Egypt's democratic experiment: challenges to a positive trajectory.

• Author: Azzam, Maha
• Position: Report

The end of Mubarak's rule was momentous both in terms of how it came about through popular protests and his trial. The barrier of fear was broken, and Egyptians of different political views could now voice their opinions, all of which was no small development in a country that had known various forms of political repression for 60 years. However, the legacy of dictatorship continues to mar every aspect of the Egyptian state and society. The damage will take decades to reverse and the extent of that damage is felt today by those who want to institute reform, whether it be the government or civil society.

The Legacy

Historically, a dictatorship survives because it has control over the main institutions of the state and also has the support of the vested interests. Egypt's dictatorial regime survived with the backing of the military, the state security apparatus, the police, and crucially the judiciary and the media as well as much of the economic elite. These were the overall instruments that perpetuated a system that best served a business oligarchy that benefited economically as it had never done previously. The challenge for Egypt's newly elected government is how to reach a new working relationship with the people that make up these institutions as with the rest of society. A new social contract between all sectors of society needs to be drawn up, and there needs to be a process of restructuring the institutions themselves, notwithstanding their inevitable resistance to change.

One of the strongest legacies of past regimes and which needs to be urgently addressed is that of human rights abuses perpetuated by the security sector and police brutality. It needs to be tackled urgently because it hinders an already difficult attempt to transform the system into a constitutionally democratic one and reflects the difficulty the present government faces in trying to establish its authority over the deposed regime's institutions. Abuse of detainees continues to be a feature of police practice. The police force, poorly paid and desperate to protect its interests, has divided loyalties, which is proving a challenge to overall security in the country. The government is engaged in a tug of war and a gradual process of change and accommodation. It has had to water down its measures and proceed cautiously with any idea of reform so as not to create even greater fissures between it and the Ministry of Interior and the police force in order not to allow security situation in the country, which the security apparatus had allowed to deteriorate badly, from deteriorating even further. The answer does not lie in procrastination, but the situation is one in which the government has had to play a delicate balancing act in order to avoid a complete breakdown in law and order.

One of the main challenges facing the present government and its supporters is the legacy of antagonism toward the Muslim Brotherhood and what is referred to as political Islam or Islamists. The anger and misinformation that has plagued the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) since the fall of Mubarak has repeated the propaganda that has been leveled against the Islamists for decades. Successive regimes have sought through the media and other channels to create a climate of fear in relation to what the Islamists (not distinguishing between different groups) might bring in terms of extremism and restrictions on political and, most importantly, personal liberties. This has been exploited to the utmost by the secular and liberal groups since 2011 partly in order for them to gain greater ground. The level of misinformation that has been circulated in the mainstream media and social media is reminiscent of the worst anti-Islam and anti-Islamist voices in the West after 9/11. To reverse deep-seated fears among a society that has been fed on government information about the Brotherhood for decades and which is ongoing by political opponents today is not an easy task. (1) Despite this, the reality on the ground is that every time there have been elections or referenda since January 25, a majority of the participating electorate have endorsed the President, the constitution and the FJP.

Forestalling the Democratic Process

Egypt's judiciary has frequently been described as independent, and although individuals in it may have opposed the policies and interference of Mubarak in the past, as a body it served the dictatorial state and had been loyal to it from Nasser onwards. In this there are parallels to the judiciary under other autocratic regimes, including that of Franco's Spain. This loyalty has been evident from the moment Mubarak fell. The first freely elected parliament for 60 years, and which resulted in an overwhelming majority for the Islamist parties and particularly the FJP, was dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court in June 2012, encouraged by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), on the pretext of a flawed election law (2). That was the same body that had supported the legitimacy of previous "elections" held under dictatorial regimes from Nasser to Mubarak.

Even when SCAF stepped back from the public arena, the judiciary continued to work against the foundation of a popularly elected legislature. (3) This came to a head over the issue of the drafting of a new constitution by the Constituent Assembly, whose membership, while inclusive, reflected the elected majority of Islamists. Much was said in the media about the polarizing effect of this new draft, although it was in effect based on the suspended 1971 constitution which the old regime had drafted and which the judiciary had supported, with some additions, notably a reference to the shura, additional workers' rights, freedom for the media, a limit to military tribunals, and perhaps importantly for the opposition it introduced a ban on members of the previous ruling party, the NDP, from participating in political life for a period of ten years, and most importantly for the democratic process, a curb on the presidential office limiting it to a maximum of two four-year terms (against unlimited seven-year terms).

There was something of a tug of war between the President and the judiciary as there was fear that the Supreme Constitutional Court would dissolve the parliament, preventing the constitution from being put to...