Beyond the Nominal and the Ad Hoc: The Substance and Drivers of China-Russia Military Cooperation.

• Author: Korolev, Alexander
• Position: COMMENTRY - Essay

Introduction

Post-Cold War China-Russia relations have always been a matter of debate, as witnessed by such titles as Rapprochement or Rivalry? (1) or Rivalry or Partnership? (2) With regard to China's reaction to Russia's policies in Georgia in 2008, for example, some observed that China "sides with the West, not Russia," (3) and that the "Beijing-Moscow rift over Georgia war deepens." (4) Others, however, argued that China is still on Russia's side. (5) Similarly, in the case of the Ukraine crisis, some argued that China "sided with Russia," (6) while others observed that "China splits with Russia over Ukraine." (7) Somewhat similar confusion surrounds Russia's reaction to the South China Sea dispute. Some believe that Russia supports China's South China Sea position, (8) whereas others ask, "Why doesn't Russia support China in the South China Sea?" (9) Academic studies can similarly be divided into those that are doubtful about the durability of China-Russia partnership and those that believe that it has strong foundations or at least that the existing bilateral problems are not unsurmountable. (10)

Meanwhile, since the end of the Cold War, China-Russia relations have progressed consistently from "good neighborliness" in the early 1990s, to "constructive cooperation" in the late 1990s, to "comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2001, to "comprehensive strategic partnership and coordination" in 2012, and most recently to "comprehensive strategic partnership of equality, mutual trust, mutual support, common prosperity and long-lasting friendship" (11) in 2016, a progression which shows the consistent consolidation of China-Russia interactions and their immunity to exogenous shocks. In the context of the deterioration of Russia-U.S. relations following the Ukraine crisis and the intensification of China-U.S. tensions, China-Russia relations have often been perceived by both policy advocates and scholars as an actual or incipient alliance. In October 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin called Russia and China "natural partners and natural allies," using the word "ally" that Moscow had previously eschewed with respect to China. (12) Some prominent Chinese international relations experts have also argued that China will be unable to shift the U.S.-dominated unipolar world order "unless it forms a formal alliance with Russia." (13) In this context some have started to ask, is there a China-Russia alliance? (14) Are China-Russia relations an alliance or not? (15)

Although these questions are important, as are the aforementioned attempts to ascertain which side China or Russia aligns with in regional crises, they are of limited help in understanding the substance and functioning of post-Cold War China-Russia relations. Indeed, to draw a sharp distinction between the nominal categories of "alliance" vs. "no alliance" and to insert China-Russia relations into either category is less important than finding out whether this bilateral relationship can function in a way that a military alliance would function, how their inter-military cooperation actually works, and whether there are systemic incentives for the two countries to align with each other. History reveals that the presence of a formal alliance does not guarantee that there is, in fact, a functional alliance, and vice versa, that the absence of an alliance treaty does not mean that there is no such alliance. In fact, states can act as alliance members without being formal allies. The "Grand Alliance" of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, formed during World War II to defeat Nazi Germany, lacked many formal features of an "alliance" and operated in the absence of treaties. (16) One of the most renowned international relations theorists, Hans Morgenthau, once wrote that there are situations when states' interests "so obviously call for concreted policies and actions that an explicit formulation of these interests, policies and actions in the form of treaty of alliance appears to be redundant." (17) One might argue that the US.-UK "special relationship" or the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral strategic dialogue (TSD) fall in this category. (18)

In a similar vein, an emphasis on ad hoc reactions to various regional events or assessments of the nature of China-Russia interactions from the vantage point of regional geopolitics in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Arctic region or elsewhere may not be the best way to grasp the actual dynamics and the driving forces of China-Russia relations. Both China and Russia are nuclear great powers with structural positions within the international system; they are, in fact, important building blocks of that system. This means that the baseline of their behavior toward each other is dictated more by the trends of great power politics involving the system leader--the United States--unfolding at the systemic level than by regional interests or disputes. As alliance theory informs us, great power alliances, understood as formal or informal relationships of security cooperation, emerge in response to imminent existential threats. (19) Since only the United States, and not the regional powers with which China and Russia have disagreements, can pose such a threat, what matters most is how China and Russia react to the behavior of the United States and not how they behave vis-a-vis an array of regional-level disputes. Therefore, one has to look into the China-Russia-U.S. triangle and see whether China and Russia in their bilateral interactions interpret the United States and its policies as an explicit external threat, which would constitute a foundation for a China-Russia military alignment.

With these considerations in mind, in this paper, I attempt to answer two interrelated questions regarding contemporary China-Russia military relations. First, I explore whether China and Russia have a shared view of security threats with respect to the United States and, therefore, whether there are international-systemic incentives for a China-Russia alignment. Second, I look into the actual mechanics of the China-Russia military cooperation that has come to fruition, rather than the promises of written agreements, to understand whether this cooperation carries the features of, or at least lays the foundation for, a military alliance. The unifying goal of the paper is to go beyond the nominal characteristics and the ad hoc reactions in China-Russia relations and look into the substance of this important bilateral power axis. I argue that China-Russia relations are "on the verge of an alliance"--which is a condition where strong foundations for an alliance are in place and only minor steps are needed for a fully-fledged alliance to materialize; the occurrence of such steps remains an open question.

Is the United States Viewed as a Threat by China and Russia?

Answering this question inevitably invites another one; is China a threat to Russia? The "Chinese threat" theory went viral in the media in the 1990s and early 2000s, and it still reappears from time to time in Russian political discourse. As noted by some renowned Russian China experts, however, the argument that Russia's governing elites and ordinary people are wary of a rising China, which now overpowers Russia on various indicators, and that, from this perspective, some form of entente with the United States and the EU is possible to ensure against the growing Chinese power, is problematic. The main problem with such an argument is that the U.S.-led West is seen by Moscow as a bigger and more immediate threat than China. (20) According to the Deputy Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladimir Portyakov, "At present, any unprejudiced person is much better aware than before that today and tomorrow, Russia faces a much bigger, more dangerous and more real threat from the West than a hypothetical threat from a rising China the day after tomorrow." (21)

Interesting remarks, in this regard, were made by President Putin himself: "Foreign experts keep telling...