Democratic Transitions in the Levant: Prospects for Restoring a Regional Order/Levant'da Demokratik Degisim: Bolgesel Bir Duzenin Onarilmasina Yonelik Beklentiler.

• Author: Dalacoura, Katerina
• Position: Report

Introduction

The modern period, and particularly after the emergence of the state-system in the early part of the twentieth century, has undermined the unity of "the Levant." The region consists of very disparate polities; there are few similarities between the political systems of the countries that comprise it, namely Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey (1) and Cyprus. When it comes to social make-up and ideological orientation, the differences are equally or even more profound. Longstanding and seemingly intractable conflicts--between Israel and the Palestinians and between Turkey and Cyprus--permeate the Levant and constitute some of its seemingly permanent fractures. More recently, broader Middle Eastern confrontations have also had an impact on the Levant: the geopolitical clash between the Iran-led and Saudi-led camps, the ideological conflict between Muslim Brotherhood groups in various countries and their opponents, as well as the struggles between Islamists and secularists. The internal fragmentation of the Levant renders it vulnerable not only to these wider Middle Eastern confrontations but also to intervention, either directly or by proxy, by global actors such as the United States, Russia, or European states.

The 2011 Arab uprisings exacerbated conflict and turmoil in the Levant, with the civil war in Syria constituting the dominant event in the region since that point in time and drawing the surrounding countries into its destructive vortex. The changes wrought by the uprisings have now intermingled with the pre-existing conflicts in the Levant and with new local and pan-Middle Eastern confrontations in pernicious ways. These developments, taken together, have seemed to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the state boundaries that have defined the region over the past one hundred years or so. (2) It is, therefore, not really convincing to speak of an order prevailing in the Levant, either in the period before 2011 or, even less so, since then. If anything, we can refer to stability or, more accurately, a degree of immobility prevailing between the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 and the Arab uprisings of 2011. Although even that had been punctured by armed conflicts between Israel and Hizbullah in 2006 and between Israel and Hamas in 2008, the Levant collapsed into a veritable disorder by 2011. (3)

I argue that the Levant will not overcome this disorder and regain a degree of order--in the sense either of stability or of recognized rules governing relations between regional actors -unless the states comprising it undergo a degree of democratization. Democracy is closely linked to the emergence of peace and security but is also a condition for them to endure. This may seem uncontroversial but, in fact, the opposing point of view has prevailed thus far in large parts of the Levant; that authoritarianism, not democracy, is a sine qua non for a regional order, or stability. However, what we have seen--most spectacularly in Syria--is that authoritarianism, by undermining society's capacity to negotiate conflict peacefully, leads to instability and chaos.

In this paper, I do not take democratization to mean the emergence of full-blown democratic systems. Rather, I interpret it as entailing a degree of pluralism, inclusiveness and accountability that allows for peaceful coexistence in domestic society and an adequate functioning of a given political system. I see democratization as being dependent on a degree of political elite consensus or intra-elite consensus on the creation of reasonably well-operating institutions that allow for a measure of civil society participation (loosely defined) to counter-balance top-heavy regimes, all in the context of a collective commitment to the broader national good. (4) The last point is important because, despite the frequent emphasis on the fragility and artificial nature of the system of states in the Levant, there are no alternatives to it (a point poignantly illustrated both by the rise and the demise of the so-called Islamic State or Daesh). The challenges to the existing borders in the Levant come from the Palestinian and the Kurdish national movements, both of which seek national self-determination and the establishment of new states.

Discrete Political Trajectories in a Fragmented Region

The polities comprising the Levant are disparate and find themselves at different points in the evolution of their political systems with regards to democratization. Cyprus has been partitioned since the Turkish intervention of 1974 but is nevertheless a mature democracy and member of the European Union; it will therefore not be included in the following discussion. Turkey will also be excluded for the reasons outlined above.

When looking at potential democratic transitions in the Levant, it is possible to distinguish loosely between two clusters of states. On one hand are Syria and Egypt, states that experienced major changes in 2011 but are currently witnessing, albeit for different reasons and in different ways, a rapid return to authoritarianism. A second group of countries--Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Palestine did not undergo major upheavals in 2011 but have experienced strains as an indirect result of the uprisings and their reverberations both in the Levant and in the wider Middle East. (5) The six countries are examined, one by one, below.

Egypt

The protesters in Tahrir Square were not raising many placards with the word "democracy" but they did demand freedom, dignity and, indirectly, accountability, representation and good governance some of the constituent parts of a democratic system. (6) The anti-corruption discourse that permeated the rebellion was closely linked to the demand for social justice, a response to the perceived growing inequality in the Egyptian economy and society writ large, but also to the lack of democratic governance. (7)

The overthrow of the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 appeared to bode well for democratization in Egypt, but two pre-existing problems contributed to undermining its prospects. The first was that Mubarak was removed with the connivance of the Egyptian military after it recognized the unsustainability of his regime. (8) This led to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) taking control of the levers of power from February 2011 to June 2012, which prepared the ground for the military's return to power in July 2013. The second problem was that popular mobilization in 2011, tremendous though it was, took place in a de-politicized context that was characterized by a weak civil society. (9) Although some analysts would dispute this assessment-- pointing to movements such as "6 April" and "We are all Khaled Said", as well as the labour protests that had gained momentum in the years prior to the rebellion--it remains true that Egyptian civil society was unable to organize to offer a counter-weight to the counter-revolutionary forces that emerged after 2011. (10) The same can be said about Egyptian opposition parties, with the exception of the Islamists.

The superior organizational capacity and the implicit message that, as "good Muslims", they would be able to deliver on the social justice demands which had underpinned the uprising, (11) opened the way to electoral success for the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafi Islamist groups such as al-Noor. Together these parties secured approximately seventy-five percent of the vote in a string of parliamentary elections from late 2011 to early 2012. (12) Muhammad Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, was elected president of the Republic in June 2012. (13)

The de-legitimation of the FJP was rapid during its one year in power (June 2012-July 2013),14 but the fact that it was overthrown by a military coup has undercut the prospects of democracy in Egypt (however popular this coup may have been among large segments of the Egyptian citizenry). President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who led the coup, was elected to the presidency by a huge percentage (claimed to be over 90 per cent) in May 2014, yet he is presiding over a repressive and increasingly authoritarian government that has outlawed the Brotherhood and increasingly incarcerated political opponents, whether they be secular or Islamist or from the right or left. The government has also stifled civil society: the NGO law of 201615 is more restrictive than any such laws Mubarak had installed and NGOs are further undermined by a discourse which depicts them as "foreign agents". (16) New legislation on public protest, on terrorism, and on the military courts has wreaked havoc on civil freedoms and the press and social media are increasingly muzzled. Parliament has been emasculated, extra-judicial killings abound, torture is rife, and the number of political prisoners runs into the tens of thousands. Some secular political parties have been co-opted by the regime, as they fear it less than they fear the Islamists, and now operate in a tightly controlled game. (17) The political space between the regime and the Islamist opposition-- the latter not being paragons of democracy either--has shrunk. The only shoots for a possible return to democracy can be found in single-issue organizations, professional and trade union associations, and among some leftist and liberal activists who are resisting regime co-optation--but are themselves fairly weak. The hopeful days of 2011 have passed and Egypt appears to have come full circle as the country experiences a greater level of oppression than it did under Mubarak.

Syria

The Syrian revolt began in March 2011 with similar demands to those in Egypt: the desire for dignity, accountability and social justice. (18) However, the regime's violent response to the protests, just as they began to spread, further fuelled the confrontation, which quickly degenerated into violent conflict. Whereas the...