany became more openly critical of human rights violations in Turkey (20) and argued that the country would be unable to join the European Union unless it addressed the Kurdish question. (21) Nonetheless, German leaders continued to stay on good terms with Turkey and actively tried to avoid political tension. (22)

Last but not least, the German government--which, in light of Kurdish nationalism's growing popularity, believes that an independent Kurdish state is still on the table--pays special attention to its relationship with the Kurds. (23) As a country whose energy supply heavily depends on Russia, Germany maintains that it must develop close relations with the Middle East in order to diversify its energy sources and remain a powerful player in the international arena. At this point, the German government believes it can leverage the Kurds, an increasingly prominent group, against Turkey, Iran and Iraq -countries beyond its control. (24) A noteworthy development, in this regard, was the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Erbil five years ago in an effort to improve bilateral relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government. (25) The German government, furthermore, started providing training and weapons to peshmerga forces, who had been fighting DAESH, in September 2014. (26) This German support is noteworthy, as for the first time in recent history, the German government actively became involved in an ongoing conflict. (27)

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The above factors motivated the German government to strike a healthy balance between domestic pressures and foreign policy considerations. Below, a summary of the practical implications of Germany's politics...