Elections in Iraq: what does the future hold?

AuthorAlaaldin, Ranj
PositionCOMMENTARY - Essay

Iraq held parliamentary elections in April 2014, the nation's third vote since the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the first since the withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2011. The elections showed that Iraq can hold its own: turnout was estimated to be more than 60% and there were no security incidents in Baghdad, the country's capital and a common flashpoint for terrorist atrocities.

On May 19th, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission released the provisional results of the elections, which show yet another electoral victory for Prime Minister Maliki. The State of Law Coalition (SLC), led by Maliki's party, the Islamic Dawa Party, emerged with at least 94 of the Iraqi parliament's 328 seats, gaining over 60 seats more than the second and third-placed rivals. His coalition received 1,074,000 votes in Baghdad alone. The two-term prime minister also emerged with 721,000 personal votes, a marked increase from the 620,000 he received in the 2010 elections. His second placed rival received only 229,000.

The Sadrist movement of the anti-Western radical cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, emerged with a total of 35 seats, whilst the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) emerged with 31 seats, which represented a comeback after its abysmal performances in previous elections. Iraq's main Sunni parties received a total of 59 seats: 27 seats for the Mutahidun bloc led by Iraq's parliament speaker, Osama Nujayfi; 21 seats for the list led by Ayad Allawi, the former Iraqi Prime Minister and former head of the now fragmented Iraqiyah bloc; and 11 seats for the list led by Deputy Prime Minister Salah al-Mutlaq. The Kurds, collectively, received 62 seats. Unlike the Sunni parties, the Kurds are expected to maintain a unified stance in Baghdad and bargain on the basis of the total number of seats they have received collectively.

The numbers suggest Mr. Maliki is a favorite within the Iraqi electorate and, despite strong opposition from his rivals and widespread criticism, will seek another term in office from a position of strength.

At the very least, the next prime minister will be a Shia from one of the main Shia blocs, namely the Sadrist movement and the ISCI, which came second and third, respectively. The ISCI's chance of taking the premiership is much stronger than the Sadrists' chance, mainly because the latter is seen as too radical by Iraq's various political movements as well as by regional powers. Both the Sadrists and the ISCI will, nonetheless, aim to prevent Mr. Maliki from holding another term in office, largely because of his consolidation and centralizing of power in recent years. The Kurds are also looking to achieve the same objective.

The politics will now begin. Everything is on the table and all sides will spend the next phase of the democratic process engaging in intense negotiations and lobbying in an effort to form the next government and secure their own political objectives. The last time this took place in 2010, the process lasted nine months.

In reality, a number of underlying dynamics underpinning Iraqi politics suggest it makes little difference who the next prime minister of Iraq is. Although the country held largely free and fair elections and a democratic culture has been gradually settling, it remains plagued by terrorist atrocities, an Islamist-led insurrection in the Sunni North, and a continuation of sectarian divisions that have been exacerbated by events in Syria.

Two underlying dynamics will ensure that it will be business as usual in Iraq and that elections, far from resolving Iraq's problems, are likely to sustain them: first, the ongoing sectarian tensions between the Sunni and Shia communities; and second, the ongoing conflict in Syria, which has essentially created a second front in the sectarian war taking place in Iraq.

Sectarian Tensions

Sectarian tensions in Iraq deteriorated so quickly after the U.S.'s withdrawal that many believe it is no longer a question of if, but when, the 2006 sectarian civil war is repeated. The conflict between Sunni and Shia communities...

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