Assessing Turkey's foreign policy choices towards the European Union.

• Author: Muftuler-Bac, Meltem
• Position: ARTICLE - Essay

ABSTRACT Turkey adopted a new strategy for its European Union accession process in 2014, in an attempt to revitalize its relations with the EU. Turkish foreign policy towards the European Union has remained consistent with full membership as its main goal. However, since 2013, there have been significant challenges for the realization of that foreign policy objective, with the altering geopolitical environment and the changing preferences in the European Union. Turkey's own foreign policy choices towards the EU were impacted by the loss of both EU's credibility in its enlargement policy and its attractiveness as an economic magnet. This paper analyzes the role of the EU specific external factors on Turkish foreign policy, and assesses the reformulation of Turkey's relations with the European Union after 2014. The main conclusion of the paper is that Turkey's foreign policy towards the EU has altered and a new pattern of cooperation is emerging between these two players.

Introduction

When Turkey adopted a new strategy for its relations with the European Union in 2014 in order to revitalize the accession process as well as open new avenues of integration, this constituted a critical step in marking the priorities in Turkey's foreign policy. While Turkey's accession to the EU still seemed far off, the new strategy, nonetheless, signaled a renewed commitment to the EU. The changing geopolitical conditions since 2013--increasing uncertainty in the Middle East, a more proactive Russian presence on the European soil, and instability around the Turkish borders--necessitate the continuation and strengthening of Turkey's institutional ties to the part of the world that still resonates some stability. Yet, since 2014, the EU faces unexpected consequences of external crisis and internal challenges. (1) First, the EU confronted a militarily aggressive Russia over Crimea in 2013, second the Syrian crisis and the unprecedented flow of refugees into the European lands paralyzed the EU leaders, and finally when the British voted to leave the EU in 2016, it led to an existentialist struggle for the integration project.

The enhanced uncertainty over the EU as a project of peace and stability seems to indicate that even if and when Turkey aims to solidify its relations with the EU, it depends on the European willingness to do so. (2) As a result, this paper aims to illustrate the multiple layers of complexities in Turkey's foreign policy choices towards the European Union by focusing on how changing external conditions shaped and constrained these choices.

Turkey has always had a highly turbulent relationship with the European Union, dating back to its Association Agreement, the Ankara Treaty, signed in 1963. (3) Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU, which began in 2005, were stalled in 2013, partly because of the EU member states' diverging material interests. (4) As of 2017, the Turkish chances of acceding to the EU remain slim. While the Cold War years more-or-less determined Turkey's role in Europe and its relations with the European countries in line with the balance of power system at the time, the end of the Cold War and the structural transformation underway since then challenged the pillars of that order. (5) The European Union also went through significant changes in the last 15 years, both in terms of institutional reforms and widening the Union to encompass most of the European geographical landmass. (6) The inclusion of the Central and Eastern European countries into the EU in 2004-2007, (7) the changing geopolitical landscape and internal developments within the EU influenced Turkish foreign policy towards the EU.

This paper looks at these changing dynamics of the Turkish-EU relations and proposes that while the EU remained an important actor in Turkish foreign policy, the EU driven dynamics impacted Turkey's foreign policy choices. The EU's credibility as a negotiating partner coupled with new security risks posed by instability in the Middle East, in particular the Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis, led to significant changes in Turkey's relations with the EU. Along with its 2014 new EU strategy, Turkey found itself engaging with the EU beyond the key instruments of EU accession negotiations. For example, on November 29, 2015, an EU-Turkey summit was held in Brussels where both parties emphasized the critical importance of their relationship, most importantly giving Turkey the role to control and patrol the EU borders. What is more, the bilateral summits between Turkey and the EU, and the newly adopted tools of High Level Dialogues- Political, Economic and Energy- indicate a transformation in the Turkish foreign policy towards the EU and the EU's stance towards Turkey going beyond the traditional forms of accession negotiations.

The paper first provides a background for the Turkish foreign policy towards the EU, second, it analyzes the EU's enlargement policy and its credibility, and finally, it proceeds onto an analysis of Turkey's relations with the EU as evaluated within the EU's enlargement policy. The key premise of the paper is that Turkish foreign policy towards the EU is shaped by the EU's own stance in its external relations and its credibility as a negotiating partner. (8) While there were also significant domestic level determinants of Turkish foreign policy leading to this change, specifically in terms of political preparedness, (9) the paper does not focus on these determinants due to lack of space. It highlights the major factors in shaping Turkey's foreign policy towards the EU as the EU driven dynamics, its credibility towards Turkey as a negotiating partner and its ability to act as a magnet. By isolating the EU's credibility as an anchor for Turkish foreign policy, the paper aims to contribute to the literature on Turkish foreign policy as well as on EU's enlargement process.

Turkey and the European Union

Turkey's relations with the European Union have always been characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and ambivalence. However, in the last few years, the two parties have increasingly moved in different, diverging directions. Turkey, despite its candidacy status and accession negotiations, never fully adopted the EU's accession criteria while the EU never seemed to fully embrace the idea of Turkey's accession. Yet, Turkish foreign policy remained committed at least in rhetoric to the EU accession goal. This is reflected by Ahmet Davutoglu, then in his capacity as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2011 as "Turkey will accede to the European Union as a full member by 2023." (10) This objective seems to be far out of reach in 2017. When Turkey first applied to the then European Economic Community in 1959, its application was motivated by its position in the Western Alliance as shaped by the Cold War dynamics, as well as the Greek application to the EEC that preceded the Turkish application. The Cold War years determined the Turkish allegiance into the Western order demarcated by the ideological differences. Turkey's membership in the key European/Western institutions--the Council of Europe (1949), the OECD (1948) and NATO (1952)--added up in building strong ties between Turkey and the West European countries. At that time, there were no major doubts that Turkey was an integral part of the European order. When the 1963 Ankara Treaty stated that Turkey is part of Europe, and once it is ready to assume its obligations arising from membership, it would accede to then European Economic Community; it established the legal basis for Turkey's eligibility for EU accession. It is for this reason that the 1963 Ankara Treaty set the path dependent process for Turkey's association with the EU. Without the Ankara Treaty's ultimate goal that Turkey is destined to join the EU, which was reiterated in the 1999 Helsinki summit that elevated Turkey's position to a candidate country, the Turkish-EU relations would be at a different platform right now. However, despite the legal basis for Turkey's eligibility, there are, of course, no guarantees that Turkey would become a member of the EU. (11)

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The Turkish fit into Europe was never easy. There were serious reservations from the EU members about the position it occupied in the European order, and these reservations became more pronounced over time. (12) When Turkey was finally included into the EU's enlargement policy in 1999 as a candidate for accession with the Helsinki summit, this opened a new chapter in Turkish foreign policy towards the EU. The opening of accession negotiations in 2005 strengthened the ties further. (13) The EU's 2005 Negotiations Framework for Turkey stressed that even if negotiations do not end with accession, Turkey should be bound with the strongest ties to the European order. This clause signaled that an alternative outcome for Turkey might be possible compared to the other candidates/acceding states, which did not have a similar a clause in their Negotiations Framework, even at the onset of the negotiations process. In hindsight, had the EU treated Turkey with the same objective standards it had evaluated the candidates from the Central and Eastern Europe in 2005, Turkey-EU relations would have taken a different turn. These signals coming from the EU influenced Turkey's foreign policy choices. It is possible to see different periods in Turkish foreign policy priorities towards the EU in response to the signals and stimuli coming from the EU and its member states. For example, in the 1999-2006/7 period, the EU's commitment to Turkey seemed high with the candidacy, opening of Community programs to Turkey, as well as the opening of accession negotiations, despite the above-mentioned clause. As a result, Turkey was eagerly adopting the harmonization packages in order to meet the EU requirements. In the 2007-2013 period, as the prospect of EU accession became dimmer, a general slowing...