F-35 Crisis between the U.S. and Turkiye: Is This the End of American Nuclear Assurance for Turkiye?

• Author: Oguz, Safak

Introduction

Europeans have often been suspicious of American intentions, but nuclear weapons have long been one of the most important tools, and perhaps the most important one, by which the U.S. prevented a possible Soviet conventional or nuclear attack in Europe during the Cold War. Europe's hesitations proved prescient when the U.S. urged its NATO allies to replace a 'massive retaliation' strategy with a 'flexible response' after Americans realized, with the launch of Sputnik in 1957, that the Soviet Union was able to strike U.S. territory.

The willingness of Americans to use strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet Union or Russian attack has been vague since NATO's earliest days and especially after the endorsement of a flexible response strategy. European allies, however, preferred to rely on the American nuclear umbrella within NATO to deter a possible Soviet threat because that has been the best, lowest cost, and most reliable security strategy. In addition to the strategic nuclear weapons (SNWs) located on American territory, the U.S. also deployed tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe, including in Turkiye, during the Cold War, although command and control of these weapons and the procedures under which they would be used remained vague.

The end of the Cold War opened a new era of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on non-proliferation, nuclear arms limitations, and nuclear arms reductions. Both sides agreed to reduce TNWs, which are not covered by any treaty, right after the end of the Cold War in the wake of discussions about the value and efficiency of these weapons in the new post-Cold War security environment.

Based on the paradigms of the new security environment, the U.S. has withdrawn most of its TNWs in Europe, except nuclear gravity bombs designed to be used by special fighters such as the F-4, F-100, F-104, or F-16 series, which are also known as dual capability aircraft (DCA). For now, the U.S. has gravity bombs in Europe deployed at military bases in Turkiye, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy. These host states use different versions of fighters as DCA, but they are also modernizing or procuring new fighters compatible with modernized B61 gravity bombs.

F-35 Lightning II, the fifth-generation fighter produced by the U.S.-led consortium that is funded by several NATO members, including Turkiye, is planned to be the default DCA for B61 gravity bombs in Europe. Allies that host U.S.' nuclear weapons have planned to procure F-35 fighters in different ways.

However, recent crises between Turkiye and the U.S. have changed these plans. The U.S. decided to remove Turkiye from the F-35 program and canceled delivery of the F-35 fighters Turkiye had paid for because of Turkiye's S-400 procurement from Russia. Although this has not been part of any discussions in Turkiye or the international community, the F-35 crisis between the U.S. and Turkiye also has a nuclear dimension.

Turkiye recently asked the U.S. to either allow it to rejoin the F-35 program or to sell it new F-16 fighters and modernization kits that will allow it to restore the efficiency of its air force, which urgently and desperately needs new-generation fighters. The U.S. response might be a crucial factor for NATO-Turkiye relations as well as for the solidarity and cohesion of the alliance. A negative American response to Turkiye's request may force Turkiye to consider asking Russia or China for new-generation fighters -an act that might trigger another crisis in the alliance. Such a step might result in the withdrawal of the U.S.' tactical nuclear weapons, which would urge the alliance to reconsider its nuclear deterrence policies, including its nuclear posture amid the Russian-Ukrainian crisis.

U.S.' Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe and Recent Modernization Program

There has not been any unique description of TNWs, which are also known as sub-strategic, non-strategic, or theater nuclear weapons. They are defined largely by exclusion and are set apart from SNWs, which include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. (1) They have not been part of any treaty or agreement in the Cold War or post-Cold War era and are commonly defined as 'not an SNW These weapons are mainly associated with lower yields and a shorter-range effect compared to the SNWs. However, it is worth noting, as highlighted by Sauer and Zwaan, that this definition might be misleading since most TNWs are more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb, which is why range-of-delivery vehicles for TNWs provide a better criterion. (2)

As with SNWs, the Cold War witnessed a massive TNWs arms race in which both the U.S. and the Soviet Union produced enormous nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons became the main game changer on the battlefield, and nuclear deterrence shaped international policy during the Cold War. As Burns and Siracusa pointed out, "If nuclear weapons changed the nature of modern war, their political ramifications were even greater." (3)

In addition to their strategic nuclear capabilities, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union deployed lower-yield and shorter-range TNWs to allied territories for use on the battlefield for limited or tactical objectives. The U.S. deployed TNWs in eight NATO countries between 1954 and 1963, a process that started with the arrival of the first TNWs in Britain in September 1954. (4) The number of TNWs deployed to Europe rose to almost 3,000 by 1960, doubled to 6,000 by 1965, and peaked in 1971 at approximately 7,300. (5) The U.S. and NATO doctrines on TNWs in Europe during the Cold War were, in part, based on the controversial notion that these weapons served as a rung on the escalation ladder lending them, in effect, a deterrent role- and TNWs was a guarantee of the U.S. commitment to Europe. (6) They reduced the financial burden of stationing troops and expanded the U.S. ability to respond quickly to an enemy attack before ICBMs and nuclear-armed submarines became the backbone of the U.S. arsenal. (7)

Especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. and Soviet Union concluded crucial treaties regarding nuclear weapons and missile defense systems, but TNWs have never been part of any official discussion or treaty. Right after the Cold War, both sides, along with host states, started questioning the importance and value of TNWs deployed in Europe as well as other parts of the world, while the international community mainly focused on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), especially those of the former Soviet Union. Rather than any treaty, the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) concluded when U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin established unilateral/reciprocal measures that allowed fast and drastic reductions without a formal arms control agreement and therefore without verification, and resulted in the removal of only half of the deployed TNWs. (8) However, as pointed out both in the U.S. Nuclear Review Strategy and NATO's 1991 Strategic Document, remaining TNWs deployed in Europe were regarded as the backbone of America's extended assurance to its European allies.

In the new security environment, the U.S. decided to reduce the number of deployed TNWs in Europe and keep only B61 gravity bombs for the use of DCA. Thus, starting in 1991, the U.S. reduced European-deployed TNWs from 1,500 to roughly 200 by 2007, including the removal of all TNWs from the UK and Greece. According to a fact sheet prepared by the U.S. government, the number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons has declined by more than 90 percent since September 30, 1991. (9)

The exact number of TNWs in Europe is still not clear, but most people believe that 150 nuclear weapons are deployed in six military bases in five countries: Turkiye, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. A copy of a draft report prepared by NATO called "A New Era for Nuclear Deterrence? Modernization, Arms Control, and Allied Nuclear Forces," published by a Belgian newspaper that received a copy from a Belgian politician, verified that 150 weapons are located in these states. The report stated that 50 of these weapons are deployed at the Incirlik base in Turkiye. (10) The existence of 50 weapons in Turkiye was also tacitly acknowledged by President Donald Trump in 2019. (11)

NATO has been revising its nuclear...