A Dance of Entanglement: The US-Turkish Relations in the Context of the Syrian Conflict/Karmasikligin Dansi: Suriye Uyusmazligi Baglaminda ABD-Turkiye Iliskileri.

• Author: Sari Karademir, Burcu
• Position: Report

Under unipolarity, the reliability and credibility of the alliances are at stake as the fulfillment of the commitments is at discretion of the unipole. (1) Differently from alliances under bipolarity, as Stephen Walt argues, unipolarity reverses the twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment to the benefit of the unipole and makes the twin dangers more likely for the weaker states who need the unipole for the pursuit of their regional security interests. Based on Walt's approach to alliances under unipolarity, the article looks at the US-Turkish relations within the context of Syrian conflict as exemplary. For this purpose, it starts with underlining the changing nature of alliances under unipolarity for regional actors. It argues that it was the declining US power that pushed the Obama administration to pursue retrenchment strategy for redistributing its resources from peripheral to core US security interests and commitments. It stresses that the Obama's retrenchment strategy defined the contours of the US strategy toward the Middle East and Syria and the Trump administration deepened US retrenchment further to put 'America First'. The article focuses on the processes that lead to strategic discrepancies between US-Turkish positions and show how they paved the way for the allies' eventual mutual abandonment in Syria. It highlights that the regional power vacuum created by the absence of Turkish-US alliance facilitated involvement of other actors such as Russia and Iran with their competing interests in the conflict. The article concludes that the unipole's strategic alliance commitments are no longer reliable for regional allies to assume risky regional restructuring roles as they face the risk of abandonment on the halfway.

Alliances under Unipolarity: Abandonment and Entrapment Problematique

American primacy is still the key determinant of international relations despite arguments for its decline in the current global power distribution. (2) The US has economic, technological and geographical primacy and the 'command of the commons,' that is the military dominance over the sea, air, and space. (3) The current international system is, therefore, unipolar both by the conventional definitions of polarity and the standard measurements of power. The major implication of the US unipolarity is that there is no possibility of a counter hegemonic alliance formation against the US. In the absence of such balancing, the US as the unipole enjoys greater flexibility in its relations and alliances. (4) It can select among different alliance partners to form 'coalitions of willing', act unilaterally or prefer to stay aloof as it has greater leeway to opt for its preferences. (5) The US's grand strategic flexibilities shaping its alliance formation have implications for the global, regional and local actors. Its power position makes it the primary factor in shaping others' perceptions and strategic calculations.

Under unipolarity, Stephen Walt argues, the reliability and credibility of the alliances are at stake and, that is a serious concern for the allies of the unipole. (6) Alliances depend on the belief that the commitments will be honored; however, as the unipole depends less on its allies for achieving its objectives it will be less willing to comply with its pledges. The lesser allies face the risk of being left alone. There is a possibility that the unipole will not aid them when they are threatened or the unipole will back them out of its own self-interest. The weaker partners need to pay higher price for the support they receive from the unipole and need to make harder effort to keep the unipole engaged in their security concerns. Although the primacy of the unipole does not render the weaker partners without leverage, their capacity to assure engagement of the unipole or extract concessions from it are limited if the unipole is not in need of the weaker party's critical assets like strategic geographic location.

Incidentally, unipolarity, as Walt states, tames the tension between the twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment significantly on behalf of the unipole: the weaker states tend to worry about the abandonment due to the unipole's declined dependency on their resources or allegiances, which decreases the likelihood of the unipole to be dragged into conflicts by its reckless and adventuristic allies. (7) Under unipolarity, it is the weaker states that are more vulnerable to the entrapment as the unipole can push the weaker states to participate in the coalitions of willings or in wars that they do not want to take part in because such demands might be more costly or contradictory with their own interests as regional powers. (8) It is possible to argue that under unipolarity, while the unipole demands the full allegiance with its demands based on the alliance commitments, the weaker states cannot rely on their 'strategic' or 'special relations' with the unipole.

Unipolarity leaves the fulfillment of the commitments stemming from the formal or informal alliances to the discretion of the unipole. (9) Considering that the unipole may be distracted by a wide array of security problems and domestic priorities, it may prefer to refrain from managing and shaping the system due its costs and let others to deal with the emerging security threats. It may even pass the buck on various regional powers rather than letting vice versa. In other words, having enjoyed considerable margin of safety due to its predominance and geography, the unipole can be the one who free rides on international security matters, especially on the regional ones. It may let weaker states to solve their own problems in order to preserve its power position by reducing the costs of involvement in other regions. As even doing nothing appears to be a less costly and less risky strategy to the unipole, in the cases of divergent perspectives and non-mutual interests, the weaker states are obliged to make a strong case to convince the unipole for its engagement in to their concerned security problems and regions. Moreover, the weak states have very limited capacity in engaging the unipole in regional affairs if it already decided to not to do so. In overall analysis, under unipolarity, the twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment is reversed as risk-averse grand strategic choices render formal or informal forms of security cooperation--alliances and strategic partnerships- unreliable for guaranteeing the weaker states' security and interests.

The Obama Doctrine in the Global Context: A Doctrine for Internal Balancing

Idiosyncratic character of unipolarity requires combining system, state and individual levels-of-analysis for understanding the unipole foreign policy behaviors. (10) Therefore, under American unipolarity, it is necessary to contextualize and understand the presidential doctrines to understand the strategic choices of the unipole. The Obama Doctrine defined the contours of the US-Turkish relations within the context of Syrian conflict with its interlocked implications in the global and regional context. The Obama Doctrine reflected domestic and international lessons of the previous administrations. (11) It is, therefore, necessary to examine the Obama Doctrine beside the Bush Doctrine, (12) shaped by the 9/11 attacks and led to the consecutive wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The decline of the US power was major concern for the Obama administration. To focus on internal balancing and prevent further decline of the US power, the Obama administration built its election campaign on two things: the cost of wars and 'nation-building at home'. Having inherited a recession-hit economy and desired a lasting personal legacy in US politics, President Obama promised to use American taxpayers' money in domestic economic recovery rather than being entangled in unnecessary wars abroad. (13) Therefore, in the global context, the Obama Doctrine prioritized the US's domestic recovery over the international commitments.

Retrenchment is essentially a response to a decline in power and requires redistribution of resources from peripheral to core commitments. (14) It emphasizes the reduction of international military commitments and costs by means of cutting defense spending and expenditures, reducing strategic-military deployments abroad, withdrawing from some alliance obligations, minimizing risks and/or pursuing all at the same time. (15) The implication of this strategy for foreign policy is a decline in international liabilities, refocusing in certain geographic areas and defining some issues as less critical. (16) This strategy enables the shift of burden by passing foreign policy obligations onto allies and reallocating resources from peripheral to core. The Obama administration's retrenchment strategy had significant implications for the global security as it redefined the US' relations with regional (Turkey and Iran) and global actors (China and Russia). Counterbalancing China under Asian pivot strategy became the focus of the Obama Doctrine, which had significant implications for Russia's global and regional security calculations.

The Obama administration decided to 'reset' confrontational relations with Russia by building up trust and cooperation over a gradually expanding range of issues. This was expected to broaden and change mutual interests and expectations over time. (17) President Obama envisioned acquiring Russia's cooperation in addressing the situation in Afghanistan, in managing the confrontation over Iran's nuclear program and in continuing the elimination of nuclear weapons. Russia meanwhile used 'the US's reset and accommodate policy' to rebuild its sphere of influence in its 'Near Abroad'. Russia seized Crimea, occupied part of Georgia and intervened in Ukraine. Additionally, it extended its sphere of influence to the Middle East by vetoing UN sanctions against both Iran's nuclear program, and Syria...