'Community of Common Destiny' as Post-Western Regionalism: Rethinking China's Belt and Road Initiative from a Confucian Perspective/Bati Sonrasi B

• Author: Bunskoek, Raoul

Introduction

"The Chinese have shown their capacity to adapt their myths to reality; they may also find that new myths will better serve their purpose" (1) The discourse of the 'Community of Common Destiny for Mankind' (hereafter CCDM), (2) introduced by Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2012, (3) widely advocated by his successor Xi Jinping and written into the preface of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) constitution in 2018 as part of the fifth amendment, (4) perceives all the people in the world to belong to a (future) globally connected 'big family'. Although the CCDM currently seems more like a myth, the Chinese authorities have used all occasions to appear serious about transforming this myth into a reality. In fact, Xi presented the rationale of China's gargantuan infrastructure project the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in late 2013 to be to "connect[...] the Asian, African, and European continents", (5) which, if successful, could lead to further steps to connect this so-called global 'big family'. It has appeared increasingly relevant amidst the spread of mutually estranging national sensibilities during the Covid19 pandemic in 2020.

This paper is about why and how this way of publicly framing the purpose of Chinese foreign policy has made sense to Xi and his colleagues. This puzzle arises from the difficulty that prevailing (6) international relations (IR) lenses, especially (neo)realist and (neo)liberal ones, have in aptly explaining these atypical discourses and practices. Observers adopting these lenses tend to delegitimize CCDM/BRI either due to its perceived overly idealistic nature or perceive it as a 'threat' due to the fear that China is primarily acting out of self-interest, seeks to change the current international order by overtaking the US's hegemonic position, or reconstitute the identity of 'others' (7) -first in the 'peripheral' Global South and ultimately in the 'Western' liberal 'core' itself--due to the all-encompassing nature of CCDM/BRI. Such views are highly problematic, however, because they effectively impose upon Chinese actors a worldview that is no different from their own Western-centric and 'provincial' perspectives, (8) all the while ignoring or discarding as 'irrational' signs that suggest alternative ways of understanding the world (i.e. Chinese political narratives). A recent quote from The Economist (9) can serve as a representative example of such a mentality: the "ultimate aim [of the BRI] is to make Eurasia (dominated by China) an economic and trading area to rival the transatlantic one (dominated by America)". This quote enlists two competing 'regions' -i.e. Eurasia vs. the transatlantic one--apparently with the goal of essentializing the differences between these two regions -i.e. China dominated vs. US dominated, 'them' vs. 'us', and even 'enemy' vs. 'friend' (10)--and therefore not only re-constitutes the monotonous Cold War division of the world, but also entirely silences and thus negates the legitimacy of the alternative provided by the imagination of a potentially de-territorialized China. That is, the idea of a globally connected 'big family'.

To make sense of CCDM/BRI from Xi's own point of view, Chantal Mouffe's epistemology is an inspiring first step: "we should acknowledge that the world is a pluriverse and realise that to accept a diversity of political forms of organization will be more conducive to peace and stability than the enforcement of a universal model". (11) Therefore, given Xi's repetitive references to Confucian values since assuming Presidency, (12) we propose a Confucianist lens to look at CCDM/BRI. We reckon that such a lens may be previously familiar only to a Sinophone audience. And yet, this cultural lens has the potential to address much more spectators due to its particular take on the quest for modernity, originally introduced to the world by European colonialism. Consequently, a picture of post-Western/post-Chinese regionalism emerges that characterizes CCDM/BRI as an alignment of intellectual rather than territorial regions where borders are at best undetermined. We hope that our trans-border sensibilities contribute to 'post-Western' IR theory in general and the 'Chinese School of IR' in particular, both of which still register territorializing temptations.

The article is built up as follows. Section two discusses China's developmental model of 'directed improvisation,' and illustrates how this model is strongly connected to Confucian thought. Moreover, the section also argues that the domestic success of this 'China Model' gave it the moral duty to display and share this model of development, which led to the BRI. Section three then introduces the worldview of Tianxia (All-under-Heaven), which to us undergirds the idea of a 'Community of Common Destiny for Mankind' (CCDM). The section argues that the BRI is an attempt to make into a reality the supremely moral myth of CCDM. As such, the inclusive and potentially ever-expanding BRI under the presumed (or 'pretended') impartial and virtuous leadership of China constitutes a form of post-Western regionalism. However, the content of this post-Western regionalism is not only based on Confucianism, it is also based on resistance against the 'West' in general and 'Western' practices of development and imperialism/colonialism in particular. Finally, Section four concludes the paper.

Crossing Boundaries: the Display of China's Just World and Developmental Model of 'Directed Improvisation' through the BRI

In a Confucian just world, morality leads to power rather than vice versa. (13) Consequently, the emperor signifies the 'supreme moral being'. His supreme morality is constituted by his selflessness and ability to self-restrain, embodied by his reign without governing (also, non-intervention into the natural flow of things). This makes his citizens (the small men) naturally feel secure with him and look up to him as a supreme moral example. (14) Moreover, all citizens within a Confucian world are hypothetically related to each other through spontaneous kinship relationships. Confucian relationships are typically dyadic and hierarchical and each relationship has attached to it a role obligation to reciprocate benevolence in accordance with their role relationship. (15) In other words, everyone has to (pretend to) perform their proper roles -and in doing so give 'face' and hence confirm the validity of a specific relationship--to people higher as well as lower on the hierarchic ladder through a certain ritual. (16) Confucius names five possibilities of such relationships, namely "Emperor and subject; husband and wife; father and son; older and younger siblings; and friend with friend". (17) The rights and obligations attached to each role ensure that "[i]n this Confucian doctrine there was therefore no possibility of naked exploitation", (18) since this would violate moral behavior. The essence of Confucian guanxi (i.e. a mutually obliged benevolence) is to contrive compatible roles through ritual and gift giving. (19) Practically, this is reflected in the sense that the emperor is obliged to provide his citizens with "secure [...] conditions for people's basic means of subsistence and intellectual/moral development". (20) The imagined audience of Confucian morality is not just the nation-state China, but the entire world, as will be elaborated on in Section three below. First, however, the following section will elaborate on the connection between Confucianism and China's model(s) of development.

The consensus among Western policy makers, academics, and international institutions like the World Bank and IMF has long been that markets can only grow if one first 'gets the governance right' (meaning: the implementation of neoliberal governance). (21) The reason rests upon the identity of a community of practice that distinguishes an insider-self from an outsider-alter: "All prosperous economies share a common set of strong, law-bound governmental institutions". (22) Hence, when 'developing' a country, actors taking these ideas for granted first seek to replicate this model of strong institutions and "best practices found in wealthy democracies" (23)--i.e. the implementation of a free market, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance--and hope that this will naturally lead to the growth that exists in their own countries too. In other words, they seek to convert developing nations ('Others') into entities like the 'self'. Unfortunately, reality has shown that this is a method that usually fails because the historical and cultural contexts differ too much. (24)

According to Yuen Yuen Ang, however, the successful model the top reformers in China implemented to pull 800 million people out of poverty is different. The Chinese authorities rely on what Ang calls 'directed improvisation', which means that "central reformers direct," whereas "local state agents improvise". (25) She points out, though, that the center does not direct through providing fixed guidelines that localities are not allowed to deviate from. Instead, the center offers three types of relatively vague guidelines within which local actors can improvise using the resources they have within their own context. This room for 'adaptation' or 'experimentation' can be summarized in three steps: 1) "authorizing yet delimiting the boundaries of localization (variation)," 2) "clearly defining and rewarding bureaucratic success (selection)," and 3) "encouraging mutual exchanges between highly unequal regions (niche creation)". (26)

The process that ensues is a 'coevolutionary process' between institutions and markets that provide mutual feedback to each other and can be summarized in three steps: "Harness weak institutions to build markets emerging markets stimulate strong institutions strong institutions preserve markets"...