Deconstructing the Gulf Crisis: Post-Colonialism and Competing 'Projects' in the Middle East.

AuthorChak, Farhan Mujahid
PositionARTICLE - Blockade on Qatar

Introduction

On September 7, 2017, in Washington, D.C., at a press conference with President Trump, Kuwait's Emir Sheikh al-Sabah was asked by the veteran Al Jazeera journalist Said Saeed about the ongoing Qatari blockade that was initiated by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Specifically, he asked about the "complicated issue at the heart of this dispute." (1) Responding, Sheikh al-Sabah disparaged the negative role of the media, which he claimed was exacerbating tensions between the disputants. Then, continuing, he downplayed the challenges ahead by highlighting the strong, brotherly bonds in the Arabian Gulf. Lastly, in closing, almost as if needing to feature the achievement of Kuwaiti intervention, he said: "Thank God. Now, what is important is that we have stopped any military action." (2) A sudden silence fell over the room. Astoundingly, Kuwait's diplomatic shuttling between squabbling neighbors was not a futile effort, as naysayers had it. (3) Rather, it was vital in preventing all-out war. This remarkable feat certainly was worth underscoring and did not go unnoticed, with media abuzz by that startling revelation. (4)

Immediately afterward, the quartet--Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain--responded by thundering 'war was never on the table!' (5) However, that was not believable. Several journalists corroborated the quartet's invasion plans, conceptualized with former Blackwater mercenaries from Latin America. (6) The genie, so to speak, was out of the bottle. From this, there was another fall-out --the widespread collapse of the quartet's credibility. Their intent to negotiate, in the light of their war-mongering, was derided, especially considering Gargash's bellicose avowals of "no negotiation." (7) Here, too, the quartet was mortified by this blatant undressing of sorts, which stymied their claims of the moral high ground. How could that be believable considering their invasion plans during the Holy month of Ramadan?

To begin, the unprecedented blockade on Qatar was orchestrated by Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) on June 5, 2017. However, preceding groundworks had begun months, even years before. (8) Paid-for opinion pieces trashing Qatar were circulated in numerous Western newspapers, traced to UAE Ambassador Yusuf al-Otaibi and the right-wing Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). (9) From there, the pre-blockade strategy moved to the climactic phase, erupting with UAE's hacking of Qatar's News Agency. (10) Curiously, the quartet refused to acknowledge Qatar's disclaimer and continued to re-broadcast the fake news. (11) Then, without any official writ or explanation, came the blockade. An air, land, and sea embargo was heartlessly decreed, affecting even basic foods and medicine. (12) Worse, the quartet threatened to punish their own citizenry with 15-years imprisonment for mere expressions of sympathy with Qatar. (13) And, nearly a month later, there was still no official explanation of 'why?' Just ad nauseum avowals by Adel al-Jubeir that: "they (Qatar) know what to do." (14) Kicking patients out of hospitals, manhandling Qatari women near Islam's holiest sanctuary, and condemning thousands of camels to a mean death by thirst, was incomprehensible. (15) Where did such deep-seated hostility originate?

The accusations against Qatar, primarily, focus on four contentious points: i) Iranian-relations; ii) funding 'terror;' iii) supporting 'political Islam'--Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, etc.; and iv) destabilizing the Arab world through Al Jazeera. Now, a fifth accusation/condition has been hurled at Qatar--rather unbelievably and not worth scrutinizing--which is to relinquish the World Cup bid, thereby resolving the crisis. (16) In actuality, these accusations do little more than concealing the actual motive behind the crisis: the flip-flopping of explanations being indicative of the quartet's obfuscation. And, accordingly, this question is repeatedly asked: what does the quartet want? In fact, Charlie Rose posed the question, on October 29, 2017 during the broadcast of his flagship 60 Minutes show, to Sheikh Tamim--Qatar's young, resolute Emir. (17) His response was telling--to usurp Qatar's sovereignty. (18)

Essentially, the unspoken goal of the Saudi-led quartet--its meta-strategy--is to impose a singular vision in the GCC and, plausibly, the entire Arab and Sun--ni-Muslim world. Arguably, the Saudis appear to entreat U.S. patronage, in exchange for privileged status, on the basis on what they could 'deliver.' Plausibly, that means agreeing to U.S. strategy vis-a-vis Jerusalem, Iran, Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood or, even, the Muslim world. Of course, this strategy seems to include usurping Qatar's riches, a simple cash-grab, considering their financial woes. Nevertheless, it seeks to achieve its objectives by either scenario: Saudi pre-eminence and tutelage over Qatar enforced through indirect rule, effectuated by submissive-tribes, leaving it a vassal-state or direct invasion to establish Saudi supremacy over its recalcitrant neighbor. Initially, President Trump tweeted support, only to backtrack afterward. However, serious obstacles surfaced along the quartet's way, not least Iran. (19) They, too, have benefactors, and vow to U.S. hegemony, more persuasively, that they can 'deliver.' And, lastly, there is an emerging third way, 'civic Islam' force led by Turkey. (20) Henceforth, implicit in this triangular rivalry is the root-cause of the blockade: a pendulum swing between autocracy, partisanship--both with differing levels of U.S./foreign provision, and an emergent civic Islam. Certainly, what is transpiring in the GCC, between competing blocs, is a microcosm of the meta-contestation in the Middle East.

In total, this article approaches the Gulf crisis three-fold: First, it deconstructs the quartet's stated-logic for the blockade, underscoring inconsistencies. Second, it uses post-colonialism theory and ideal-types, as explanatory variables, to unravel competing regional trajectories and describe how different states/alliances--or rival 'projects,' engage with U.S. hegemonic power in the GCC. Moreover, post-colonialism provides persuasive insights when studying rentier-states who outsource their security. Thirdly, it describes a three-way rivalry between: i) Saudi-led descendant autocratic project; ii) Iranian-led ascending, but unsustainable, partisan project; and iii) Turkish-led emergent civic Islam project.

Kansas City Shuffle

To begin, a 'Kansas City shuffle' is an idiom that conveys misdirection, prodding focus in a particular direction, when what matters occurs elsewhere. This characterizes the quartet's strategy and explains their exaggerated infatuation with Iran, terrorism, and corruption. Leave aside MBS' purported $1.3 billion spent on 'Salvatore Mundi,' a yacht and a French Chateau (21) or allegations that Saudi Arabia funds 'terror' more than any GCC member-state. (22) Granted, unraveling the blockade differs, contingent on who describes it. For the U.S., it may be to protect Israel, control regional energy sources, and hold Saudis to their Middle East peace plan. For Iran, it presents opportunities for trade and facilitates its regional ascendancy. For the Saudi-led quartet, it may be a mechanism to ingratiate itself to a wayward benefactor (U.S.), reap financial rewards and enforce its writ on the Arab heartland as well as its credentials as the sole-spokesperson for the Sunni-Muslim world. Surely, these are important, but our aim is to deconstruct and evaluate the quartet's stated accusations against Qatar.

Firstly, concerning Iran, Shaikh Tamim was transparent in acknowledging their healthy, diplomatic relations. It is normal, considering they share a major natural gas field. However, Qatar's policy differences with Iran are serious, even more than blockading countries, irrespective of noisy condemnations. Ultimately, both countries exact statesmanship and compartmentalize their objectives, avoiding zero-sum binaries. (23) Their relationship is practical, due to mutual economic interests and geography. Hence, some level of engagement is inevitable and insisting on cutting this relationship entirely, is a non-starter.

Furthermore, the quartet's hyperbole about Qatar-Iran relations is acutely hollow considering the UAE's robust trade with Iran and hosting 500,000 Iranian residents. (24) Besides, 80 percent of GCC-Iran trade originates in UAE--measuring, nearly, $20 billion yearly. (25) Actually, UAE-Iran relations are longstanding, multi-faceted, even if contradictory. "Over the past decade Abu Dhabi has emerged as a strategic hawk on the Iranian nuclear issue even as Dubai functioned as a loophole..." (26) Similarly, Egypt too, has cooperated with Iran. Even to support Assad's brutal regime with weapons transfer--irrespective of their possible use against Saudi-supported rebels. (27) Consequently, it is all rather murky, but such a specious allegation cannot be taken seriously. So, why isn't Saudi Arabia reproaching its partners for this glaring mutiny?

Secondly, the accusation that Qatar officially supports terror groups in Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan or elsewhere, is without merit. Actually, Qatar's military presence in Yemen was at the request of 'big brother' Saudi Arabia. (28) Internally, they were squeamish of a bombing campaign targeting the poorest Arab country. This holds for Syria, too, as evidenced by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, who said: "Qatar, along with Saudi Arabia and the U.S., had jointly coordinated the arming and funding of Syrian opposition groups." (29) Indeed, Qatar repeatedly has taken the back-seat, even against its own better judgment, at Saudi be-hest. (30) And, this is equally true for opening a Taliban office in Doha, requested by U.S. authorities. (31) Here, perfectly perceptible, is realpolitik at work, where participation is demanded...

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