Anatomy of the Libyan crisis.

• Author: Kekilli, Emrah
• Position: ARTICLE

ABSTRACT In Libya high hopes for change, experienced in 2012 and 2013 after Muammar Qaddafi was overthrown in 2011 by a civil rebellion following a 42-year rule, were lost in the civil war which broke out as a result of a coup attempt in 2014 by Khalifa Haftar. This article aims to investigate the Libyan crisis by taking into consideration the actors involved in the crisis, the causes, bottlenecks and the positions of regional and international actors. The article argues that the Libyan crisis, in a sense, was shaped under the deep impact of the competition experienced among the regional actors in the Arab World following the Arab Spring and suggests that the support for Khalifa Haftar especially provided by some of the countries in the region deepened the Libyan crisis and prevented the Presidential Council established under the leadership of UN Libya Mission from guiding the political transition process in Libya.

Introduction

Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader deposed in 2011, monopolized the politics, society, economy, culture and even the forms of socialization in Libya during his 42-year rule but the "February Revolution" changed the equilibrium. While Muammar Qaddafi did not allow opposition, he also prevented the middle classes from gaining strength. A small part of the Libyan public opposed Qaddafi and some of them were arrested and jailed or executed whereas others fled abroad to continue their opposition. Large masses of the public that socialized via tribal organizations chose to stay quiet assuming a dormant but stable attitude. The unrest experienced for long years by the Libyan public against Qaddafi turned into a civil uprising with the help of the Arab revolutions that started in 2011. As is the nature of all revolutions, the whole system established during the Qaddafi period collapsed as a result of the civil uprising known as the "February Revolution" by the Libyans; many Libyan elites fled the country and those that stayed behind went underground. The individuals who led the opposition against the Qaddafi regime at home and abroad, the tribes that had to take a backseat during the Qaddafi regime, the leaders of some tribes who had to stay in the background during that period and the youth who demanded change became the new actors of Libya.

As a part of the Arab World, Libya was deeply affected by the developments in the region while the "February Revolution," a part of the 2011 Arab revolutions, was also deeply affected by the transitions in the region. The new Libyan actors developed regional alliances with the governments which had differing positions regarding the Arab revolutions and the political engagements necessitated by these alliances affected their political positions in Libya. All the parameters that were determinative in regional politics had an effect on Libyan politics whereas Libya's historical parameters also affected the developments following the "February Revolution." Therefore, many local, regional and international actors are determinant in the Libyan crisis which has a complex structure with many interwoven religious, tribal, military and economic parameters. Taking these characteristics of the Libyan crisis into consideration, this article addresses all the actors in the crisis separately and assesses their claims of legitimacy, goals, local and regional allies and international supporters. Overall, the Libyan crisis is examined in the article by addressing the developments in Libyan domestic policy in the framework of regional transformations experienced following the Arab revolutions.

Political and Military Balance in the Western Region

Presidential Council

The Presidential Council (PC) established in the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) (1) signed in December 2015 is accepted by international actors as the legitimate authority of Libya. The LPA was signed in Skhirat, Morocco as a result of national agreement negotiations initiated by the UN for Libya, which drifted into a civil war with the coup attempt in 2014 by the retired General Khalifa Haftar. The PC is composed of nine members, the president, five deputy presidents and three ministers, and undertakes its executive functions with the authority obtained from the UN since it has not been approved by the LPA House of Representatives (HR). The PC was not able to enter Tripoli for a long time due to opposition and did not reach the naval base in Abu Sitta, Tripoli until March 30, 2016. The PC established its authority by creating a chain of alliances in Tripoli, but, as will be described below, it is facing serious opposition although it has obtained the support of many actors.

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The PC, which does not intend to become aligned to any of the actors in the Libyan crisis, aims to manage the transition process in Libya by receiving the support of all the actors. The PC, which entered into Tripoli as a result of a consensus, wants to achieve the same result in the East of the country. Therefore, it desires to negotiate with the retired General Khalifa Haftar and aims to mastermind the transition process in the whole country by gaining the support of the actors in the Eastern region. Hence, it has avoided any strong reactions to Khalifa Haftar's violations of its own authority. This attitude has resulted in criticisms from both the supporters of and opposition to the PC in the Western region. The PC is facing substantial challenges and there are critical uncertainties regarding its position and future in Libya. The fact that it was not approved by the HR means that the actors in the Eastern region, especially Khalifa Haftar, do not accept it as a legitimate authority. Moreover, the actors in the Western region that reject the LPA do not accept the PC's legitimacy either. Although the LPA is regarded as having executive power with the authority bestowed upon it by the UN, the political framework in which the PC can gain legitimacy has not been activated since the LPA has not been carried into effect. In addition to this there is an independent military administration in the Eastern region, controlled by Khalifa Haftar, which is completely outside the authority of the PC. (2)

Therefore, the PC's legitimacy and executive power on Libyan soil faces serious challenges. Additionally, the PC has failed to make any substantial steps, since taking up this position, to solve problems such as: Libyan dinar losing its value against the dollar six times, serious drops in the purchasing power of the public, increasing value of imported goods, power outages that hinder everyday life, safety and security problems and political assassinations. (3) When all these are considered together, the future of the PC becomes questionable in a political framework in which the LPA is not carried into effect.

The General National Congress and National Salvation Government

The General National Congress (GNC), which took office after the July 2012 elections, was supposed to be transformed into the High Council of State (HCS) according to the LPA; however, a group of parliamentarians refused it and the GNC continued its activities under the same name. The main motivation for GNC members who promote the use of the same name is based on their refusal of the LPA. This group, led by GNC President Nouri Abusahmain and the National Salvation Government (NSG) it appointed--which was led by Khalifa al-Ghawil--consider the HR as illegitimate claiming that the elections held in June 2014 were invalid. (4) Since the GNC refuses the LPA as well, it regards itself as the sole legitimate authority in Libya.

The GNC, which is the political front of the religious, political and social groups and their armed extensions that oppose the LPA and the PC, argues for the LPA to be renegotiated and their "revolutionary" demands to be represented more strongly. The GNC believes that the LPA has allocated all legislative power to the HR, all executive power to the PC and that the HCS is only a council and therefore it is not fair to the actors in the Western region. At this point, the GNC maintains that a text of agreement should be generated in which the demands of the Western region actors are more strongly represented. Some of the religious leaders, most notably Libyan Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariani and some of the revolutionary commanders, are in the same alliance with the GNC. The congress uses the HR's tolerant conduct towards Haftar as a propaganda tool and claims that the HR President al-Sarraj prefers Haftar to the revolutionaries. (5)

Since the GNC and the coalition around it do not have regional or international support, they are day by day evolving into a marginal opposition group. Both the GNC and the NSG, which were quite powerful in March 2016 before the HR entered Tripoli, weakened when the HR gained strength in Tripoli and the Western region. The fact that the HR gained acceptance in the international arena familiarized the actors in the Western region with it. As such the GNC and NSG started to become isolated and attempts to use military power against the HR were unsuccessful. With no support from regional and international actors, the GNC and NSG started to transform into marginal opponent groups whose sphere of influence shrank and whose ideology sounded empty.

The High Council of State

The High Council of State (HCS) was established in February 2016 by GNC members who accepted the LPA and supported the PC. When the discussions about the acceptance of the LPA inside the GNC became stronger, its members made a political move and founded the HCS thinking that refusing the LPA could be used to marginalize the Western region. The fact that the HCS was established, although the LPA was not carried into effect, can be qualified as a move by the actors in the Western region who desired to gain international legitimacy. The actors who did not have regional or international support, wanted to obtain international...