From energy security to energy governance: Turkey's role in a globalizing energy landscape.

• Author: Bayraktar, Alparslan
• Position: COMMENTARY

One of the commonplace issues in energy debates has been Russian/Middle Eastern dominance, as suppliers of oil and natural gas as well as energy security efforts have long been framed as "security of supply." The 1973-4 Oil Crisis was undeniably and historically the hallmark of the poignancy of such a framework. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War added "security of transit" to the agenda. With the increasing resilience of energy infrastructures, technological, and institutional innovations, we now are witnessing the "security of demand" concerns that push the conventional suppliers to rethink their policies. This triple area of concerns can be extended to include "energy poverty," since "resource wars" are not passe and remain a highly relevant contemporary issue. Further, the least developed countries are the most vulnerable ones to climate change and suffer from the lack of emancipation from the extant "poverty trap." (1)

Although it would be a chimera to state that political and foreign policy considerations are no longer part of the energy security debate, it can be claimed that robust infrastructure and institutions now prevail over political whims in shaping the reality and "feeling" (2) of security. The most important empirical evidence of depoliticization of energy security is the European Union's (henceforth, EU) construction of a single voice in energy (3) and its leadership in the fight against climate change, (4) as well as improving relations with the Russian Federation after prolonged squabbling between the two parties. As an EU candidate country and poised between energy supply and demand nodes, Turkey can transform this critical juncture of a changing energy security paradigm into being an energy hub with more robust markets and institutions at home and abroad.

This article is an attempt to narrate how the energy security landscape has transitioned from a centralized, politics-intensive, zero-sum game-oriented structure into a decentralized, market-intensive, conciliatory structure where all actors realize that interdependency triumphs and institutions would do well to follow suit. In the first part, a historical and conceptual background of energy security will be outlined to be followed by a discussion on the regional and global developments, with the EU at the center of this analysis, which will enhance the understanding of Turkey's energy case. The evolution of EU-Russia relations along with internal developments in the EU and Russia will clarify how energy security is perceived and managed to derive lessons for Turkey. The role of international/transnational organizations, with an emphasis on increasing salience of regulatory agencies, will be given in the last section to make a compelling case for more active involvement in such networks, as energy policy has become more a "beyond-nation-state phenomenon" and an archetype of networked governance. The main idea is that the challenges of energy poverty, climate change, and sustainability cease to become daunting tasks for states to manage with the right institutions in place.

A Global Great Game or a Quest for Better Rules?

There is probably no area of anthropogenic life not touched by energy. Rasmussen once implied that "when faced with the problem of energy, we are facing ourselves." (5) This is why conventionally, energy security conceptualization has been shaped in accordance with "logic of war, subsistence and total security logic" and provided legitimacy for totalistic energy security policies. (6) The old Great Game of the 19th century between the Russian and British Empires has been replaced by a new Great Game, (7) whereby the newly-independent former Soviet countries, China, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan are in the lineup along with transnational corporations and their home governments. (8) One of the most important junctures for energy security in the early twentieth century has been oil's substitution for coal in Britain during WWI and later in the U.S. by Truman administration's efforts to overcome coal mine strikes. (9) From 1948 onwards, oil was the primary commodity to complete post-War reconstruction. One of President Truman's four themes in his 1949 inauguration speech was about the spread of technical advice and know-how for underdeveloped regions. This theme corresponded to expanding oil production and setting the rules of the game with peacetime military presence in the Middle East being a natural by-product. (10) In 1951, the Paley Commission's Resources for Freedom report advised Truman that "a new economy of energy must depend on both rational individual consumption of energy... and a necessary but limited intervention of the part of the state to support energy technologies." (11) Later in 1961, American Petroleum Head Frank M. Porter coined the term of "energy security" in his testimony to the House of Representatives, where he also emphasized "techno-scientific advancement." (12)

Until the formation of OPEC in 1960, competition between International Oil Companies (IOCs) was controlled via a cartel agreement (Achnacarry, 1928), which set production quotas. After independent production and competition increased and OPEC initiated its quota mechanism, these IOCs shifted their attention to unexploited non-OPEC territories of the North Sea, Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico. (13) Technological innovation was accompanied by institutional innovation in the management of 1973-74 and 1978-79 Oil Crises. This new institutional approach had actually been anticipated. As Timothy Mitchell traces in his article, energy's "ubiquity" and consumption in a "taken-for-granted" manner were sharply attended by the scientific community in 1967 and three years later, Federal Power Commission Chair John Nassikas used the "national energy crisis" discourse in his speech at the National Press Club. His statement had two themes: "deficiencies in energy supplies" and "deregulation," as the main remedy. (14) Then came the 1973 Oil Embargo on the 19th of October, precipitated by the U.S. "unwillingness to support negotiations that would address the question of Palestine." (15) The U.S. response was deregulation...