Domestic Determinants of the U.S.-Iran Rivalry.

AuthorDemir, Imran
PositionARTICLE

Introduction

There has been an unresolved debate in conflict literature over the influence of domestic factors in the outbreak of conflict between states. Scholars have approached the topic, known as the diversionary theory, from different dimensions. (1) They have utilized different methodological tools to verify or refute the assumption that state leaders use foreign conflict to divert attention away from domestic political problems. Yet, despite the unique focus of most of these studies on the same country, namely the United States (U.S.), the results are still inconclusive. And the theory still remains one of the most contested areas of foreign policy studies.

While the diversionary tendencies of the U.S. have been the subject of a host of studies, scholars have also begun to take interest in the reaction of potential targets of diversionary actions from the U.S. The theoretical reasoning guiding this new avenue of research is that it is not enough for U.S. Presidents to have diversionary incentives. If the target behaves strategically by adopting a more cooperative stance, it can sideline such actions. Nevertheless, in a study investigating diversion in the context of strategic conflict avoidance, Fordham has claimed that strategic conflict avoidance might fail if the leaders of some frequent American targets, Iran for example, actually were seeking hostile actions from the U.S. to enhance their domestic legitimacy and international prestige. (2) Therefore, it is worthwhile not only to observe whether the U.S. diverts against Iran, but also to analyze whether Iran chooses to avoid or reciprocate such U.S. actions.

Equally interesting to analyze is whether Iran, which has viewed the U.S. as its arch-enemy (the "Great Satan," to use Iran's epithet) from the first day of the Islamic Revolution, uses conflict with the U.S. as a tool to enhance the theocratic/revolutionary regime in the face of growing domestic discontent with the regime's economic and political foes. (3) Decades of international economic sanctions, which have left a heavy toll on the Iranian economy, aggravated by a growing rift between hardliners and reformist factions within the Iranian political elites, have undermined support for the regime among a restive population demanding broad-based political, social and economic reforms. The use of diversion by Iran, and particularly against the U.S., might not sound so convincing at first as some scholars consider diversion to be an instrument uniquely available to preponderant powers such as the U.S., which can project power at choice across the globe without risking any major U.S. interest. However, it is important to investigate this possibility as experts on U.S.-Iran relations maintain that despite the fact that the pragmatic concerns of the Islamic regime dictate conciliation with the U.S., Iranian leaders would still use ideology as much as the U.S. does to mobilize the support of its domestic audience. (4) Abulof, for instance, contends that to ensure its political survival against challenges from the reformers, the Iranian government led by Ahmadinejad used American and European objections to Iran's nuclear program as an instrument to rally around the flag. (5) Another scholar has observed that, although the relations between these two countries have been based on regional and international security and stability concerns, both countries used ideology as a tool to capture support from their domestic audiences. (6) Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, both sides have demonized each other. While Iran has been keen on promoting an anti-American image destined to overthrow the regime, from the American perspective the Iranian regime is a bulwark of political Islam motivated to spread its revolutionary zeal.

Therefore, it is important to systematically show whether the U.S. and Iran use their rivalry to divert attention away from domestic political and economic problems. Inspired by the scholarship on the relation between diversion and rivalry, this paper examines the propensity of the U.S. and Iran to use their rivalry for diversionary purposes from 1990 to 2004. (7) In addition, it conducts a test of strategic conflict avoidance by examining whether Iran reciprocates hostile actions from the U.S. or acts more conciliatory to avoid becoming the target of diversion.

The paper proceeds in four steps. Following an introduction of the literature, which demonstrates the relevance of the research questions, the paper presents an argument that seeks to explain the theoretical reasoning behind the link between domestic factors and the dynamics of conflict between Iran and the U.S. The third section of the paper explains the research design and the data for testing and analyzing the implications behind the questions of interest. Finally, before the conclusion, the results of the statistical analysis are presented and their implications are discussed.

Literature Review

Diversion and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

Diversionary theory of conflict rests on the assumption that when confronted with domestic problems, political leaders resort to external conflict to restore internal cohesion and unity. In his survey of the literature on diversionary theory, Levy states that nearly every war in the past two centuries has been attributed by some scholars to state leaders' desire to improve their domestic standing. (8) Although early systematic examination of this hypothesis did not produce consistent empirical support, subsequent research, however, has found results lending support to the argument that state leaders use conflict abroad to divert attention from domestic political problems. (9) Morgan and Bickers, and DeRouen, among others, offer evidence that U.S. Presidents are prone to diversionary behavior when they face a decline in the support of one of the factions within their ruling coalition, such as the party.

Not all studies, however, have been equally promising in their findings. Contrary to the wisdom that presidents use force to boost their popularity at home, contending studies mainly point to regime type, institutional constraints and rationality of addressing the sources of domestic discontent, rather than trying to sweep the problems under the carpet by diversionary actions. Lian and Oneal, Miller, Meernik and Waterman, and Prins and Sprecher, for instance, maintain that there is little evidence to support the existence of a relationship between domestic political conditions and American foreign policy. (10) Their findings lean toward the fact that presidents are less likely to appeal to the use of force at times of economic and political discontent at home. Presidents, already constrained by domestic problems, they argue, cannot afford further erosion in their popularity by engaging in behaviors that carry with them the risk of failure.

In another debate, scholars investigate how strategic interaction influences the behavior of leaders, especially the behavior of potential targets of diversionary aggression. (11) According to this line of inquiry, the willingness on the part of state leaders experiencing domestic problems to divert is not a sufficient condition for diversion to take place. Despite the fact that such leaders may be willing to engage in a diversionary behavior, it is perfectly reasonable to expect potential adversaries to anticipate this willingness and either limit their interactions with those leaders or respond cooperatively to avoid being the target of diversion.

The empirical findings, however, are too mixed to conclude that potential scapegoats engage in strategic conflict avoidance. DeRouen and Sprecher, for instance, observe that the Arab rivals of Israel use domestic unrest in Israel as an opportunity to escalate their hostility toward the latter rather than minimizing their interaction with the potential diverter. (12) Fordham, on the other hand, analyzes the behavior of a sample of potential targets of diversion for American presidents from the list of enduring rivals of the U.S. identified by Diehl and Goertz. (13) Fordham's findings provide only qualified support to the strategic conflict avoidance thesis. (14) Therefore, he warns us to be cautious not to expect too much from strategic conflict avoidance especially with countries such as Iran, Iraq and China, which use conflict with the U.S. as a way to enhance their legitimacy at home and prestige abroad.

Diversion against Rivals

It is important to note that rivalry research program does not consider the conflict between rivals as a function of domestic processes. Instead, it concentrates on the temporal connection between the disputes of the same set of states and the history they create for each other. (15) The central tenet of the research program is that conflict in one period influences conflicts in subsequent periods. It assumes that an initiated conflict left unresolved opens the path for a relationship of recurrent disputes between the same states. (16) Thus, irrespective of domestic influences, the recurring conflict between rivals is considered to be a consequence of past conflicts.

Against this backdrop, investigation of diversionary tendencies among rivals shows that conflict between rivals is not entirely a consequence of their conflict history and may have some domestic antecedents. (17) Sprecher and DeRouen (2005), in their analysis of conflict behavior between Israel and three Arab countries, Syria, Egypt and Jordan, find evidence that supports the link between domestic unrest and the level of hostility between the Middle Eastern rivals. (18) Bennett and Nordstrom, on the other hand, focus uniquely on the influence of bad economy on the termination of conflict between 63 interstate dyads for the period of 1816-1992. Contrary to their expectation, they find a positive relation between declining economic conditions and aggressive behavior. (19)

Theoretically speaking, it sounds...

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