Demystifying Qatar's Pro-Revolution Monarchy: Old Rivalries, New Geopolitical Motives.

AuthorRezeg, Ali Abo
PositionARTICLE

Introduction

Throughout history, monarchies have been largely skeptical of revolutionary change taking place within their geopolitical reach, with the majority positioning themselves in opposition to the revolutionary movements promoting such change. Since the French Revolution (1789), the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), and the Iranian Revolution (1979), international factors have played a crucial role in the success or failure of various revolutions. Exporting revolutionary ideas and principles abroad has been the most critical issue of concern to the neighbors of revolutionary countries, especially monarchies, prompting them in some cases to establish counter-revolutionary coalitions with a view to foiling these movements, or at least containing them.

In the case of the Arab Spring revolutions that erupted in Tunisia in late 2010 and in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain in early 2011, Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), played crucial roles in thwarting these revolutions and the nascent democratic process they promoted. Saudi Arabia even provided a safe haven for Tunisia's fugitive President, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. What's more, Riyadh, along with other Gulf monarchies, sent 'Peninsula Shield' forces to help quell the protests that erupted in Bahrain. With the exception of Qatar, the Gulf monarchies welcomed and financially supported Egypt's military coup against Mohammed Morsi, the country's first-ever democratically elected leader. Following the coup in Egypt, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi also extended assistance to Libyan General Khalifah Haftar, who continues to lead counter-revolutionary forces in the North African country.

Unlike the other Arab monarchies, Qatar adopted a supportive position vis-avis the Arab Spring uprisings. Indeed, Qatar's Al Jazeera media network played a major role in mobilizing the Arab masses that took to the streets to demand change, and in promoting the revolutionary process. Qatar welcomed the Tunisian Revolution, generously supported the country during its transitional stage, and behaved the same in the Egyptian and Yemeni cases. Qatar also exerted efforts to drum up Arab and international support for humanitarian intervention in post-revolution Libya and Syria and is known to have sent military and financial support to Syrian revolutionary forces. Al-Thani's emirate was even accused by its monarchial neighbors of covertly assisting the peaceful protests that erupted in Bahrain.

Qatar's pro-Arab Spring policies led to an unprecedented tension between it and its royal neighbors; before bilateral ties were indefinitely suspended when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in 2014. The three countries, plus Egypt, imposed a comprehensive boycott and embargo on Qatar in the summer of 2017.

Given that Qatar's political system is a conservative monarchy, this study aims to review the dynamics and geopolitical interests that drove Doha to embrace a pro-change policy in the region. Throughout history, conservative monarchies have been extremely wary about revolutionary changes taking place within their geopolitical reach, and have spared no effort to undermine radical change by forming counter-revolution alliances, waging wars against the revolutionary state, and in some cases addressing the needs of dissatisfied domestic groups. (1) The importance of the current study derives from its assessment of the correlation between regime type and states' reactions to nearby revolutionary upheavals. Looking at the exceptional case of Qatar, this study challenges current theories explaining the role of conservative monarchic regimes in countering revolutions in neighboring states. The existing theories interpret the Arab monarchies' reactions to the Arab revolutions as little more than attempts to preserve the status quo.

This paper discusses the dynamics behind the exceptionalism in Qatari policies and identifies thirst for power as the main motive that drove Doha to embrace these policies; this is evident in Qatar's ambitious political elite, its challenging of Saudi hegemony over the Gulf, and its competition with the UAE in terms of regional interests. A cultural aspect is also explored, as evidenced in the ruling family's references to Qatar's culture to justify and explain their policies. The domestic dynamics of Qatar's tribal community are also noted, as this factor helps further elucidate why Qatar was eager to adopt an independent foreign policy toward the Arab revolutions.

Main Driving Factors

A Strive for Power

A strive for more power and influence in the Middle East was the main driving factor that prompted the monarchic state of Qatar to adopt exceptional policies during the Arab revolutions. An eagerness for more political clout was an inevitable outcome of the rise of Qatar's ambitious political elite since the mid-1990s. This was clear in the policies engineered by the elite, which governed the monarchy in the period from 1995 to 2013, which came to be known as the time of the 'Two Hamads' (Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani and his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamad bin Jassim).

Resisting Saudi hegemony over the Gulf was another way for Qatar to assume regional power, most importantly by taking advantage of the political vacuum left by the fall of Egypt's Mubarak regime, Saudi Arabia's chief regional ally. Doha also competed with the UAE for influence in the Middle East, with al-Thani standing against al-Nahyan's bid to counter the Arab revolutions, especially those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. The U.S. support and protection also proved to be a critical manifestation of Qatar's keenness to accumulate power. Doha spared no effort to convince the U.S. that it was the best Middle Eastern state to forge and leverage useful ties with Islamist groups in the region, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, which attained power in different parts of the Arab world following the political earthquake of 2011.

An Ambitious Political Elite

Personal traits are significant when analyzing the uptick of Qatari regional influence since it coincides with Emir Hamad bin Khalifa's rise to power. Although Hamad's rule began in 1995, his true rise began with the discovery of massive gas reserves in Qatar in 1997 (around 5.6 percent of global reserves), which allowed him to adopt a proactive foreign policy over the last two de-cades. (2) Emir Hamad was accompanied by an ambitious political elite, particularly his Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim. Both men had a strategic vision for assuming influence in the region, not only for purposes of survival but also for achieving leverage. (3) This could either be accomplished by bandwagoning off Saudi Arabia, as other Gulf states do or by having an independent foreign policy -the latter route would allow the small state of Qatar to achieve relevance on the regional and international levels. (4)

The two Hamads (5) saw that Qatari state-building was inextricably linked to the emergence of a robust and autonomous foreign policy. (6) Following his seizure of power from his father in a bloodless coup, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa was anxious to take an independent path and uncouple his country's foreign policy from that of Saudi Arabia. Like the other Gulf States, Qatar's foreign policy to a great extent mirrored that of Saudi Arabia until the mid-1990s, when the Gulf monarchy, under the leadership of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, carved out its own independent path. (7) This was soon reflected by his establishment of the Al Jazeera news network in 1996, with dozens of Arab journalists -many of whom held anti-Riyadh views- joining the news platform. (8) It was also seen in his rush to normalize ties with Iran, with which Qatar shares enormous offshore gas fields, and Israel, after the latter took part in the 1997 Doha Conference. (9) The emir's particular personality, reflected in the way he was running the state, made his foreign policy unpredictable, idiosyncratic, and successful. This could be seen in his effective mediation efforts, resulting in close ties with Iran and Hamas, a positive relationship with the U.S., and, perhaps most importantly, his pro-Arab Spring policies. (10) The emir, in his speeches at UN General Assembly meetings, clearly voiced his country's policy of backing anti-corruption and anti-authoritarian revolutionary change in the region with a view to achieving what he termed "reconciliation between the [Arab] people and their states." (11)

Meanwhile, his ambitious premier and Foreign Minister, bin Jassim (19952013), was becoming known as the engineer of Qatar's increasingly proactive foreign policy in the region. (12) Emir Hamad bin Khalifa trusted him and gave him the powers he needed to manage the country's affairs on the internal and external levels. Bin Jassim also acted on the regional and international levels by managing the country's investments through the massive Qatar Sovereign Fund. (13) He was a co-founder of Al Jazeera, which became bin Khalifa's trump card in his efforts to offset Saudi hegemony and oppose the blockade imposed on Qatar in 2017. (14) Al Jazeera was emboldened to broadcast programs that would have been considered taboo in the past, providing, for example, details of the 1996 Saudi/UAE-backed coup attempt against Qatar and government corruption in the UAE. (15)

Hamad bin Jassim also pursued Qatari mediation in the Middle East and Africa, which has been the main dynamic behind the country's reflective foreign policy over the last two decades. (16) He convinced Hamas to come to Doha in 2012 and take up a temporary residence there, making the Gulf monarchy a political incubator for the Palestinian resistance group. Qatar also provided generous financial support to both the Fatah-led Palestinian authority and Hamas. This support, along with the hosting of reconciliation...

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