Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How to Make Sense of Turkey's S-400 Choice?

• Author: Kjbaroglu, Mustafa
• Position: ARTICLE

Introduction

Two main questions raised by most defense analysts, especially in Western countries and also at home with respect to Turkey's decision to buy the S-400 air defense system from Russia are: "Does it make sense?" and "Is it worth the risk?" These questions are simple, yet carry massive implications regarding the criticism to which Turkey has been subject over the last several years, and thus the challenges that lie ahead in connection with its decision.

The essence of the criticisms leveled against Turkey emanates from it being a long-time NATO ally, one that undertook extremely tough and risky responsibilities throughout the Cold War period in defense of the Western alliance against the threat posed by Soviet Russia. It may seem therefore strange for a NATO country like Turkey to go for a strategic defense procurement policy with a country like Russia, which is still treated as the main rival in the contingency plans of the Alliance. Indeed, NATO's long-term hostile stance toward Russia has toughened recently, especially since its illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 that brought to a halt the constructive and cooperative bilateral relations of the post-Cold War era within the context of the NATO-Russia Council that was created in 1997.

Nevertheless, approaching the S-400 issue from such a dire perspective would be highly misleading in the sense that it could create the impression that Turkey has made a radical decision as a result of a profound shift in its mainstream foreign and security policies. The story is not as clear cut. Turkey's decision to buy the S-400s is the outcome of a long and exhausting journey, full of hope and despair. Over the last three decades, Turkey has sought out the best air defense capability to be deployed all over the country.

Against this background, this article will discuss and analyze the timeline of one of Turkey's most critical--and most criticized--defense procurement projects with a particular emphasis on its hopefully constructive and yet potentially damaging impact on the future of the fledgling Turkish defense industries.

Accordingly, in the first section, a brief account will be given about how Turkey got to the point of signing defense contracts, first with a Chinese firm and then with a Russian firm, after having been involved in extended and tiresome deliberations for years in efforts to procure the Patriot air defense system from its ally, the United States. This section will also highlight the arguments and counter-arguments that Turkey and its NATO allies have leveled against each other over the logic and feasibility of buying non-Western air defense systems, given Turkey's status as a country that occupies a significant place within the Western security structure, and about the implications of such a move for the security of the entire alliance.

The second section will highlight the controversy over Ankara's choice of non-Western air defense systems that sparked crises between Turkey and its NATO allies, the United States in particular, which prompted the U.S. Congress to pass legislation to impose tough sanctions on the Turkish Armed Forces as well as on the leading Turkish companies operating in the military-industrial complex in Turkey that have developed longstanding collaborative defense projects with their American partners, such as the production of the F-16 fighter aircraft, SOM cruise missiles (Satha Atilan Orta Menzilli Muhimmat) and a large variety of electronic warfare products.

The third section will shed light on the specifics of the S-400 deal that indicate it may make sense for Turkey to bear the brunt of engaging Russia in a highly strategically important defense procurement policy despite the risk of the deterioration of its relations with its Western allies, apparently not only in the military domain but also in the political and economic domains.

The fourth section will assess the impact of the S-400 dispute on the recent developments and achievements taking place in the Turkish defense industries and will demonstrate how all of these play out in the context of bolstering the country's capacity and capability in these respects.

The article will conclude with remarks about the need to approach the S-400 dispute from a higher level and a much wider perspective by sketching a picture of the current situation in international politics where no dominant paradigm exists, unlike the Cold War period in which the behaviors of the actors on the world stage (states as well as non-states) at the regional and global level were constrained.

Turkey's Attempts to Establish an Air Defense System

It goes without saying that Turkey's geographical location in the vicinity of volatile regions and in a rather hostile environment requires the deployment of air defense systems all over the country against the threat posed by the missile and air force capabilities in the hands of a number of countries in its strategic environment. (1)

Turkey's existing air defense systems, consisting of Stingers, Rapiers and Hawks, not only have limited ranges (i.e., short and medium), but also limited lifespans, and they are aging fast. Turkey's Nike Hercules missiles, which were deployed around the city of Istanbul during the Cold War years, have relatively longer ranges of about 140 km, but they cannot be relied upon anymore, and many have been sent to retirement already.

Thus, Turkey's airspace is not being protected by proper land-based air defense systems, nor is the vast territory of 783,562 [km.sup.2] beneath it, where 84 million Turks live. In lieu of an effective land-based system, Turkey's airspace is patrolled by Turkish Air Force units consisting of F-16 fighter aircraft, which carry air-to-air missiles, as well as refueling (Aerial Tanker) aircraft and an early warning system (i.e., AWACS), with a view to achieving active protection against potential missile attacks and violations of Turkish airspace by enemy aircraft. A certain proportion of these patrolling missions are carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which have recently entered the Turkish Air Force inventory. (2) Nevertheless, UAVs are far less effective than a landbased system. Turkey is, therefore, in dire need of deploying a proper air defense structure that would provide consistent coverage all over the country in order to meet the fundamental requirements of being a sovereign state such as protecting its population and its territorial integrity in a rather hostile environment. (3)

Hence, erecting an elaborate air defense capability has long been a priority for Turkish politicians, diplomats and the military, and it has always been on the agenda of Turkish-American relations, especially since the temporary deployment of the U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense systems, namely 'Patriots,' during the first Iraq war in 1991.

Since then, Turkish authorities have been more than willing to procure this equipment at a fair value and deploy it permanently in Turkey, particularly in regions neighboring the Middle East. Despite extended negotiations, however, no consensus could be found in order to go ahead with a joint project. Turkey's desire back in the late 1990s was to have a share in the development of the ballistic missile defense technology, which was not very welcome by the United States.

A similar situation was experienced in the triangular relations among Turkey, the United States and Israel with respect to cooperation on the development and eventual deployment of the Arrow-II air defense system. While the Americans put the blame on the Israelis as being the ones who did not want to share this new and sensitive technology with Turkey, Israelis pronounced almost exactly the same views about the attitude of their American counterparts. All in all, the project was shelved, at least from Turkey's perspective, and has actually never come to fruition to date, due to the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations in the late 2000s. (4)

Nonetheless, Turkey's quest to develop an elaborate air defense capacity continued during the second half of the 2000s, as Ankara widened the scope of potential suppliers to include new countries such as China, Russia and the NATO allies, namely France and Italy. Turkey issued a call in 2009 for the procurement of a 'Long-range Air and Missile Defense System,' dubbed T-LORAMIDS, and collected offers in 2010. (5)

The lack of an effective air defense system in Turkey was felt even more keenly when Syria plunged into civil war in March 2011; this eventually led, among other things, to a reversal of the then gradually improving bilateral relations between Ankara and Damascus. (6) This incident revived the need for taking swift measures to deploy a permanent air defense structure in the country visa-vis the growing threat perceived from the ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in the arsenals of its neighboring states.

Based on the lessons learned from earlier attempts in the 1990s and 2000s, the prevailing view among Turkish authorities was, this time, to acquire an elaborate air defense capability on condition that:

* The system would provide an effective air defense shelter for Turkey against the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as military aircraft;

* The first set of batteries could be deployed and become operational within a short span of time after the signing of the purchase agreement;

* The supplier firm would agree to share the technology with Turkey to allow co-production of the system, including its advanced versions in the near future;

* The price would be affordable.

The U.S. firms Raytheon and Lockheed Martin responded to the call with Patriots, while the Chinese firm China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) made its offer with the FD-2000 (the export version of HQ-9), and the Russian firm Rosoboroneksport offered the S-300. Later, the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam offered the SAMP/T...