German--Iranian relations after the nuclear deal: geopolitical and economic dimensions.

AuthorFathollah-Nejad, Ali
PositionReport

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The Geopolitical Dimension

Germany's Role during the Nuclear Crisis: Following in Washington's Footsteps

While Iran's relations with Western Europe had deteriorated after the 1979 revolution, they nevertheless remained intact, with cooperation continuing in the economic, political, and cultural realms. Importantly, Tehran had traditionally viewed Europe as a counter-balance to U.S. pressures. This view had to be gradually revised during the 2000s, when Iran negotiated with the EU3 (the UK, France and Germany) over its nuclear program. Firstly, in the wake of the initial diplomatic breakthroughs leading to the Tehran (October 2003) and Paris (November 2004) Declarations, the Europeans did not fulfil Tehran's expectations in return for the 22-month suspension of its nuclear program (November 2003-August 2005), which were, namely to lobby the U.S. to dismiss its belligerent posture towards Iran and instead to offer Tehran a security guarantee, and to end the U.S. blockade over Iran's World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. Instead, once Iran resumed its nuclear program, accurately pointing out that the agreement was not fulfilled by the other side, the Europeans ratcheted-up the pressure, blaming Iran for having broken the accords, although the latter specified the temporary and confidence-building measure of suspension that should be reciprocated by equally meaningful steps. (1) Secondly, the failure in that initial phase of nuclear negotiations between the EU3 and Iran prompted an 'Americanization' of the EU's diplomatic strategy towards Iran by 2006. The Europeans had now adopted the U.S. position by demanding that Iran fully halt its nuclear program ('zero enrichment') as a precondition to further talks. If Iran did not give in, it would face the risk of a U.S. attack. Exactly a year into Ahmadinejad's presidency, this warning was communicated by Joschka Fischer, then Germany's Foreign Minister, at a speech delivered at the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) in Tehran. Fischer stressed "not to make the messenger responsible for the message." (2)

In fact, the 'Americanization' of Germany's Iran policy was driven by the German Chancellery which at that time was closely following Washington's line on many foreign policy issues. In this period, however, German companies which had enjoyed profitable business relations with Iran prior to the outbreak of the so-called nuclear crisis in 2002 and the ensuing campaign of sanctions against Iran heralded by the U.S. Treasury from 2004 onwards, had often expressed their frustration over Berlin having joined the U.S.-led coercive diplomacy against Tehran. Germany company representatives repeatedly stressed that while they were forced out of the lucrative Iranian market due to U.S. pressure, some U.S. firms were still indirectly involved in Iran. Specifically, German multinational companies like Siemens and Daimler, which have a strong stake in the U.S. market and financial system, cut their trade with Iran having come under pressure from the U.S. Treasury that had issued a warning a la George W. Bush Jr. of 'either you are with us or against us.' German foreign policy-makers rationalized their turn towards coercive diplomacy as a means of avoiding a scenario comparable to the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq. As a result, as Saghafi-Ameri and Ahadi have stated:

given the fact that the negotiations between Iran and the [EU3] and then the [P]5+1 countries on Iran's nuclear programme did not yield the desirable results, the observable tendency in the administration of Mr. Ahmadinejad was reviewing the foreign-policy approach [of the previous two presidencies of seeking detente and a "dialogue among civilizations"--AFN] and establishing closer ties with Eastern countries under the title of "Look to the East policy." (3) This strategy, however, proved to be futile, given Washington's unilateral power exerted upon those Asian countries with which Tehran sought closer ties.

The disagreement between the EU and Iran was embedded in a larger geopolitical conflict. In August 2005, negotiations between the two sides broke down after the EU3 offered a package of proposals to Iran, which Tehran harshly rejected. The director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) called the proposal a "humiliation of the Iranian people." Without any substantial offers in return for Europe's demand that Iran fully renounce its enrichment program (prompting an EU diplomat to label the package as "a lot of gift wrapping in a pretty empty box"), the package primarily reflected the EU's geopolitical will to tie Iran to Europe. Firstly, the package included the longer-term prospect of Iran becoming an important energy supplier for Europe (especially with a view to Iranian gas), in an attempt to diversify European energy supply in the face of an increasingly dominant Russian supplier. Secondly, the EU3 envisaged Iran as a market for its industrial products, holding out on the prospect of a trade agreement with Iran and on political support for Tehran's accession to the WTO--both of which would have facilitated European export of a range of products to Iran. Thirdly, while urging Iran to limit its nuclear activities to a minimum, the EU3 pledged to provide Iran with access to fuel rods and nuclear technology, which would have potentially put the Iranian nuclear sector in a situation of permanent dependency. Thus, the EU3's proposal demonstrates that the European states perceived Iran primarily as an energy supplier, as a market for European products, and as a country that should remain technologically dependent on Europe. The Iranian rejection led the Europeans on their part, and above all Germany, to react by fully aligning with the U.S. vis-a-vis Iran. (4) Against this background, in mid-2005, Germany's main foreign policy think-tank took note of "Iran's new distance from the West" (5)

Germany's Role during the Nuclear Negotiations

The election of the centrist Hassan Rouhani to the Iranian presidency in the summer of 2013 provided Germany, and the entire West, with an opportunity to change course. The ensuing nuclear negotiations were primarily made possible by two main factors: Indispensably, the U.S. dropped its unrealistic and therefore counterproductive demand for 'zero enrichment' in Iran. In addition to that, the White House had become increasingly dissatisfied with its closest regional allies, mainly Israel and Saudi Arabia, which prompted it to consider Iran as a solid actor when it came to stabilizing an unraveling and highly fragile region. Being part of the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) negotiating team, the German Federal Foreign Office helped facilitate the nuclear deal. It continually lobbied for the deal in public as well as behind closed doors and positioned itself against any potential spoilers of the deal, including its close ally Israel. In a tremendous diplomatic feat, the P5+1 and Iran eventually reached an agreement in July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

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The JCPOA's provisions are indeed historic. At its core lies the removal of the nuclear-related sanctions (those sanctions imposed during the nuclear crisis by the UN and by the U.S. allies, above all the EU), in exchange for the Iranian agreement to downsize its nuclear program. In December 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran had fulfilled its promise, thus paving the way for 'Implementation Day.' The tremendous extent of this downsizing is surprising, since Tehran had overstepped almost every red line it had set for its nuclear program during the crisis. Even the most skeptical Western nuclear experts working on the Iran dossier have voiced much satisfaction, agreeing that the deal would make it impossible for Iran to build a nuclear bomb without being caught by the strict inspection and safeguards regime. What has to be kept in mind, however, is the agreement's provision that the sanctions can be put back in place should Iran violate the deal--a prospect that is unlikely given that the Iranian elite aims to get rid of the sanctions. Moreover, the JCPOA is still upholding the arms and missile embargo against Iran for the next five and eight years, respectively, thus making sure that the regional imbalance in terms of conventional capabilities between Iran and, above all, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, will remain in place.

Germany and Iran after the JCPOA

Prior to the JCPOA it was widely anticipated that the agreement would have a relaxing effect on regional geopolitics as well as on Iran's domestic politics. This could turn out to be true in the mid--and long-term; in the short-term, however, the opposite dynamic set in: Political repression in Iran intensified under the umbrella of rapprochement with the West, while the already rampant anti-Iranian resentment of important political actors in the region (above all Saudi Arabia) only increased.

Since having reached the agreement in 2015, the German and Iranian foreign ministries have not ceased to stress that the nuclear deal can and should serve as a blueprint for tackling the other crises in the region and even beyond. However, the regional perception of the JCPOA differs strongly from this European assessment. The Iran nuclear deal has aggravated concerns by regional players as to Tehran's increasing geopolitical standing in the...

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