Engineering a European Islam: An Analysis of Attempts to Domesticate European Muslims in Austria, France, and Germany.

• Author: Bayrakli, Enes
• Position: ARTICLE - Essay

Introduction

Richard Traunmuller shows in his quantitative empirical study that there was an increasing tendency in the EU 27-member states (3) from 1990 to 2011 to regulate religions. (4) Although Traunmuller's study speaks of a general trend and does not deal with differences in the states' policies in regard to different religious communities, this trend is especially true for Islam. As Jonathan Laurence shows in his study from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, "gone were the ad hoc responses [...] and in came corporatist-style institution building and the establishment of 'state-mosque' relations." (5) Especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, European countries became more and more interested in gradually taking "'ownership' of their Muslim populations because it grants them unique influence over organizations and leadership." (6)

By influencing how Islam should look, national governments aim at creating "the institutional conditions for the emergence of a French or German Islam, e.g., rather than just tolerating Islam 'in France or Germany" (7) This reflects two aims of these states: i) to free Muslims and disconnect them from an allegedly foreign policy agenda, especially from the influence of the embassies of their origin countries, and ii) to 'moderate' those Muslim organizations that have a transnational link to Islamist movements. (8) Many authors share the observation that states want a domesticized, "democratic European Islam" in the context of debates about Islam as constituting a threat to "security," (9) "integration," and "European values," (10) while others also problematize the racial dimension that structures these attempts. (11)

In most European countries, the initiative to create 'state-mosque' relations comes from Ministries of the Interior, which have institutionalized 'dialogue platforms' to discuss issues of Islam, society, inclusion and extremism with Muslim actors. For Muslim civil society actors, the main purpose of participating in these state initiatives is to negotiate the institutional incorporation of Muslim institutions into the political system, and the accommodation of Muslim religion, as Luis Manuel Hernandez Aguilar shows for the case of Germany. (12) While a number of analyses discuss these Islam policies on a European level, (13) in a comparative perspective in different European countries (14) or single cases such as Austria, (15) Germany, (16) France, (17) or Great Britain, there is little critical research comparing Islam Politics on a cross-national European level.

One of the most quoted works by political scientists is Fetzer and Soper's comparative study on the accommodation of Islam in Germany, France and Britain. (18) Drawing on social movement theory, their main insight is that historically built church-state relations pre-structure the accommodation of Islam. This basically affirms the approach of path dependency as taught in theories of institutionalism, which is also shared by other authors. (19) Tatari has added to the four theories of social movement theory (SMT) discussed by Fetzer and Soper (resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structure theory, ideological theories, and approaches highlighting the influence of church-state relations) a fifth explanatory factor, which is "to account for the religious traditions characteristic of a particular group." (20) Others rather questioned the SMT approach. For instance, Loobuyck et al. have demonstrated that church-state regimes did not have an impact on the institutionalization of representative Muslim organizations, which is an important critique of Fetzer and Soper's work, who take the different treatments of Muslims -compared to the dominant churches- by the state as given. In their analysis of cases in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK, they argue that "several states have abandoned their traditional methods when dealing with the institutionalization of Islam." (21) They conclude with the observation of a trend that "transcends disparate regimes and relies mostly on other factors such as acknowledgment of Islam, security and integration policy." (22) The evidence for this claim lies in the timing of the beginning of these policies alongside political incidents, explicit reference to de-radicalization -or at the very least "dialogue"- and the call for a "European Islam" to replace a variety of Islamic trends and traditional Muslim cultural practices in Europe." (23) This approach draws on other authors' work, who argues not to overemphasize state-church relations. (24)

The debate and state policies targeting Muslims reached a new level after the 9/11 attacks. Since then, there is a general trend in Europe characterized by "increased surveillance and police activity around Muslim actors and organizations, banning of groups and deportation of radicals and greater limitation on the religious practice of Muslims" such as the minaret, headscarf, halal slaughter and male circumcision bans. (25) Yukleyen argues that in the post 9/11 era the laissez-faire approach of many European countries vis-a-vis Islam and Muslims "has been replaced by policies that monitor Islamic religious activities and by recognizing representative bodies that claim to speak in the name of all Muslims." (26)

In recent years, there has been more critical work that looks at Islam Politics from a perspective of race, (27) discourse, (28) postcolonialism, (29) and critical studies such as the anthropology of secularism. (30) This article draws on these works and uses a racism studies-informed postcolonial approach to look not at the specific accommodation of certain aspects of Islamic practices, but rather at the approach federal state agencies, governments and the states take to create what has been called Austrian, German or French Islam in those countries. These strategies operate on a different level and do not deal with specific fields of practice like chaplaincy or the institutionalization of Islamic Theology, but rather take the grand strategy of states and governments into account.

A Postcolonial Analysis of Islam Politics

Farid Hafez has drawn on Foucault's notion of the dispositive, which is understood to be made of "disproportionately heterogeneous ensembles, discourses, institutions, architectural institutions, regulating decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral or philanthropic doctrines [...] The disposition itself is the network that can be intertwined between these elements." (31) He frames Islam Politics as a dispositive. (32) In our analysis, we will make use of this dispositive analysis to understand the approach of Austria, Germany, and France in their dealing with Islam. Although there is no uniform definition of postcolonial studies, a common ground to all approaches is that they deal in the widest sense with the nature and the effects of colonialism. (33) Chandra proposes a postcolonial informed political science research program that is characterized by a stronger incorporation of non-Western knowledge, as well as an "openness to anthropological and historical knowledge as well as area studies." (34) Chandra explicitly refers to three possible approaches, which are not meant to be exhaustive: (i) critiques of existing Eurocentric theories of comparative politics; (ii) bottom-up ethnographic and historical understandings of politics in particular contexts; (iii) re-evaluating key political concepts such as the state, democracy, nationalism, and war in the light of different non-Western experiences. (35)

In a broader sense, Chandra is critically concerned with the Eurocentric knowledge production found in political science, especially regarding the so-called "Third World.' His concern is an appreciation of local knowledge, respecting the knowledge production of other human groups in the so-called Global South. (36) Or as other decolonial theoreticians would say: It is about creating pluriversality instead of (Western) universality. (37) For Chandra, postcolonial studies share many of the interests and approaches which can be found in political science, such as critical race theory, feminist studies, etc. (38)

Ziai argues additionally that postcolonial subjects within the Global North should be taken into consideration as a central category for domestic political relations. (39) Ziai points out that postcolonial policy research is based on the usual methods used in political science, primarily qualitative research methods, (40) as we use Foucault's notion of the dispositive here.

The Construction of an Austrian Islam by the Austrian Government

Islam was already institutionalized in Austrian territory by the Islam Act of 1912, following the Austria Hungarian Empire's annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina. In 1979, the Islamic Religious Community was established as a corporate body that represents the religious interests of all Muslims living in Austria. In early 2011, then-state secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Sebastian Kurz, presented the "Dialogue Forum Islam" as a means to "improve coexistence and increase the sense of belonging of Muslims." (41) This seemingly inclusive mode of speech, which superficially opposed discrimination and called for the improvement of the lives of Muslims, was used to support this new institution. But soon it became clear that this initiative attempted to introduce a new Islam Politics that differed from the state's approach to other legally recognized religious communities and churches. It used an ambivalent discourse, which on the one hand is directed against racist generalizations about Muslims, while on the other hand co-opts right wing concepts such as counter-society, a concept developed from that of a parallel society. (42)

Already during the press conference held in January 2012, Kurz declared that he aimed to amend the Islam Act of 1912 and draft a proposal for the Federal Government. (43) A...