Faraway so close!: The effect of Asian values on Australia's interactions with East Asia.

• Author: Baba, Gurol
• Position: Report

Introduction

Beginning in the 1990s, several discourses emerged to interpret the existence and virtues of Asian values, two of which constitute the starting point of this research. The first one focuses on East Asia's major cultural commonalities. The second one explains how these commonalities have contributed to East Asian economic development. This research merges the two in order to accentuate two dimensions of Asian values: the psychological "P" (cultural and intellectual) and the pragmatic "P" (economic and commercial). For the Asian Values literature the two "Ps" mark almost a new dichotomy, particularly in terms of interpreting a non-Asian actor's interactions with the region. Asian values are mostly analysed as Confucian projections of Asian, specifically East and South-eastern, commonalities. Yet the research on the two "P"s skews this angle, by merging various discourses on Asian values, and aims to cast a light on how Asian values operate inter/intra East Asian interactions.

The 2 "P"s operate in East Asia both independently and complementary. The psychological dimension has an intellectual and cultural value, which claims the exclusiveness of East Asia and its distinctiveness from the "West." The pragmatic dimension has an economic and commercial value, which almost discards East Asia's supposed distinctiveness, and initiates and sustains East Asia's commercial relations with non-Asians. The values represented by the two "P"s complement each other in terms of supporting East Asia's economic development and maintaining the level of development within the East Asian framework. This research aims to provide clues so that non-Asian powers can approach the region with more Asia-compatible policies and deepen and broaden the spectrum of their relations across the region.

One of the non-Asian powers that stands to benefit from this analysis, which enjoys a significant geographical but relatively less cultural proximity to East Asia, is Australia. The Australian case study illustrates how, for non-Asian actors, the psychological and pragmatic elements of East Asian culture are necessarily two sides of the same coin. It also reveals the type of interactions of a non-East Asian country that are hindered by the influence of Asian values, when not understood.

The seemingly symbiotic nature of the 2 "P"s highlights the fact that Asian values do not create an exclusionist tendency, or an "authentically Asian" way of doing business; rather they generate flexibility in the region in terms of economic and commercial interdependencies, and keep the communication and business channels open for non-Asian actors. Yet, for diplomatic and political relations, Asian values have a restrictive effect on non-Asians. Australia's reluctance to brandish its "Asianess" (and as a consequence engage seriously with Asian values) has restrained Canberra's strategic thinking about the changes in Asia and their resulting challenges, particularly when relations among the Asian Giants are problematic or tense. This limits Australia's political and strategic weight in the region.

To alleviate the limitations caused by the influence of 2 "P"s, simply understanding Asian values may not be sufficient for non-Asian actors,

as can be seen in the Australian example. They need to both understand and integrate these values into their diplomatic practice, and demonstrate a more culturally/ psychologically Asia-oriented approach through their strategic and political relations with the region. Such an effort will enable Australia and other non Asian actors to be welcomed as more equal partners by East Asia, and will also increase their space to manoeuvre during a crisis among Asian giants.

Asian Values in Practice: The 2 "P"s

A great deal of post-Cold War IR literature has focused on the role of the peculiarities of Asia's rise, namely the "East Asian miracle." The developments (2) unearthed cultural, commercial and even psychological elements peculiar to East Asia, which are known collectively as "Asian values." These values are not crystal clear and cannot easily be categorized. As Koro Bessho (3) underlined, there is 'no single set of clearly defined values applicable to Asia as a whole, or even to East Asia' This makes Asian values more of a flexible and comprehensive set of cultural and psychological commonalities than a rigid regional identity package.

Although the discourse on Asian values has changed focus over time, its psycho-cultural motto has stayed the same: East Asia is proudly and exclusively different from the "West" The term "Asian values," in today's understanding, was first used in the 1970s in order to make cultural reference to the East Asian Miracle by focusing on merely Asian qualities. (4) The discourse was rejuvenated with the Universalist claims of human rights and democracy made by the United States in the 1990s. East Asian countries saw this claim not as an exemplary humanitarian value, but as the creeping reach of the U.S.' ideological domination. (5) Thus both in the 1970s and the 1990s, Asian values discourse emanating from Asia itself had an anti-Western feeling and an assumption of Asian supremacy.

There are four major strands of the discourse on Asian values. (6) The first strand asserts that Asia has a distinct value system based on collective destiny, individual sacrifice, and communitarianism. The values and institutions of Western democracy do not completely fit into this system. The assertion of a distinctly Asian values system has been criticized on the basis that proposing such a value set is a deliberate ploy to justify and protect East Asian semi-democratic regimes. (7) Supporting this criticism, Malaysia's former Deputy Prime Minister stated that 'it is altogether shameful to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices'. (8)

The second strand of Asian values discourse focuses on the philosophical and historical roots of Asian values in Confucian and other Asian traditional texts. The proponents of this strand (9) claim that although Asian values are not compatible with the notions of Western democracy, they are still democratic by their very nature. Criticisms of this approach argue that 'proving' the democratic underpinnings of Asian values by referring to ancient Asian texts (particularly Confucian, Buddhist, Indian epics, Mongolian, and Persian dating from about the 8th century), is disingenuous: nearly anything can be 'proven about pro-democratic ideas' using this method. (10)

The third strand, which attracts relatively less criticism, aims to find empirical links between Asia's political and economic development and its values, from a trans-regional and transnational perspective. (11) The fourth strand downplays the cultural authenticity of these values (12) by arguing that they 'are not especially Asian by any significant sense,' and can be found in other civilizations. (13) According to this analysis, economic reforms in East Asian countries are more about 'socio-cultural engineering' than Confucian cultural heritage. (14)

It is not easy to capture the essence of Asian values in a single document since they are "living, breathing cultural forces, too subtle, too slippery, above all too alive." (15) They are not static but rather remodelled, reimagined, and reappropriated at different times. Nevertheless, merging the first and third approaches above reveals two dominant areas of the influence of Asian values: psychological (cultural/intellectual) and pragmatic (economic/commercial). These 2 "P"s operate both independently and complementarily at the same time.

The crux of the psychological "P" goes back to the German thinkers' unique German Kultur arguments developed against the democratization trend in Britain, France and the United States. (16) Originating from these arguments, this "P" emphasizes East Asia's distinct cultural value system almost as a reaction to Western democratic, individualistic and liberal values. (17) In this sense, reference to Asian values is an intellectual effort to uplift and emphasize East Asia's cultural peculiarities.

The psychological "P" was a recurring feature of the Singaporean and Malaysian statesmen's statements of the 1970s, perhaps a result of the increasing influence of South East Asia, which coincided with weakening Chinese and Indian political leadership in the region in the 1960s. (18) The English colonial legacy in these countries also meant that the politicians could deftly manoeuvre and project their views in the English-dominated international media. Asian unity was also appealing to the political elites of these former colonies, as a means of cementing the multiethnic nation within the state. (19) The statements stressed that Asian values were not only unique but also "better" than their Western equivalents. Former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, defined Western values as "infectious" in his speech on National Day in 1978 and the 'antidote' he proposed should be the "strong assertion of the Asian values common to all Singapore's ethnic groups," and that "the virtues of individual subordination to the community ... counteracted] the disruptive individualism of western liberalism." (20)

With the end of the Cold War, the psychological narrative of Asian values transformed once again as an expression of confidence, pride and the empowerment of being "Asian" and being different from, or even opposing, the West. Lee Kuan Yew and former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad often argued that these values had invigorated Asia and had paved the way for the East Asian miracle. (21) Mohamad stated:

"There was much talk of the 21st Century becoming the Asian Century. The Europeans were not going to have things their way much longer. ... The threat of Asian domination of the world in the 21st Century was becoming more and more real. They could not be stopped militarily. Nor could the West defeat them and impoverish them by...