Evaluating the Fighter Jet Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations.

• Author: Ersen, Emre

Introduction

Turkey and Russia enjoy more than five hundred years of diplomatic relations with each other. Yet, this long history has been dominated by rivalries and conflicts rather than cooperation and partnership. Since the 15th century, the geopolitical struggle between Ottoman sultans and Russian tsars over the Black Sea and the Balkans resulted in many Ottoman-Russian wars. Even the simultaneous collapse of the two empires during the First World War did not radically change the picture in the Turkish-Russian relations. Although the Soviet Union and the newly founded Republic of Turkey attempted to develop a strategic dialogue in the 1920s, this came to an abrupt end with the start of the Second World War. Stalin leadership's demand of territory in Eastern Anatolia as well as greater control in the Turkish Straits in the post-war period compelled Turkey to join NATO in 1952 and strategically align with the Western bloc during the Cold War. Still, particularly from 1960s onwards, Ankara and Moscow gradually improved their economic ties in the fields of trade, industry and energy despite political and ideological differences.

In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union presented a unique opportunity to initiate a breakthrough in the Turkish-Russian relations. For the first time, mutual economic interests started to play a much more important role than military factors in shaping the relationship between the two countries. (1) During this period, rapidly increasing volumes of trade and other economic considerations began to shape the course of their political dialogue, while a new concept of "multidimensional partnership" was introduced to define the new relations between Turkey and Russia. (2) Each country's problematic relationship with the West also played a crucial role in the evolution of cooperation with one another. This has been particularly true for Turkey, which has traditionally tended to strengthen links with Russia, whenever it confronted significant issues with its NATO allies. In the 2000s, as Turkish policymakers encountered new problems with the U.S. and EU, they started to perceive Russia as an important pole--and sometimes even an ally. Considering Moscow was also subject to sharp criticisms from the West during the same period, the Turkish-Russian rapprochement gained further momentum. (3) In this regard, it is important to note that Turkey was the only NATO member state that refused to impose sanctions against Moscow following the crisis in Ukraine and the referendum in Crimea in 2014.

As relations between Turkey and Russia were steadily developing, the Arab uprisings started to sweep across the Middle East and North Africa. During this period, a closer relationship with Russia became even more important, particularly after Turkey began to confront serious conflicts with some of its Middle Eastern neighbors. Apart from the impacts of the massive humanitarian tragedy caused by the ongoing chaos in Syria, Ankara also felt threatened by the violent armed clashes taking place in its south in the form of civil wars and terrorist attacks. Moscow, on the other hand, viewed the developments in the Arab world mainly in the light of its global rivalry with the U.S. Russia's firm support to the Bashar Assad government during the Syrian civil war can only be understood within the framework of its global, regional and national threat and interest perceptions. (4)

In September 2015, Russia opened a new phase in its support for the Assad regime with direct airstrikes in Syria, primarily targeting the rebel groups supported by Turkey. In a matter of weeks, Turkish-Russian relations deteriorated rapidly due to the strengthened Russian military presence in the region. Eventually, on November 24, 2015, Turkish armed forces shot down a Russian SU-24 fighter jet on the grounds that it was violating Turkey's airspace. Ankara carried the issue to the agenda of NATO, while Moscow harshly responded by declaring a series of economic sanctions against Turkey and accusing the government of helping the terrorist groups in Syria. As a result, political, economic and cultural ties between the two were decidedly frosty during the following seven months until President Erdogan sent a letter of regret to President Putin in June 2016.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the impacts of the fighter jet crisis on Turkish-Russian relations. Although political and economic links between the two countries have significantly improved, particularly after the meeting between Erdogan and Putin in St. Petersburg in August 2016, it should be emphasized this is also, in large part, due to the sharp deterioration of Ankara's relations with both the U.S. and EU in the wake of the July 2016 failed coup attempt. More importantly, despite the remarkably quick reconciliation process between Ankara and Moscow, the two countries have so far failed to resolve their differences regarding the regional conflicts not only in the Middle East, but also in the Black Sea and Caucasus. (5) Their ongoing disagreements about the Syrian issue in particular still constitute the greatest challenge to the development of a genuine Turkish-Russian strategic partnership in the short term.

The Syrian Conundrum

Turkey has a long 911-kilometer land border with Syria. As the civil war in Syria escalated in early 2011, Turkey was confronted with a number of serious security issues originating from the chaos in this country. Apart from the threats posed by terrorist organizations such as the ISIS as well as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Ankara also suffered from the immense social and economic problems caused by more than three million people fleeing civil war and taking refuge in Turkey. Blaming the Assad government for the escalation of the crisis, Turkey offered support to opposition groups, along with some of the Western countries in the autumn of 2011. It also became a vocal critic of the Assad regime on the international stage and argued the issue could not be resolved as long as Assad remained in power. This approach inevitably created a rift between Ankara and Moscow, as the latter is one of the main supporters of the regime along with Iran.

Disagreements about Syria had already caused a number of problems between Turkey and Russia before the fighter jet crisis. For example, Turkey's request from NATO to deploy Patriot missiles near the Turkish-Syrian border was criticized by Moscow. (6) The various international meetings held in Geneva, which brought together the warring parties in Syria, also failed to resolve the significant differences between Turkey and Russia. The issue was even tackled at the High-Level Cooperation Council meeting held in Ankara in December 2014. Yet, while Putin praised Assad for a significant win in the elections in Syria in a joint press conference, Erdogan reacted by saying "pro-coup leaders are elected by a high margin everywhere in the world." (7)

Assad's political future was not the only issue that caused friction between the two countries. There have also been disagreements regarding the fight against ISIS in the region. Although both countries stated several times that they viewed ISIS as a common threat, Russia objected to Turkey's proposal to establish a "safe zone" for refugees and opposition groups in northern Syria and indicated this could only be possible after the issue was discussed in the UN Security Council. (8) Moscow also criticized Turkey's bombardment of the PKK camps in Iraq in July 2015 on similar grounds and emphasized once again that the Turkish action required UN Security Council approval. (9)

Despite their disagreements about Syria, it is important to note Turkey and Russia have also tried to maintain a degree of political dialogue with each other. This was particularly important in the quick resolution of the crisis that escalated following Turkey's decision to force a passenger plane en route from Moscow to Damascus to land at the Esenboga Airport in Ankara in October 2012. Although Turkish officials claimed the aircraft carried military equipment to the Assad regime, Russia did not turn this into a major issue and the crisis was resolved in a matter of days through diplomatic channels between the two countries. Putin's official visit to Turkey shortly after this incident was also interpreted as a sign that relations were not upset by disagreements over Syria. (10)

In fact, even the start of Russia's airstrikes in Syria on September 30, 2015 did not immediately interrupt the political dialogue between Ankara and Moscow. For example, only a week before the Russian military campaign began, Erdogan joined the opening ceremony of the Cathedral Mosque in Moscow, while Putin visited Antalya in November 2015 to attend the G-20 summit, meeting many Turkish officials. Although the two governments again failed to reach an understanding about the Syrian conflict during these meetings, Putin said, in a press conference held only ten days before the downing of the Russian fighter jet, that Turkey and Russia had "common priorities" and the Syrian issue was not an obstacle for the improvement of bilateral relations. (11)

It can be argued that two major factors have been decisive in the toughening of Turkey's criticisms against Russia's military presence in Syria. First, Turkey became extremely concerned about Russian jet assaults on Turkish-supported rebel groups rather than the ISIS targets. (12) Ankara even issued a joint statement together with the U.S., France, Germany, Qatar and Saudi Arabia condemning Russia's bombing of these groups as well as civilians in the region. (13) Erdogan also publicly criticized the Russian airstrikes, saying he could not understand the rationale of this military intervention given Russia does not share a border with Syria. (14)

A more important factor that resulted in alienation for Turkey was the issue of the Syrian Kurds. In July 2015, an attack by ISIS in...