EU-Turkey relations in the context of the Middle East after the Arab Spring.

AuthorKaracasulu, Nilufer
PositionReport

Introduction

The EU was slow in responding to the recent developments in the Middle East. It was even criticized for lacking a strategy toward the countries affected by the Arab Spring. Furthermore, the EU sent contradictory signals regarding the democratic transitions and political reforms. Still, it is not clear if it is supporting stability or change. Meanwhile, Turkish foreign policy became more active and assertive searching for a leadership role in the Middle East. Yet, this approach has raised a critical question: whether Turkey follows an autonomous foreign policy from the West, namely the US and the EU, in other words the "losing Turkey" debate. Trying to elaborate on this debate, the article analyzes Turkey and the EU foreign policies towards the Middle East in the context of the Arab Spring with a particular emphasis on the cases of Egypt, Iran, and Syria. These three cases are chosen for two reasons. First, instability in these states has destabilizing outcomes for the whole region, which in return influences the policy priorities of both Turkey and the EU, including security and economic considerations. In this respect, these cases are helpful in understanding the changing approaches of Turkey and the EU after the Arab Spring. Second, these three cases have come to the fore out of the Arab Spring. On the one hand, Egypt and Syria are the two states, which have been highly subject to the destabilizing impact of the Arab Spring. There is an ongoing devastating civil war in Syria; and Egypt entered into a new complicated transition period with the deposition of President Morsi by the army. On the other hand, Iran took advantage of this process, consolidating its role as a major player in the region. It has now become impossible to solve the Syrian crisis without Iran's involvement. In this context, Iran sat at the table with the major powers to talk about its nuclear program with a stronger hand. The six major powers, namely Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, and Iran twice had a meeting and will meet again on April 7, 2014. They are seeking for a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue.

This article argues that even though their strategies are not totally in line with each other, Turkey follows the same objectives that the EU neighborhood policy has pursued towards the Middle East. (1) Meaning, economic opportunity and peace are the main driving forces of its actions. Turkish regional foreign policy should be based on a firm Western and EU anchor accompanied with revitalization of its EU membership process, even if Turkey-EU negotiations have stagnated in the past few years. In this context, the onus is on Turkey to quell concerns about its goals by supporting peace, democracy, and prosperity in the region. Of course, EU membership is not a must for the success of Turkey's regional foreign policy; but as argued by Keyman (2) and Onis, (3) previous experiences indicated that EU membership is important for the success of Turkey's democracy, economy, and foreign policy strategy based on soft power. Indeed, to make full use of its soft power in foreign policy, Turkey's political and economic transformation should be regarded as a success story. Soft power is embedded in the "value-based" definition of power. (4) Furthermore, bilateral cooperation has the potential to create a positive effect on regional transformation, because the EU has financial and institutional resources, while Turkey enjoys more popularity and credibility, thus it can be regarded as a path for inspiration.

Numerous analysts have advocated that Turkey-EU cooperation could better face the challenges the Middle East represents by aligning Turkish regional foreign policy with the EU. (5) They pointed out that Turkey and the EU can work together in helping to reform political systems in the region and that the EU's capacity to disseminate its values and stabilize the Middle East can be enhanced with Turkey's partnership. This literature also indicates the numerous obstacles for cooperation between Turkey and the EU on foreign policy issues.

First, Turkey fears going towards a 'privileged partnership' and does not want to have a foreign policy dialogue outside the accession framework. Second, it is reluctant to discuss foreign policy issues outside the EU summits. Third, the EU has its own hesitations to discuss with Turkey strategic issues and is often internally divided among its member states on foreign policy issues. Fourth, the European financial crisis has tied its hands and caused it to seriously reconsider its role as a "player" in world politics or a "payer," especially when it comes to the Arab world. Fifth, the EU has trepidations on Turkey's new visa policy that abolishes visa requirements for certain countries in the Middle East.

This article also accepts that there are obstacles for a common EU foreign policy, but for analytical purpose, this article focuses on the union rather than on the particular member states. In this context, the EU's first High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, in October 2013 stated "we need to be able to act through CSFP, as a security provider in the neighborhood and at the international level to protect our interests and project our values. Member States' commitment to this is required." (6) It is well known that the EU countries, in many cases, lack consensus, making it difficult to arrive at a joint strategy, which in turn complicated a coordinated effort between Turkey and the EU towards the Middle East in the post Arab Spring. Thus, it has been recognized that coordinated foreign policy between Turkey and the EU is not an easy accomplishment, but still it is important that Turkish regional foreign policy should be based on a firm Western and EU anchor as indicated by Onis, "making the EU membership the pivotal element or the central axis of its multi-dimensional foreign policy." (7)

Turkey's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East

How does Turkey approach regional affairs? Instead of Turkey's traditional policy of regional detachment, which was the rule during the Cold War, there has been a search for deep engagement in the last decade, illustrated by the foreign policy slogan "zero problems with neighbors." According to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the core principles of Turkish foreign policy are "a balance between security and freedom, zero problems with neighbors, a multidimensional foreign policy, a pro-active regional foreign policy, an altogether new diplomatic style, and rhythmic diplomacy." (8) The progressive membership process with the EU in the early 2000s made it easier for the AK Party government to gain the support of pro-EU segments of Turkish society and to undertake significant reforms on the domestic front, both of which in return strengthened the AK Party's hand in implementing its foreign policy vision. (9) With this approach, Turkish foreign policy set the nation's economic interests at the top of its agenda while still privileging improvement of political relations. Thus, considering its economic opportunities, it was eager to develop peaceful relations with its neighboring countries, namely Iran, Iraq, and Syria. (10)

Meanwhile, Turkey's accession process to the EU, which has been a top priority for the AK Party government since 2002, lost steam during the government's second term. This was in part due to an internal EU debate on the issue of whether Turkey has a European identity. This debate grew in intensity in 2005 with the opening of membership negotiations.

Instead, an alternative status was presented as an option, causing negative sentiments in Turkey. Furthermore, in 2006, the issue of Cyprus had frozen eight chapters of the EU's acquis communautaire. According to Davutoglu "the relations with the EU did not progress to an extent that we would like to see, but the relationship has continued." (11) Nevertheless, Turkey and the EU have restarted accession talks in November 2013, three and a half years after their last meeting. Overall, the EU membership process has gone exceptionally slowly while at the same time Turkey continued to give great importance to the Middle East in its foreign policy.

A key to understanding the new vision of Turkey towards the Middle East is the AK Party government's quest to become a regional power. Its goals encompass being an order instituting country (duzen kurucu); an actor shaping the game (oyun kurucu); a problem solving country (sorun cozucu) by being a mediator or a facilitator in regional conflicts; and a reliable and strong actor. Turkey is following an assertive foreign policy. Conveying a new vision for Turkey that actively seeks ways to balance its relationships and alliances within its region, the AK Party government delivers an image of a self-confident regional power. Thus, to many observers, Turkey has been seeking a semi-hegemonic order. (12) Yet, in its Middle East policy, Turkey has been trying to increase dialogue and apply an active and multidimensional diplomacy. It also attempted to enlarge economic cooperation by increasing relations such as trade, transportation, and direct or indirect investments. (13) Before the Arab Spring, Turkey tried to develop its regional ties independent of the level of democratization in the countries based on maximization of its interests, but it also encouraged reforms behind closed doors by fostering dialogue.

Turkey's Regional Approach after the Arab Spring: the Cases of Egypt, Iran, and Syria

After the Arab Spring, Turkey supported democracy promotion in the region, if necessary, siding with the societies of regional actors for a regime change. (14) Criticizing the previous Western approach towards the region and attributing to them the stagnation of any type of democracy and reform in the Middle East, Davutoglu explained that:

The values demanded by the...

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